Ten Things to Watch in the Middle East and North Africa in 2026

Gulf investments merge geopolitical and economic considerations. International actors are crucial to reining in conflict in Gaza and Sudan. Lebanon and Syria struggle with territorial cohesion. The risk of renewed escalation between Israel, the US, and Iran is high. Negotiations over the Western Sahara will affect relations between Morocco and Algeria. Ten things to watch as we move into 2026.

• Politics: Domestic events will be momentous in the year ahead. The Recep Tayyip Erdoğan administration’s opening up to the Kurdish question is happening amid continued authoritarian drift. In Israel, elections will cast judgment on Benjamin Netanjahu’s legacy. Other polls will offer insight into the state of authoritarian governance in the region.

• International Relations: Morocco’s plan to grant the Western Sahara autonomous status is increasingly likely to succeed following a UN Security Council vote earlier this year, but it will be detrimental to the country’s relations with Algeria. The United Arab Emirates faces key questions about arms deliveries to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. Gulf investments combine commercial heft with geopolitical interests and speak to the transactional instincts of the current US president.

• Conflicts: After a fragile ceasefire took hold, Gaza faces a precarious future: an international security force, stalemate between the IDF and Hamas, ethnic cleansing. Renewed military escalation between Israel, the US, and Iran over the latter’s nuclear programme is possible. Lebanon and Syria are struggling to avoid fragmentation in post-conflict settings.

Policy Implications

Europe has become increasingly sidelined in the Middle East, also in economic and investment terms. Post-election dynamics will nonetheless offer avenues for engagement in a number of countries there. Germany will need to revisit its doctrine of “Staatsräson” if it wants to align itself more closely with European partners in this regard as well as to regain credibility as a mediator in the region.

Peace Without Democracy? Turkey’s Kurdish Opening Amid Authoritarian Consolidation

In 2025, Turkey’s authoritarian drift only accelerated. The arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s most formidable rival – on dubious charges, with prosecutors demanding a 2,000-year sentence, marked a new low. Yet the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) responded with unexpected resilience, organising mass rallies and expanding its base beyond traditional constituencies. Meanwhile the EU, despite its rhetorical commitment to democracy, deepened security cooperation with Ankara, prioritising arms deals and migration control over the safeguarding of democratic principles.

A parallel development unfolded in the Kurdish conflict. In May, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) declared its intention to disarm, following a call from its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan to do so. The government branded this the “Terror-Free Turkey” initiative, but has yet to offer meaningful political concessions. In November, the European Court of Human Rights issued a final ruling demanding the release of Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş, yet Ankara stalled. The peace process remains fragile, with Kurdish actors sceptical of the government’s sincerity.

In 2026, Erdoğan is expected to manoeuvre for a fourth presidential term, despite the constitutional limits on time in office. A new Constitution or early elections may be floated to reset term counts. The CHP will likely face greater legal harassment, even as it seeks to capitalise on growing public discontent. The Kurdish peace process may reach a critical juncture: Demirtaş’s release could signal progress, but Öcalan’s fate is unclear and the government’s intentions remain opaque. Economically, Turkey faces persistent inflation and stagnation, fuelling unrest. Yet Western governments, particularly under a second Donald Trump administration, are unlikely to challenge Ankara’s trajectory. As Erdoğan consolidates power and the EU looks away, 2026 may prove decisive – for Turkish democracy, the Kurdish question, and regional stability at large alike.

