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Africa enters 2026 beset by a host of challenges: entrenched autocrats face Gen Z protests, debt pressures threaten major economies, jihadist violence is spreading. Western military retreat and heightened great power competition complicate matters but may also offer opportunities for increased African agency. Against this backdrop, we present a selection of “Ten Things to Watch in Africa” in 2026.
Politics and security: Aging autocrats likely prevail in controlled elections across several countries, yet face mounting pressure from youth protests and coup risks reflecting legitimacy crises. Jihadist insurgencies expand beyond the Sahel while secessionist conflicts persist. Inequality, governance failures, and climate stress ensure heightened instability throughout 2026.
Economy: Debt crises peak as African economies confront refinancing cliffs amid fiscal constraints and currency pressures. The G20 Common Framework faces critical tests with ongoing restructuring. Several African states focus on mineral beneficiation via export bans and prioritise AI adoption and innovation, though infrastructure gaps and regulatory incoherence threaten both industrial and digital transformation.
Geopolitical repositioning: French withdrawal creates sovereignty opportunities African states increasingly exploit. Yet transactional US policies and hostile behaviour towards heavyweights Nigeria and South Africa create considerable risks, threatening established partnerships and regional stability. African states balance Chinese, Russian, and Gulf partnerships against diminishing Western ties.
Electoral management, inclusive governance, and conflict prevention are key to stability in Africa. Several governments, the IMF, the G20, and other creditors must resolve rising debt distress. Africa needs unified positions on AI governance and UN reform. Europe must adapt to French retreat and US unpredictability or lose relevance as alternative partners expand in presence across the continent.
The year 2026 will feature several decisive elections across sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 1). The trend of electoral victories for long-standing incumbents, observed in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo in 2025, is expected to continue. In Uganda, 81-year-old President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, is seeking his seventh term following constitutional changes that removed presidential term and age limits. Similarly, the Republic of Congo’s President Denis Sassou Nguesso and Djibouti’s President Ismaïl Guelleh – both octogenarians who secured constitutional amendments lifting age limits – will contest elections. Each country will hold polls in tightly controlled political environments, with media reports from Uganda already documenting assaults on opposition candidate Robert Kyagulanyi (Bobi Wine) and his supporters by the security forces. Further arrests and trumped-up charges against opposition figures are likely to feature prominently in the run-up to the polls.
These tensions are expected to also characterise other upcoming elections, particularly South Sudan’s five-times postponed presidential contest. Elections in the world’s youngest country are now scheduled for December 2026. Despite ill health, President Salva Kiir, who has been in office since independence in 2011, has indicated his intention to run again. It is doubtful whether these elections can meaningfully enhance political accountability with increased polarisation and renewed armed clashes looming on the horizon. A similar tense climate will likely engulf the elections in Benin, where disgruntled military personnel attempted to overthrow President Patrice Talon in December 2025. Heavy-handed responses risk further fraying civil–military relations and destabilising the country ahead of the polls.
By contrast, the forthcoming elections in Cape Verde and Zambia are expected to take place in comparatively stable political environments, offering prospects for democratic consolidation. Cape Verde’s polls are likely to reinforce its long-standing record of peaceful, competitive elections, while Zambians heading to the ballot box, though expected to be orderly, will test the credibility of the electoral process amid concerns that constitutional reforms may benefit incumbent President Hakainde Hichilema.
The global wave of protest by a frustrated Gen Z is set to continue in 2026, with Africa’s growing “youth bulge” making it a hot spot hereof. In Kenya, for instance, protests organised via social media over inequality, increased taxation, and lack of government accountability are likely to intensify in the year ahead, especially if economic pressures persist and the state continues to respond with repression rather than reform. As Kenyan elections approach in 2027, the William Ruto government – which insists that such dissent is a threat to stability – may amplify its tactics of repression, such as firing tear gas and live ammunition at demonstrators and arresting those who are vocal online. Claims of damage to undersea cables that affected services such as Signal, Telegram, and X may resurface, potentially leading to free speech-related constitutional challenges (Amnesty International 2025). Yet, Gen Z protesters without a visible leader will continue to face pressure to crystallise their demands or risk being seen as purely a force of disruption rather than change.
