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Almost nothing is known about how, by and large, the population of Germany views the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February 2026. A representative online survey of 2,492 respondents from the final week of March provides insights into corresponding attitudes and beliefs. They help to situate current public and political debates in a broader empirical perspective.
The attack by the US and Israel is widely perceived as illegitimate and illegal by those living in Germany. A clear majority (71 per cent) consider the war to be in violation of international law, while only 28 per cent believe that military assault was justified as a preventive measure.
German public opinion is dominated by the perception that military, strategic, and geoeconomic interests – rather than normative political goals – drive the attack by the US and Israel. Some 77 per cent believe that this has led to a war that will last for months, if not years. Only 28 per cent agree that, as a result, Iran will democratise.
The surveyed public favour restraint and reject deeper military involvement by Germany as well as other countries. Some 61 per cent oppose the idea of deploying the German Navy to the Strait of Hormuz to safeguard maritime shipping passing through.
Even though a majority consider it feasible that supporters of the Iranian regime may carry out attacks in Germany, when looking at the war the predominant fear identified is rather its impact on everyday economic conditions – especially rising gasoline prices and inflation.
Against this backdrop, German public opinion is found to speak to support for a rules-based international order. It opposes military escalation and arms exports while favouring diplomatic approaches. To prevent a growing elite–public gap, decision makers should invest more in diplomacy, prioritise international law, and respond more consistently to violations thereof – even by partners and allies.
War between the United States, Israel, and Iran, beginning anew on 28 February 2026, marks a significant escalation in an already volatile regional context. What was initially framed as targeted military strikes by the US and Israel has quickly developed into a broader and potentially protracted violent conflict. The current situation raises concerns about regional destabilisation as well as the consequences both for Germany and on a global level too.
The conflict involves multiple actors with diverging interests. These include the US and Israel as initiating parties, Iran as the primary target, and a growing number of other countries in the region increasingly subject to attack as well, such as Kuwait, Lebanon, and respective Persian Gulf states. At the same time, the implications of these events extend far beyond the Middle East. Following the escalation of hostilities, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime routes, has been severely disrupted. Its effective closure stems from a combination of threats, drone attacks, and the potential deployment of naval mines by the Iranian side (Mongilio 2026).
On the other hand, the US has now imposed a naval blockade targeting ships entering or leaving Iranian ports, further increasing uncertainty and risk when passing the Strait (Hunnicutt and Hafezi 2026). This has effectively brought large parts of global maritime trade to a halt. As a result, oil and gas supplies have been curtailed, contributing to rising prices, supply shortages, and increasing economic uncertainty worldwide. The disruption has negatively affected harvests and food security, prompting the United Nations to warn that prolonged closure of the Strait could lead to an acute food crisis (World Food Programme 2026).
European countries, including Germany, are also directly affected by these developments. Economic concerns such as rising energy prices and inflation, but also broader questions of security, are taking centre stage. Against this backdrop, it is important to understand how the German public perceives the war, including the reasons given for the choice to pursue it as well as its manifold consequences. Knowing how people view the conflict allows policymakers to better respond to public concerns, and thus to adapt their decision-making accordingly.
Examined here are public attitudes towards these events, as stemming from wave no. 19 of the survey ‘Menschen in Deutschland: International’ (MidInt). This was conducted using an online access panel, with 2,492 respondents participating between 24 and 31 March 2026. MiDInt is embedded in the MOTRA project and aims to capture public attitudes in Germany towards major international developments in a timely manner (Kleinschnittger, et al. 2023).
The attack by the US and Israel is widely perceived as illegitimate and illegal by those living in Germany. A clear majority (71 per cent) consider it to be in violation of international law, while only 28 per cent believe that it was justified as a preventive measure. This indicates broad rejection of the official narrative invoked by the initiating parties. On the question of whether the targeted killing of the head of the state of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was justified, the German public is divided into two nearly equal camps: a narrow majority of 51 per cent consider it so, while 49 per cent disagree. Despite this division, a large majority (77 per cent) are of the view that Iran has the right to defend itself militarily against such aggression (see Figure 1).