The Electoral Cycle: Contestation under Constraint

The 2026 regional electoral schedule is relatively light in terms of the number of contests occurring but politically charged all the same. In North Africa, Morocco and Algeria anchor the parliamentary calendar, while Libya’s tenuous transition adds a high-risk presidential race to the mix. Morocco’s general election, scheduled for September 2026, will come after a wave of “Gen-Z 212” protests driven by deteriorating services, high youth unemployment, and anger over heavy spending on infrastructure related to Yalla Vamos 2030. Political debate is already focused on electoral engineering (e.g. tightening candidate-vetting and adjusting rules on campaign finance and corruption) under a palace-led narrative of renewing trust and widening youth and women’s participation. Algeria’s June 2026 parliamentary elections will test whether expanded social spending and new energy investments can pre-empt a similar youth-driven challenge after the Hirak and growing warnings about a “next in line” Gen-Z protest wave. Libya is, meanwhile, the most fragile case at present: the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) and international partners are working towards concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections around mid-April 2026, but the timetable remains conditional on elite agreement over the legal framework and security guarantees.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon’s general election in May 2026 will be the first since the 14-month Israel–Hezbollah war and the election of General Joseph Aoun as president in January 2025. Voters face a compressed agenda such as Hezbollah’s arms, the durability of the reformist “Change MPs” elected in 2022, and whether a prospective International Monetary Fund-backed rescue package can finally move forwards. In Israel, the Knesset election due by 27 October 2026 will be the first national vote after the latest Gaza War and the judicial overhaul crisis, with campaigns likely to centre on accountability for the failures leading to 7 October, civil–military relations, and the balance of power between politicians and courts.

In the Gulf, Bahrain’s 2026 general election will unfold under political-isolation laws that bar former opposition members from running and take place in the shadow of a decade-long crackdown only partially eased by royal pardons in 2024. Iraq’s 2026 presidential election will be an indirect contest in which parliament votes for the head of state. The outcome will be shaped by the balance of forces emerging from the November 2025 legislative polls, held under a revised electoral law that raises effective thresholds and narrows the space for independents rooted in the Tishreen protest movement.

Finally, local elections in 2026 (particularly Iran’s May 2026 Islamic council elections under a new, more proportional voting model; Jordan’s next round of municipal and governorate polls; Oman’s 2026 municipal council elections; rolling municipal contests in Libya) will be quieter but revealing arenas of confrontation over matters of representation and control.

The FIFA Men’s World Cup taking place in summer 2026 will see an unprecedented number of participating countries from the MENA region (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, with Iraq and Turkey still also able to qualify should they win their respective play-offs in spring). Whether this will interact with electoral and protest dynamics in the region remains to be seen.

Table 1. MENA Elections in 2026

Source: Authors’ own compilation.

The Battle Over Israel’s Future in the 2026 Elections

Israel is set for elections by October 2026 at the latest, yet Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to push for an earlier vote – likely in June. Such timing would avoid the politically charged atmosphere surrounding the period of the 7 October anniversary commemorations as well as the Jewish holiday season, which could reduce voter turnout.

Polls show Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc regaining ground, with a plausible path to forming another governing coalition. His standing has improved after the confrontation with Iran and the return of hostages, but two obstacles remain: his corruption trial and the ultra-Orthodox demands to settle the conscription law, which stands at odds with the priorities of his voter base.

With an eye to the upcoming elections, the coalition has begun reshaping Israel’s institutional landscape. Proposed reform to the electoral threshold aims to secure the entry of smaller right-wing parties to the Knesset and to foment fragmentation among an opposition that has been relatively unified thus far. Additionally, personalised legislation aims to sideline Naftali Bennett who registered a new party in 2025 to reduce internal competition within Netanyahu’s political camp. The bill stipulates that leaders of new parties would have to repay the debts of ones they previously led before being able to use recently raised funds. As a prior leader of two other parties (Yamina and Jewish Home), the bill puts Bennett in a particular bind.

Simultaneously, a series of judicial reforms have been designed to shield Netanyahu from legal accountability. One legislative initiative would allow the Knesset to suspend legal proceedings against the prime minister at its discretion. Another would split the attorney general’s powers between three government-appointed posts, as a way to weaken independent legal oversight. These efforts also align with reported pressure on President Isaac Herzog by Trump to grant Netanyahu a pardon, which the latter has now formally requested himself. These measures seek to remove, all in all, the main barrier to his re-election, since a conviction would bar him from political life.

Controlling the public narrative has become equally critical. The proposed Media Regulation Law would expand governmental oversight of broadcasters in ways that affect their financing and undermine media independence. The refusal to establish a state commission of inquiry into the failure leading to 7 October, replaced instead by a government-steered committee, further illustrates attempts to control the wider discourse.