Such a lack of policy clarity is already being faced further southeast in Madagascar, where social media-facilitated Gen Z demonstrations already toppled former president Andry Rajoelina. The new military-appointed prime minister, still a member of the old guard, will face difficulty including decentralised Gen Z voices in policy development for fear of demonstrations beginning anew. Various other countries face similar tensions: Tanzania, following the election-day killing of protesters at the end of October 2025; Uganda, with the 2026 elections challenging Museveni’s almost 40-year rule; Togo, where artists and bloggers part of the 6 June Movement (M66) have been arrested. Despite contextual differences, such demonstrations are united by their use of social media, the generational inequality driving them, and the common use of the “Jolly Roger” pirate flag popularised by the anime television series One Piece.
With jihadism continuing to plague many countries in the wider Sahel, the region is stepping into a highly uncertain future. The coups in Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Burkina Faso (January and September 2022), and Niger (July 2023) were driven largely by civilian and military frustration over the insufficient handling of jihadist threats. The coups have already fundamentally altered regional dynamics: all three countries withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and created the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) in 2024. Yet, Mali’s military junta is under severe pressure: Jihadists blocked fuel trucks from entering the country in 2025 (Doumbia and Tangara 2025), while related attacks on government forces throughout that year laid bare how the new incumbents have been unable to improve the security situation in their respective countries. There is little reason to expect these dynamics to reverse in 2026 amid persistent jihadist violence, limited state capacity, and regional isolation.
As the coup governments struggle to make decisive inroads against the jihadists, they are also likely to further hollow out political and civic space. In Mali and Burkina Faso, political parties’ activities will remain suspended; elections in all three countries have been postponed meanwhile. Moreover, activists and journalists will continue to face intimidation and arbitrary arrest. Nonetheless, the junta governments seem to still enjoy high degrees of popular support. Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré propagates a sovereigntist and Pan-Africanist message that still resonates both among the country’s citizenry and beyond. The great majority of Malians are either “satisfied” or “completely satisfied” with General Assimi Goïta’s performance according to the most recent Afrobarometer survey (Adou 2025). At present, the Sahelian coup governments remain in place despite their failure to improve the security situation. The EU is therefore well advised to continue its policy of re-engagement in 2026, while remaining mindful of the limits of a military response to the crisis, which has already proven insufficient in the past.
Africa enters 2026 with multifaceted risks of violent conflict remaining alarmingly high and on the increase. Compared to a decade ago, the number of both armed conflicts and of states affected by them has noticeably risen; more secessionist/territorial, governmental, and jihadist insurgencies are occurring nowadays as well (see Figure 2). Jihadist insurgencies continue to expand especially in West Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central Africa’s Great Lakes region, and northern Mozambique. Whether US airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria will have a lasting effect is uncertain. Jihadism partially overlaps with secessionist conflict, which constitutes an independent risk: separatist mobilisation in southwest Nigeria could intensify, Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis remains unresolved, and Ethiopia’s political settlement as regards the Tigray region remains fragile. Interstate tensions are also looming. Ethiopia–Eritrea relations remain volatile and Rwanda’s continued involvement in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo will continue to threaten wider regional escalation despite ongoing mediation efforts and a peace accord brokered by the US and Qatar.
Non-state violence – in addition to government crackdowns in some countries – further complicates the picture. Farmer–herder clashes – exacerbated by climate pressures – continue across Nigeria and neighbouring states. In countries such as Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Eritrea, in particular, struggles over the succession of aging leaders represent considerable conflict risks in 2026. Moreover, military coups have become a recurring feature in the region with a clear upwards trend compared to decreasing numbers thereof in previous decades (see Figure 2). Recent years show a pattern whereby armed takeovers emerge mainly from elite power struggles, jihadist insurgencies, and related public discontent.