Expectations regarding the course of the war point towards prolonged conflict rather than short-term resolution. Only 30 per cent believe that hostilities will end soon and with the US and Israel victorious, while more than three-quarters (77 per cent) expect it to last for months or even years (see Figure 2).
Humanitarian concerns play a central role in shaping public perceptions in Germany here. Some 87 per cent of those surveyed believe that the Iranian civilian population is suffering the most as a result of these developments. At the same time, there is widespread scepticism that the war will lead to political transformation. Well over two-thirds of respondents (72 per cent) do not believe that the chosen path will result in democratisation (see Figure 3).
Taken together, these findings show that an overwhelming majority of the German public reject the trajectory chosen here not only on political and moral grounds but also from a legal perspective. Accordingly, the war is not seen as a legitimate or promising preventive measure, rather as legally problematic, likely to endure for the foreseeable future, and highly detrimental to civilian life.
Public perceptions of the grounds for war are shaped by the assumption that military, strategic, and geoeconomic interests – rather than normative political goals – drive the US and Israel’s chosen course of action. Only a minority are of the view that the initiating parties are concerned with objectives such as promoting democracy, supporting the Iranian opposition, or enforcing human rights. Accordingly, 59 per cent reject the idea that military assault was intended to establish a democracy in Iran, 58 per cent disagree that it was launched to provide support to regime opponents, and 57 per cent do not believe that it was started to enforce human rights.
At the same time, a majority of respondents also identify security-related objectives as relevant. Slightly more than two-thirds believe the war was intended to destroy Iran’s long-range missiles (68 per cent) and three-fifths agree with the statement that the US and Israel started the war to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (61 per cent). Nevertheless, perceived motivations here are dominated by geopolitical and economic considerations. A large majority (82 per cent) deem the securing of US access to oil in the Middle East to be the main driver of the war. Additionally, 75 per cent assume that the original idea was to overthrow the Iranian regime. German public opinion is more divided, however, on whether these events serve to divert attention from respective domestic political problems: whereas 47 per cent agree with this interpretation, 53 per cent do not.
The German public clearly favours restraint and rejects deeper military involvement, both at the national and international level. As regards the latter, 69 per cent support a condemnation of the attack by the UN Security Council. An even larger majority (78 per cent) believe that other NATO member states should stay out of this war completely (see Figure 5).
Nationally, meanwhile, little support for military measures is similarly noted. A clear majority (68 per cent) oppose providing military support to other states attacked by Iran, such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. Likewise, 61 per cent are against the idea of deploying the Germany Navy to the Strait of Hormuz to safeguard maritime shipping passing through. In contrast, non-military measures receive broader backing: some 69 per cent favour a complete halt of all arms deliveries to the Middle East, while 55 per cent support expanding economic sanctions against Iran (see Figure 6).
Taken together, those surveyed are clearly opposed to both military intervention in the Middle East and further arms exports to the region, while a majority favour more traditional diplomatic means of involvement such as condemnation and economic sanctions.
A look at the perceived implications for German society reveals that the Iran War is a source of widespread anxiety among the general public, particularly regarding the economy and security issues. Such concerns are most pronounced in the first of these domains. More than three-quarters of respondents (76 per cent) are quite or very afraid that the war will significantly increase inflation. Similarly, 65 per cent fear rising gasoline prices; in tandem, 70 per cent are concerned about severe disruptions to global trade over a longer period (see Figure 7).
By contrast, fears related to security and military escalation, while still substantial, are less pronounced and more nuanced. A majority of those surveyed (57 per cent) are quite or very afraid that supporters of the Iranian regime could carry out attacks in Germany. Nevertheless, concerns about further escalation drawing in Germany or other NATO countries are somewhat lower: some 45 per cent of respondents are very or quite afraid that the German Armed Forces may become involved in combat operations in the Middle East, while only 41 per cent express unease around a potential attack by Iran on another NATO member country.
Overall, findings indicate that the German public is less concerned with immediate security threats than the war’s anticipated impact on everyday economic conditions. Rising gasoline prices, inflation, and disruptions to global trade dominate how those in question perceive the risks associated with the Iran War. Fears of military escalation, although present, play a comparatively smaller role meanwhile.