Polls indicate that around 70 per cent of Israelis see the upcoming elections as the most consequential since the state’s founding (Solomon 2025). Their outcome will determine whether Netanyahu’s long political reign is coming to an end or entering a new phase, with profound implications for Israel’s future.

Breaking the Deadlock or Tightening the Screw: The Western Sahara and Algerian–Moroccan Relations

On 31 October 2025, the UN Security Council adopted US-backed Resolution 2797 renewing the mandate of the Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) (Höfner 2025). The resolution broke with precedent by calling on the parties to negotiate a permanent settlement on the basis of Morocco’s 2007 “Autonomy Proposal.” The latter envisages regional self-rule under Moroccan sovereignty in matters of national symbols, national security, external relations, and royal authority. This resolution has been celebrated in Morocco as a diplomatic success and a setback for Algeria and the Polisario Front, who have been demanding a referendum on self-determination since 1975.

This UN resolution reflects the conflict coming to take on international dimensions. Morocco has been actively lobbying for this, securing a series of wins in the process – including gaining EU and US backing for its Autonomy Proposal. Meanwhile, Algeria’s traditional allies China, Russia, and Pakistan all abstained in the UNSC vote. Resolution 2797 illustrates Moroccan diplomatic momentum and Algeria’s relative isolation, as illustrated by recent Russian and Gulf Cooperation Council declarations of support for the proposal. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the UN can achieve concrete progress here considering the long-standing deadlock besetting MINURSO.

What comes next will largely depend on relations between Algeria and Morocco going forwards. They have deteriorated drastically since the election of Abdelmajid Tebboune to the Algerian presidency (December 2019) and Morocco’s signature of the Abraham Accords with Israel (December 2020). Resolution 2797 is more likely to entrench respective positions than lead to bilateral rapprochement – that is, unless the two countries can find a suitable off-ramp, such as mediation by Arab partners, after decades of bellicose statements being made by each side.

Both also risk popular backlash if they are seen to be backing down. The Moroccan authorities have named 31 October as a national holiday, serving to temporarily dispel the troubles looming following the Gen-Z 212 protests. Meanwhile, the Algerian foreign minister declared his country’s willingness to support mediation between Morocco and the Polisario Front under the condition of the process adhering to the principles of a referendum. Algeria’s relationship with France, however, is fraught with issues following the arrest of Franco-Algerian writer Boualem Sansel and other outspoken critics.

Other regional actors may put pressure on Algeria, Morocco, and the Polisario Front to sit down at the negotiating table. The Trump administration may see this as a stand-off ripe for diplomatic intervention, considering its well-declared desire to assist in conflict resolution. The EU will welcome the possibility of negotiations and conflict resolution considering the legal challenges made against the 2019 EU–Moroccan trade agreement regarding goods from the Western Sahara region. Germany and Italy may play a greater mediator role due to their own current respective relations with Algeria. Meanwhile, we may also witness a shifting of efforts and competition for support within the African Union, where Morocco hopes to erode diplomatic backing for the Polisario Front and secure a realignment of position by African heavyweights South Africa and Kenya.

Sanctioning the United Arab Emirates for Arms Trafficking is Sudan’s Newest Battlefield

In October 2025, the capital of North Darfur, El Fasher, fell to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). More than 5,000 civilians were massacred in the course of the latter’s takeover. Since hostilities began in April 2023, Darfur has developed into a war within a war whereby RSF fighters target the region’s ethnic Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa minorities. The fall of El Fasher, the last capital city in the Darfur region to come into RSF hands, marks a turning point: it has served to consolidate the group's territorial control over the west of Sudan and now leaves thousands of civilians trapped and unprotected amid the RSF’s genocidal violence.

With the fall of Darfur bringing the war in Sudan back to international front pages, attention quickly shifted to the role that the UAE plays in the conflict. Early on in the fighting, the latter emerged as one of the RSF’s most important suppliers. It was the UAE’s support that enabled the RSF to make surprising advances against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and therewith into the east of the country. Weapons, equipment, and other cargo were trafficked into Sudan via Chad, Libya, and Uganda (Ali 2024), typically in cooperation with the Russian Wagner Group as it already had a presence in Darfur and the south of Libya prior to the onset of hostilities. The UAE in turn gained access to Sudanese gold, of great value given the Gulf country is one of the top exporters of the commodity worldwide. The RSF smuggle and sell gold (as well as gum arabic) to fund their continuous need for weapons, fuel, and equipment.