Underlying structural drivers of all forms of conflict will persist. Poverty, inequality between identity groups, governance deficits, and climate stress remain key sources of grievance fuelling conflicts, protests, and coups. External rivalries may further escalate said conflicts, as in Sudan. As these drivers are unlikely to disappear overnight, efforts to promote peace and security must prioritise prevention, inclusive governance, and strategies that address the root causes of conflict rather than merely treating the symptoms.
Many countries in the region enter 2026 with persistently high risks of debt distress driven by high debt-service burdens, foreign-exchange shortages, weak revenue capacity, and a fragmented creditor landscape. The challenge lies less in high debt stocks per se, rather in their composition: costly Eurobonds (debt in foreign currency) are reaching maturity in 2025–2030 amid an increasing reliance on domestic borrowing at very high rates (Manger et al. 2025). Distress intensifies when these conditions meet (politically) constrained fiscal space and/or macroeconomic shocks. In 2026, several large economies (Angola, Kenya, Nigeria) will hit domestic or external refinancing inflection points. Further, three major restructuring cases (Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia) will require consolidation or completion, providing an important test of the G20 Common Framework – the only multilateral mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring.
Several countries will face critical debt challenges in the year ahead, though with varying degrees of urgency. Senegal emerges as the most likely candidate for acute distress, confronting a dangerous combination of rising borrowing rates, hidden liabilities, and a frozen IMF programme during its political transition. Kenya and Nigeria, two of the region’s largest economies, face distinct but equally pressing issues: the East African country must navigate severe foreign-exchange constraints while rolling over expensive domestic debt amid public resistance to revenue measures, its West African counterpart needs to simultaneously stabilise the naira and address structural revenue weaknesses through difficult fiscal reforms.
Resource-dependent economies face commodity-linked vulnerabilities. Angola’s steep repayment obligations in 2026 coincide with declining oil output, making its negotiations with Chinese creditors particularly critical for avoiding default. Mozambique occupies a precarious middle ground: while not facing immediate maturity pressures, its large contingent liabilities from state enterprises create medium-term risks that could rapidly escalate if global conditions deteriorate or gas revenues disappoint. Ongoing restructuring cases – Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia – face distinct challenges: post-election fiscal discipline, foreign-exchange scarcity, and creditor alignment respectively.
Overall, the year ahead is set to sharpen debt stress, as marked by difficulties of refinancing, slow restructurings, and limited policy space – unless meaningful revenue gains, growth improvements, and better creditor coordination emerge.
Amid the intensifying geopolitical competition for critical raw materials (CRMs), African governments are seeking to leverage this demand in 2026 to promote domestic value addition, moving beyond ore extraction towards intermediate and processed products. A key policy instrument will remain the use of export bans on raw or minimally processed minerals to incentivise domestic processing.
Zimbabwe has tightened its lithium export regime. Lithium ore exports have been banned since 2022, and 2026 marks the final year for the export of lithium concentrates. From the start of this year onwards, concentrates are expected to be processed domestically at the Huayou facility into lithium sulphate, an input for lithium carbonate and hydroxide. Malawi is a more nascent case. In October 2025, it banned exports of all unprocessed CRMs to increase domestic value added. Its CRM portfolio includes uranium, rare earth elements, and graphite, with several ongoing mining projects.
Guinea, the world’s second-largest bauxite producer, has adopted a different approach. Mining licences have been conditioned on a commitment being made to build domestic aluminium-processing facilities. This was underscored through recent licence revocations, notably the transfer of a bauxite reserve held by EGA to the state-owned Nimba Mining to accelerate refinery construction. The impact of this new strategy on future bauxite exports is unclear.
Proponents of export bans regarding CRMs often cite Indonesia’s experience with nickel and bauxite. The country’s initial ban introduced in 2014 was accompanied by expanded smelting capacity. Evidence shows employment growth in nickel districts, driven by manufacturing jobs (Bosker et al. 2025). However, Indonesia benefitted from structural advantages, including control of over 40 per cent of global nickel reserves and an established industrial infrastructure. African governments face tighter constraints related to infrastructure and skill acquisition, which makes the success of an export-ban strategy aimed at increasing local value addition far from guaranteed.
