Little is known about how those living in Germany view Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 or the latter’s subsequent military offensive in Gaza. A representative August 2025 online survey of 1,050 respondents provides insight into opinions on these issues as well as assessments of media coverage, understandings of anti-Semitism, and attitudes towards Germany’s culture of remembrance.
Sixty-eight per cent of respondents agree with the statement that Hamas committed war crimes on 7 October. A similar number (65 per cent) believe that the Israeli army is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Fifty-nine per cent agree that Israel’s military action should be considered genocide against the Palestinian population.
Only 10 per cent fully support the statement that Israel’s security should be Germany’s raison d’état. More than two-thirds believe that German foreign policy should be guided by international law and universal human rights.
Over 60 per cent would have liked to see the former coalition government name and condemn Israeli war crimes in Gaza. Sixty-eight per cent are in favour of the current federal government urging their Israeli counterparts to end the blockade of Gaza and establish a permanent ceasefire. Only 18 per cent would like to see stronger military support for Israel.
Sixty-one per cent of those surveyed believe that criticism of Israel should be separated from anti-Semitism. Finally, 56 per cent believe that Germany’s historical responsibility should apply to Jews and not to the Israeli state.
Policy Implications
Large sections of Germany society are in favour of a readjustment of the focus and direction of their country’s foreign policy towards Gaza and Israel. A majority believes that Germany should clearly adhere to international law. Critical reflection on the reasons for and consequences of the existing gaps between public opinion and foreign policy action is therefore urgently needed.
Opinions on the Situation in Israel and Palestine
United Nations reports document war crimes committed by Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups on 7 October 2023, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Israel in the course of its subsequent military offensive in Gaza (e.g. United Nations 2024). On 16 September 2025, a UN commission headed by South African Navi Pillay, who served as a judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as well as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights between 2008 and 2014, concluded that Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza (United Nations 2025). This finding confirms earlier analyses by international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International (2024), ECCHR (2025) and Human Rights Watch (2024), and concurs with the assessment of leading genocide researchers too (Nader 2025). What views, then, do those living in Germany hold on these issues?
Sixty-eight per cent of respondents agree with the statement that Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups committed war crimes against the Israeli population on 7 October 2023; 12 per cent disagree; 21 per cent do not know (see Figure 1 below; details on the survey and sample are provided at the end of this text). Almost two-thirds of respondents (65 per cent) also believe that the Israeli army is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Only 15 per cent disagree; 20 per cent have no opinion on the matter. A majority of respondents (59 per cent) also consider Israel’s military action to amount to genocide against the Palestinian population. Twenty-one per cent disagree with this statement; 20 per cent do not know, meanwhile. On the other hand, 62 per cent of respondents believe (at the time of survey) that Hamas could immediately end the suffering of the people in Gaza by releasing all hostages. Eighteen per cent have no opinion on this statement; 19 per cent disagree. When asked whether Germany is partly responsible for the atrocity crimes committed by Israel in Gaza, only 34 per cent of respondents agree while 48 per cent disagree. Nineteen per cent have no opinion on this statement.
In July 2024, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring the entire Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory (Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem) to be illegal and concluding that it must be ended immediately (International Court of Justice 2024). This assessment is shared by 58 per cent of those we surveyed. Seventeen per cent reject this position while 25 per cent have no opinion on the matter (see Figure 1). Slightly less than half of those surveyed (47 per cent) also agree with the statement that the terms “colonialism” and “apartheid” accurately describe Israel’s policies and actions in Palestine, while 24 per cent reject this statement and 29 per cent do not know.
Figure 1. On the Situation in Israel and Palestine
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,034).
Policies of the Old and New Federal Governments
Since former chancellor Angela Merkel declared Israel’s security to be Germany’s raison d'état in her speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2007 – a position she reiterated a few months later, in March 2008, before the Knesset – leading politicians in Germany have regularly emphasised this special obligation that their country carries. A brief published in November 2023 by the Scientific Service of the German Bundestag clarifies, however, that “raison d'état” is not a legal term, rather a political statement (Deutscher Bundestag Wissenschaftliche Dienste 2023). German foreign policy and behaviour orientating itself around this political principle is, as such, not without controversy. Very recently, some 170 experts publicly called for a reorientation of German foreign policy in line with principles of international law and a more comprehensive understanding of the country’s historical responsibility towards Israel and Palestine alike (staatsraison.net 2025). How much support, then, does the German government’s position across the current and previous administrations enjoy among the population at large?
Figure 2. On the Statement “Israel’s Security is Germany’s Raison d'État”
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who chose values on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 “completely wrong” to 7 “completely correct,” or alternatively “I don't know what that means.” Since the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,049).