The collapse of the central government, the breakdown of the main RSF–SAF frontline into smaller, more localised wars, as well as the lack of international will to intervene more meaningfully in the country have made Sudan a lucrative market for selling small arms, drones, and military equipment. The logistics of fighting a war across multiple fronts over a number of years as well as the shifting sands of Sudanese militia involved in smaller-scale subnational fighting appeals to the UAE in particular because it complements trends within its own defence industry, such as producing armoured vehicles and drones.

Public pressure has increased on the UAE to cease its support for the RSF, and on European lawmakers to impose sanctions. So far with little success. The UAE’s backing is critical for the RSF’s survival on the battlefield, and its shared interest with Russia in exploiting Sudan’s gold reserves is a major obstacle to ending the war. Yet many EU states are hesitant to sanction the UAE, mainly because of its growing role as a strategic partner in energy. This raises the stakes of embargoing the UAE over Sudan, especially because developments in the African country itself have not been high on the list of priorities of any EU member state to date. Whether the EU will move towards sanctioning the UAE in 2026 remains to be seen, and may become the newest battlefield in the brutal war continuing to rage in Sudan.

Gulf Investments: Political Access and Influence

The Gulf development model of seeking to diversify into non-oil sectors like trade, industry, mining, and tourism has come of age. It includes investment in companies deemed of strategic importance at home but that can be politically controversial. Gulf sovereign wealth funds were welcomed when they saved Western banks from bankruptcy in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, but they have also since raised concerns about undue influence via strategic stakes – particularly in sensitive areas like the defence industry (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 2025).

Gulf countries see themselves as global players and try to diversify away from their traditional Western partnerships in an age of increasing multipolarity. Yet there are limits to this. The US, for example, conditioned Emirati access to advanced Nvidia chips for its burgeoning artificial intelligence industry on curtailing the influence of Chinese companies such as Huawei in the country’s telecommunications sector.

The ability of Gulf countries to pull off large deals swiftly and unbureaucratically has opened up avenues of political influence other governments and the European Commission can only dream of. Qatar’s donation of a USD 400 million jet to Trump, the use of his family’s cryptocurrency ventures in the course of Emirati companies’ multibillion dollar deals, and the planned erection of a USD 1 billion TrumpPlaza in the Saudi coastal city ofJeddah are cases in point. When the US president forced a reluctant Netanyahu to publicly apologise for Israel’s bombing of a Hamas delegation hosted on Qatari soil and announced in an executive order that

the United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States (The White House 2025),

it likely was under the impression of the transactional benefits his country and his family can derive from such policies.

Gulf investments in Africa have raised concerns about unsavoury political dealings and environmental destruction. The mining sector is of particular concern. UAE-based International Resources Holding has, for instance, invested in related ventures in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia.

Moving forwards, the following issues will be ones to keep a close eye on: how Gulf countries navigate the thin line between American expectations and Chinese opportunities; what role Europe plays in Gulf expenditure decisions; how far investments in emerging markets in Africa will go and what forms of political backlash they will induce; what kind of influence Gulf dealmakers can buy with a venal Trump administration.

Table 2. Major Gulf Investment Deals

Source: Authors’ own compilation.

Gaza: Between International Security Force, Bisectional Stalemate, and Ethnic Cleansing

Trump’s 20-point peace plan and a fragile ceasefire facilitated the release of the remaining hostages, further to having helped reduce the carnage and increase aid delivery – albeit at still woefully insufficient levels. Further progress being made significantly depends on the establishment of an international security force, possibly by countries such as Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, and/or Indonesia. Necessary preconditions for such a force to become operational would be Hamas’s disarmament, a political role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in a government of technocrats, and credible avenues to Palestinian statehood in the Occupied Territories (Forti, Gowan, and Rodenbeck 2025). Such a scenario is, however, unlikely. Hamas remains entrenched in the half of the Gaza Strip that is not occupied by Israel and allies such as Qatar and Turkey are unlikely to exert diplomatic pressure on the organisation to disarm without a plan for what comes afterwards by way of a political solution.