AI will become a more visible political and economic issue across Africa in 2026, as governments and private sector actors alike transition from experimentation to consolidation and implementation. The year marks the deadline for Phase I of the AU’s Continental AI Strategy (2025–2026), which will be a litmus test for its ability to harmonise increasingly disparate national policies. While early adopters such as Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda have already launched national AI strategies, many other countries of the continent are still in the early stages of development. A central governance question will be whether emerging frameworks on data protection, public-sector AI use, and algorithmic accountability strengthen state capacity and service delivery, or instead entrench surveillance and exclusion.
At the same time, Africa is set to become an increasingly contested arena for global technology powers. China, the US, the EU, and Gulf countries are expanding their investment in digital infrastructure, cloud services, and AI-related training programmes in the region (Tafese 2025). Competition over standards, data localisation, and “trusted AI” partnerships will intensify in 2026, particularly in economically and geopolitically significant countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. How African governments balance external partnerships with strategic autonomy will determine their long-term technological (in)dependence.
Another issue to watch is the trajectory of local AI innovation. African startups are increasingly developing AI solutions tailored to local needs in areas such as agriculture, retail, fintech, education, and health. Following the “DeepSeek moment” in early 2025, when open-weight models – which allow for local adaptation without dependence on proprietary platforms – gained global attention, the year ahead will reveal whether locally trained models are able to gain traction in Africa, particularly in digitally advanced countries with well-developed startup ecosystems such as the four just mentioned (Lay and Tafese 2025). Whether these lower-cost alternatives can scale local ecosystems – amid constraints in computing power (e.g. high-performance chips), data, and funding – will be critical in determining whether AI exacerbates existing inequalities or supports more inclusive development in the region.
Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to face an increasingly fractured global order and a hostile as well as unpredictable Donald Trump administration in 2026 (see below), while trying to assert its growing demographic and political weight. With Somalia (2025–2026) joined by the newly elected DRC and Liberia (2026–2027) as non-permanent UN Security Council members, the “A3” African states will attempt to leverage these positions to shape international responses to mounting crises. Both the DRC and Liberia will bring crucial perspectives on conflict management and peacekeeping reform to the table.
Despite being home to some 1.4 billion people, the quest for permanent UNSC representation for Africa will likely remain in limbo. The Ezulwini Consensus, demanding two permanent seats with veto power plus five non-permanent seats, will continue to face resistance from the Security Council’s five permanent members (P5). While the September 2024 UN Pact for the Future acknowledged Africa’s under-representation, concrete reform will prove elusive through 2026. This institutional gridlock will perpetuate broader challenges in unreformed multilateral institutions.
Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa will function as constrained middle powers – Nigeria hobbled by security challenges, Ethiopia managing post-conflict recovery and potentially escalating tensions around its 2026 elections, and South Africa navigating constraints on economic growth. Yet, Nigeria’s potential accession as a BRICS member could strengthen its international position. It remains unclear whether African states will succeed in intensifying AU coordination sufficiently to leverage their collective demographic weight – projected to approach 2.5 billion by 2050 – into greater influence on the international stage.
The proliferation of external middle powers – most notably Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates – competing alongside traditional and emerging powers – China, the US, and the European countries – will offer African states increased room for manoeuvre in 2026. France completed its military withdrawal from Chad, Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire by mid-2025, retaining only facilities in Gabon and Djibouti – where multiple nations maintain military bases. These rapid exits, combined with the US withdrawal from the Sahel, have transformed Africa’s security landscape. More African states may assert similar sovereignty demands in 2026, though the continued presence of Russian mercenaries across the region reveals the complexities of replacing Western partnerships with alternative arrangements.
Under the second Trump administration, US–Africa relations are characterised by the taking of a strictly transactional perspective. National vulnerabilities to Washington’s demands now fluctuate based on three factors: aid reliance, endowment with CRM assets, and degree of alignment with US security shifts.