Overall, the survey results paint a consistent picture of how the German public views the war in Iran.Ratherthan seeing it as a legitimate or effective intervention in service of humanitarian or political goals, respondents interpret this war of choice primarily through the lens of power politics, security interests, and geoeconomic considerations. A large majority reject the preventive justification given by the US and Israel; those surveyed do not expect a quick resolution or meaningful political transformation on the part of the Iranian regime. Instead, perceptions are dominated by the anticipation of prolonged conflict and further escalation.
At the same time, there is broad opposition to military involvement by Germany or other Western actors. Diplomatic and economic responses – such as condemnation and sanctions – are clearly favoured over any form of armed intervention. Ultimately, public concern in Germany is driven less by immediate security threats than by the envisaged impact of the war on everyday life. Rising gasoline prices, inflation, and disruptions to global trade dominate the fears concretely expressed by survey participants.
These findings are broadly in line with other recent surveys conducted in Germany. Data from the ZDF Politbarometer similarly highlight expectations of prolonged conflict and strong concerns about the accompanying economic consequences, particularly rising energy prices (ZDF 2026). Likewise, results from the ARD DeutschlandTrend indicate widespread scepticism as regards military intervention in Iran by the US and Israel: a high degree of anxiety about global instability, economic disruption, and the expansion of the conflict is reported here (Müller 2026).
These pessimistic outlooks can be read alongside current diplomatic, military, and domestic political developments. First, recent events strengthen the German public’s expectation that there will be no quick end to the war but that it will last for months or even years. Pakistan-mediated talks between the US and Iran failed to produce an agreement, and a temporary two-week ceasefire remains fragile and limited. Additionally, the prevailing belief that war will endure is tied to a general distrust as regards the official justifications for it given by the US and Israel. Shifting and at times inconsistent reasoning, particularly from President Donald Trump, alongside the use of highly escalatory or dehumanising rhetoric seem to have further undermined the credibility of the official narratives advanced.
Second, survey results indicate limited confidence in the effectiveness of external military intervention as a driver of political change. Only a minority of respondents see potential for democratisation here, while a majority doubt that the removal of a regime’s key personnel can fundamentally transform the political system in place. This suggests scepticism around the likelihood that military action can achieve such goals, as largely consistent with the evidence when looking at the Middle East region historically. This highlights the need for policymakers to prioritise diplomacy, long-term engagement, and support for internal reform processes.
Third, public perceptions of the war reveal a tension between legal assessments and moral evaluations. While a large majority (71 percent) consider these events to be in violation of international law, 51 percent nevertheless regard the killing of Khamenei as justified. This suggests that respondents might differentiate between the overall legality of military assault and the evaluation of specific actions occurring as part of it, potentially reflecting considerations that go beyond a strict interpretation of international law. At the same time, German public opinion shows strong concern for the war’s humanitarian consequences. This combination of legal scepticism and situational judgments is also reflected in the broader public and political debate in Germany, where reactions to the killing of Khamenei and the war as a whole have ranged from cautious approval (Bundesregierung 2026) to calls for a stronger emphasis on international law (Bundesregierung 2026; Milanović 2026; Stellungnahme aus der Wissenschaft 2026).
Fourth, the identified economic concerns reflect ongoing developments within both world markets and Germany alike. Recent domestic policy responses – such as the introduction of a fuel-price cap and the announcement of mineral oil tax reductions – underscore the salience of dominant public fears. In parallel, ongoing discussions within the federal government about prospective additional measures point to the limits of current policy responses and the difficulty of effectively mitigating the Iran War’s wider economic consequences.
Beyond the economic realm, a clear public preference for diplomacy over military intervention contrasts with the conflict’s ongoing escalation but corresponds nonetheless to the broader tensions besetting Germany’s and the European Union’s relationship with key international partners. Calls from the US for greater international support for their chosen course of action stand in contrast to Germany’s reluctance to engage militarily – a position that aligns with public opinion. In tandem, the war further complicates Germany’s relationship with Israel, which has already been pulled in new directions due to tensions between its commitment to Israel’s security (“Staatsraison”) and concerns over compliance with international law in Gaza (Binzel and Richter 2025). The Iran War deepens these dilemmas and highlights the potential for a widening elite–public gap on matters of foreign policy.