Yet a Palestinian state – or even the PA taking on an increased governance role – is anathema both to Netanyahu’s right-wing government and most of Israel’s opposition parties as well. Israeli society at large is unlikely to develop a more critical stance and reckon with war crimes regarding events since 7 October 2023, like it did after the 1982 Lebanon War and the massacres in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila that Christian militias perpetrated with the help of the Israeli army. At that time the investigative Kahan Commission was installed and led to the resignation of Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon. Later the Oslo process led to a short-lived period of credible peace negotiations in the 1990s.

No such levels of mutual empathy are currently discernible, which makes bisectional stalemate a sobering likelihood. Hamas would survive in the coastal part of the Gaza Strip, more protection racket than effective governance institution, while Israel controls its side of the Yellow Line, at times with the help of gang-like proxy troops recruited from among the local population. Consigned to abject poverty and without hopes for reconstruction, some parts of the population might opt for “voluntary migration,” as Israeli right-wing ideologues like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich would euphemistically term it even long before 7 October. In an even bleaker scenario of renewed military escalation this could see ethnic cleansing actively pursued, a strategy that said right-wing ideologues have been unapologetically open about time and again.

Iran at a Crossroads: Nuclear Uncertainty, Regional Escalation, and Domestic Turmoil

After the 12-day war with Israel and the subsequent bombing of its nuclear facilities by the US, Iran’s atomic programme – or what remains of it – continues to be at the forefront of Western strategic concerns. Thus far, Iran and its former partners per the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark 2015 agreement, have not reached consensus on a renewed deal. A major point of tension lies in Iran’s insistence on its right to pursue nuclear capability, while the Western powers, particularly the US, demand zero enrichment. Recently, however, Iran has shown signs of a willingness to cooperate. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that his country is currently not enriching uranium, which could provide a window of opportunity – albeit a narrow one – for negotiations to resume.

The prospects for reaching an agreement would be undermined by any renewed Israeli attack, with that outcome potentially once again drawing the US into the conflict. Recent developments point towards escalating tensions: Israel bombed Beirut once again on 23 November 2025, killing Haytham Ali Tabatabai, a senior Hezbollah commander and chief of staff of the latter’s armed wing, in the process. The Israeli airstrike on the Lebanese capital’s southern suburbs fanned regional tensions – the ceasefire in place was already fragile – and triggered renewed threats of retaliation from Hezbollah. The attack, which struck a residential building and killed several additional Hezbollah members, was Israel’s first major strike on Beirut in months and appeared intended to disrupt Hezbollah’s ongoing efforts at rebuilding. Further, Trump’s recent statements during the protests that erupted in late December in Iran, which suggested potential US intervention in the event of regime violence, constitute an additional escalatory dimension.

Domestically, the regime in Tehran faces an increasingly uncertain future. Simultaneous crises – ranging from energy shortages and water scarcity to anxiety over regime stability should the ailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei pass away, combined with mounting societal demands for political and economic reform that could trigger future protests (and have indeed triggered recent protests) – are putting its system of governance under acute strain. The current leadership will need new thinking if it wishes to maintain its grip on power.

Hezbollah: Disarmament, Fragile Stability, and the Risk of Renewed Escalation with Israel

Lebanon enters 2026 facing an increasingly stark dilemma regarding Hezbollah’s weapons cache: a fragile window for negotiated disarmament is opening just as the risk of renewed war with Israel arises. On 4 December 2025, the Israeli military issued evacuation warnings in several southern towns and struck sites it identified as Hezbollah weapons depots. These operations form part of a broader pattern of intensified Israeli targeting since late autumn, signalling that the 2024 ceasefire no longer provides a stable deterrent framework. Hezbollah, for its part, cites these strikes as proof that disarmament cannot be pursued while Israel maintains the capacity and political will to escalate the conflict.