Among those surveyed, the statement “Israel’s security is a matter of Germany’s raison d'état” met with very little agreement: on a scale from 1 (“completely wrong”) to 7 (“completely correct”), only 10 per cent are convinced that this statement is (wholly) accurate (values 6 and 7). Thirty-five per cent of respondents consider it (completely) erroneous (values 1 and 2), while 22 per cent do not know what this statement means (see Figure 2).
Figure 3. On German Foreign Policy at Large
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “strongly disagree” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,020).
In addition, more than two-thirds (69 per cent) of respondents believe that German foreign policy should be guided exclusively by international law and universal human rights, and not by any raison d'état (see Figure 3). Furthermore, 78 per cent agree with the statement: “Germany must criticise Israel if it abuses human rights and violates international law. There must be no double standards.” Accordingly, the vast majority are against unconditional support for Israel. Nevertheless, 27 per cent agree with the statement that it is the German government’s duty to continue to support Israel politically and militarily, even if the Israeli army has committed war crimes in Gaza. Similarly, just under one-quarter (23 per cent) agree that it is also the German government’s duty to support Israel militarily and politically despite the latter continuing to occupy Palestinian territories and expel Palestinians. Half of those surveyed believe it is important for the German government to regularly reaffirm Israel’s right to exist (50 per cent) and to clearly recognise the State of Israel as a Jewish state (53 per cent). However, 61 per cent also agree with the statement that instead of supporting the right of states such as Israel to exist, the German government should rather commit to the right of both Israelis and Palestinians to exist and to self-determination alike.
Figure 4. On the Consequences and Contradictions of German Foreign Policy
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,042).
Almost one-third of respondents (31 per cent) blame German foreign policy on Israel for Germans becoming less welcome abroad in future, with their country being complicit in Israeli war crimes. However, 42 per cent disagree with this statement while 27 per cent have no opinion on the matter. When asked whether German policy towards the Middle East is influenced by racist thinking, a similarly polarised picture emerges. Thirty-two per cent agree with this statement, 40 per cent disagree, 28 per cent do not know. Finally, a clear majority (61 per cent) consider it contradictory for German politicians to take a stand against right-wing extremism at home while at the same time supporting a government in Israel that is in part right-wing extremist; only 17 per cent disagree with this statement, while 21 per cent have no opinion on the matter.
Figure 5. On the Policies of the Previous Administration
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,039).
When asked more specifically about the policy of the former traffic-light coalition with regards to the events on and since 7 October 2023, the vast majority (66 per cent) of respondents believe the administration was right to condemn Hamas’s war crimes that day, 10 per cent disagree with this statement, while 23 per cent have no opinion on the matter (see Figure 5). Furthermore, a large majority of those living in Germany would have liked to see a much more critical stance towards Israel’s actions in Gaza be taken by Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. Sixty-three per cent agree with the statement that the former federal government should have identified and condemned Israeli war crimes in Gaza from the outset. Sixty-four per cent agree with the statement that the traffic-light coalition government should have pushed Israel harder for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, while 55 per cent agree with the statement that the former federal government should have stopped arms exports to Israel shortly after the latter’s offensive in Gaza began. Those surveyed were accordingly cautious when it comes to stronger support for Israel under the traffic-light coalition: only 23 per cent agree with the statement that the previous administration should have provided Israel with even stronger political and military support. Fifty-three per cent disagree with this statement, while 24 per cent have no opinion on the matter.
Figure 6. On the Policies of the New Administration
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,041).
Attitudes towards how the current federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul are handling foreign affairs are similarly clear. At the time of survey (end of August 2025), 68 per cent of respondents said that the current administration should urge the Israeli government to end the blockade of Gaza and establish a permanent ceasefire. Calling on the Israeli government to withdraw from Gaza and to end the occupation of the West Bank is a stance also supported by a clear majority (60 per cent) of those surveyed.
In September 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Shortly after the federal elections in February 2025, Merz announced his intention to find ways and means to enable Netanyahu to visit Germany despite this set of circumstances. This stance is not one enjoying majority support among the domestic population, however: only one-fifth (20 per cent) disagree with the idea that Netanyahu should be arrested and handed over to the ICC if he enters Germany. In contrast, 49 per cent agree with this statement while 31 per cent do not know. Only 27 per cent support the chancellor bringing the current Israeli prime minister to Germany. Forty-five per cent do not agree with the extending of such an invitation and 28 per cent have no opinion on the matter. At the same time, however, 47 per cent consider it important for the German federal government to maintain close contact with Israel and that German Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with the Israeli prime minister in Israel in May 2025. One-quarter (25 per cent) reject this statement while 29 per cent have no opinion on the matter.