In the health sector, aid-dependent states like Malawi and Zimbabwe will face existential risks. Because the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) remains the primary vehicle for sustaining African countries’ HIV response, any further withdrawal of funding to it will create deficits that domestic budgets are simply unable to absorb. Even sturdier systems, such as Kenya’s, already face disruptions. Consequently, a resurgence of preventable diseases is likely in 2026. In response, African governments are aggressively mitigating this exposure. Botswana and Côte d’Ivoire are pioneering domestic financing to insulate HIV programmes from US policy volatility, while others are courting the EU, multilateral institutions, and Gulf partners.
US resource diplomacy will continue to centre on the Lobito Corridor, which integrates Angola and the DRC into Western supply chains. While this provides essential infrastructure, it imposes strict strategic conditionality and mandates anti-China alignment. Simultaneously, coastal West African states like Ghana are deepening security ties to contain Sahelian extremism yet will find themselves increasingly drawn into US-led efforts to counter Russian influence in the region. This follows a period of significant friction with Nigeria, where the lingering threat of unilateral US military intervention continues to strain regional cooperation. It remains to be seen whether the US will resume strikes in northern Nigeria in 2026, which the air force started at the end of 2025.
By diversifying their security and economic portfolios – including engaging with China and Europe to avoid over-reliance on the US as a single guarantor – African states are attempting to reclaim agency (Basedau 2025). By 2026, the most exposed nations will need to navigate a volatile landscape. Abrupt changes in US policy may necessitate the swift reconfiguration of their fiscal spaces and national security strategies accordingly.
African teams have long been among the World Cup’s most reliable producers of surprise. We’ve seen Cameroon’s Indomitable Lions roar into the quarter-finals in 1990, Senegal stun the world (and France) in 2002, Ghana come within a Luis Suárez handball of the semi-finals in 2010, and Morocco finally shatter the glass ceiling in 2022. With an expanded tournament and a record number of nine guaranteed places for African teams, the stage is once more set for unexpected runs deep into the tournament. North Africa dominates among the African contingent, with four of its teams having qualified in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Morocco will be looking to prove that its 2022 run was no one-off, while Mo Salah’s Egypt are desperate to finally leave their mark.
One of the standout stories is that of Cape Verde, who have qualified for their first-ever World Cup following an impressive campaign. The island nation of around 500,000 people is one of the smallest countries to ever reach the tournament – second only to Curaçao, Germany’s first opponent when proceedings kick off. Cape Verde qualifying ahead of Cameroon, Africa’s most frequent World Cup participant with eight previous appearances, underlines how competitive African football has become and that reputation alone no longer guarantees success.
This is where the fun meets sober reality. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal arrive as two of West Africa’s football heavyweights, but their biggest opponent might be US immigration. The “partial travel ban” imposed on both countries by the host nation means that thousands of vibrant, drum-beating West African fans might be stuck at home watching on television when the time comes. If the West Africans have travel headaches, South Africa has a diplomatic migraine. With political barbs being traded over G20 exclusions and foreign policy, relations between Pretoria and Washington are, to put it mildly, frosty. This highlights once again how global sporting events intersect with wider geopolitical currents.
Ghana, meanwhile, arrive with unfinished business: sixteen years after being infamously denied a place in the semi-finals, the Black Stars will once again test the enduring belief that Africa’s breakthrough moment at the World Cup is still to come.
This GIGA Focus departs from the series’ usual format and is the result of the collaborative effort of a number of GIGA Institute for African Affairs staff. Martin Acheampong and Julia Grauvogel authored the election-watch section. Andrew Crawford contributed the short outlook on Gen Z protests, while Grauvogel also wrote the section on the future of the Sahelian countries. Matthias Basedau authored the segment on violent conflicts. Jann Lay contributed the outlook on debt in Africa, Francisco Ahumada Lobos wrote the section on CRMs. Tevin Tafese compiled the outlook on AI in Africa and assessed the respective qualifying teams’ prospects for success in the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup. Thies Niemeier contributed the segment on the Africa policy of the current US administration, Christian von Soest authored the section on Africa’s role on the global stage. The text was edited by the latter and Tafese, working together with Basedau in his role as editor of the GIGA Focus Africa series.