At the same time, the political and institutional landscape has shifted in ways without precedent since the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990). Both countries have, for the first time in decades, appointed civilian representatives to the US-chaired ceasefire-monitoring mechanism put in place in Naqoura, southern Lebanon. Beirut designated former ambassador Simon Karam to the commission, expanding hereby a forum that had previously been limited to military interlocutors. The move signals that the Lebanese presidency seeks to anchor future security arrangements – including oversight regarding Hezbollah’s rearmament and the reintegration of the south under state authority – within a more formal governance framework rather than relying on ad hoc security principles.

Yet these openings co-exist with rapidly escalating pressures. Hezbollah continues to reject any disarmament process that it views as unilateral or externally imposed, particularly while Israeli strikes remain ongoing. Domestic actors are equally divided: Christian and Sunni parties insist on a full state monopoly over the use of force, while many within the Shia community interpret the disarmament debate as an attempt to weaken their political position. Meanwhile, external actors, especially Israel and the US, increasingly expect the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to take a more proactive role in monitoring and reining in Hezbollah’s arsenal.

The core risk, therefore, is not simply that disarmament fails but that an uncoordinated or coercive approach fractures an already highly fragile political order. If the Lebanese authorities attempt to enforce disarmament without parallel guarantees regarding Israeli behaviour, and without the credible political inclusion of Hezbollah’s constituency, the LAF could become entangled in a direct confrontation with the country’s most powerful non-state actor. The consequences hereof may be internal fragmentation and the rapid deterioration of the border situation, potentially pushing Lebanon back towards civil war while simultaneously triggering broader escalation with Israel.

A sustainable path to peace requires careful sequencing: consolidating the ceasefire framework, ensuring Israeli compliance, and embedding disarmament within political bargaining rather than it being a purely security-driven process. Without such calibration, Lebanon’s long-delayed efforts to restore the state’s monopoly on force risks becoming the catalyst for the country’s next major crisis.

A Fragmented Security Landscape in Syria

As of the first anniversary of the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, 8 December 2025, the transitional government under Interim President Ahmad ash-Shar‘a controls some 60 per cent of Syrian territory (on other aspects of the post-Assad transition, see Bank, Lynch, and Pearlman 2025). The remainder of the country is either militarily occupied by regional states – Turkey in the north, Israel in the southwest – or respectively dominated by the mostly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast and by Druze counterparts in the southeast.

In the short-term, the most pressing security challenge faced is the integration of the SDF-controlled territories into the post-Assad state. Negotiations between the interim government and the SDF should have been finalised by the time 2025 comes to and end but there is no swift resolution to this issue in sight. Points of contestation here are, among other things, the exact means of integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian army (as large battalions, smaller units, or individuals) as well as the question of who has the right to use the region’s natural resources, especially oil and water. The SDF’s negotiating position has gradually weakened in the course of 2025, steadily losing its standing as the only or even primary US partner in fighting the Islamic State to the new interim government instead.

In southeastern Suwayda, the situation has been in complete deadlock since the massive violence of July 2025. This flare up left up to 2,000 people dead, mostly Druze civilians, and the area under control of the separatist Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijri, who is supported by Israel. It is here that the interim government has lost territorial control – arguably its biggest political mistake during the first year in office. To alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Suwayda and to end the impasse, sustained humanitarian measures must be earnestly pursued.

Entering the year 2026, the security landscape in Syria continues to be characterised by fragmentation – as the legacy of over five decades of brutal dictatorship and 14 years of internationalised civil war alike.

This GIGA Focus deviates from the series’ typical format. It is the joint production of several GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies staff members. Ardahan Özkan Gedikli wrote on possible changes regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Elianne Shewring authored the section on Israel’s upcoming elections, Hakkı Taş the one on regional elections. Hager Ali wrote on Sudan, Houssein Al Malla contributed the section on Lebanon, André Bank analysed the situation in post-conflict Syria. Diba Mirzaei wrote on Iran, Eckart Woertz on Gaza. The latter and Dima Abu Alkheir jointly edited this GIGA Focus while in addition authoring the part on Gulf investments.

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