The Concrete Measures the Federal Government Should Take in Dealing with Israel
The UN Genocide Convention was adopted by the UNGA in December 1948 in response to the Shoah. Germany declared its accession to the Convention in 1954. It obliges signatories to prevent and punish genocide wherever it may occur. Coming at the latest with the first order issued by the ICJ on 26 January 2024 in the case of South Africa v. Israel, a “real and imminent risk” of genocide against the Palestinian people was established and this obligation hence triggered. In addition, the German government must answer to the ICJ. In a complaint filed by Nicaragua, the European country stands accused of aiding and abetting genocide and violating its duty to prevent it under the Convention in connection with events in Gaza. So far, however, the German government has deemed there is no need for it to take concrete measures such as imposing a complete ban on arms exports or sanctions. What do those surveyed, then, think about the prospective taking of such measures by the German government against Israel?
Figure 7. On the German Government Potentially Taking Measures against Israel
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,025).
Only 18 per cent of survey participants would like to see stronger military support for Israel from the German government. Sixty-six per cent disagree with this statement while 15 per cent have no opinion on the matter. Two-thirds (67 per cent) are in favour of the German government citing and condemning the Israeli government’s behaviour as contrary to international law and also of immediately stopping the approval of further arms exports to Israel (66 per cent). Only 15 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, disagree with these two statements; just under 20 per cent do not know. In addition, 51 per cent of respondents are in favour of the German government suspending military and police cooperation with Israel (with 26 per cent disagreeing and 24 per cent abstaining).
While slightly less than half of those surveyed (47 per cent) agree with sanctions being imposed on members of the Israeli government (25 per cent against, 28 per cent abstained), a narrow majority (53 per cent) are in favour of an import ban on goods from illegal Israeli settlements (with 20 per cent against and 27 per cent abstaining). There is no majority in favour of imposing general economic sanctions against Israel, with 44 per cent of respondents opposed thereto. However, only 28 per cent explicitly reject this. Twenty-nine per cent have no opinion on the matter. Even less support (32 per cent) is given to the statement that research cooperation between German and Israeli companies and universities should not be further expanded. Forty per cent reject this statement and 28 per cent do not know. If, however, cooperation between German and Israeli universities and research institutions was linked to Israel’s occupation and its atrocity crimes in Gaza, 47 per cent would be in favour of ending it immediately. In contrast, 27 per cent are against and 26 per cent abstained.
Germany’s Role within the Scope of an European Union-Wide Response
In May of this year, the majority of member states voted in favour of reviewing compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel. This article requires respect for human rights and democratic principles. The review was prompted by allegations that Israel had seriously violated these principles in the course of its military offensive in Gaza. Germany voted against initiating such a review. The report, which is now publicly available, refers to corresponding violations by the Israeli government. Nevertheless, the federal government rejected either a complete or partial suspension of the Association Agreement. How did survey participants assess Germany’s chosen course of action here?
Figure 8. On Germany’s role within the Scope of an EU-Wide Response
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,041).
A slim majority (52 per cent) believe that Germany should have voted in favour of reviewing the Association Agreement, while 12 per cent are against this happening and 35 per cent have no opinion on the matter (see Figure 8). Significantly less than half of respondents (35 per cent) agree with the statement that Germany has a special relationship with Israel and can therefore take a different position from the rest of the EU. Forty per cent disagree, while 25 per cent abstain. However, only 43 per cent believe that the Middle East policy of the federal government is leading to the country’s isolation within the EU, although this proportion is significantly higher than that of those who disagree with this statement (26 per cent). Here, 31 per cent do not know. Forty-four per cent cannot answer whether Germany should advocate for a complete suspension of the Association Agreement. Among those expressing an opinion, a majority are in favour of such a suspension (32 per cent agree versus 24 per cent disagree).
Since May 2024, numerous EU member states – including Spain, Ireland, and France – have recognised Palestine as a state. The German government considers the recognition of Palestine to be the wrong choice at this point in time. Among those surveyed, 46 per cent are in favour of recognising Palestine as a state, while 22 per cent are against; 32 per cent have no opinion hereon (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. On the Recognition of Palestine as a State
Notes: The chart shows the percentage of respondents who selected the answer options "yes,” “no,” or “don't know.” Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,044).
German Media Coverage
In September 2024, more than 300 journalists signed an open letter calling for protection for their colleagues in Gaza, the lifting of Israel’s ban on journalists entering the latter, and reporting that does not rely uncritically on official Israeli accounts alone (gazajournalistenschuetzen.wordpress.com 2024). German media outlets have also been criticised for failing to accurately contextualise the origins of the conflict and current events, as well as for contributing to the dehumanisation of Palestinians (e.g. Hafez 2024). There are also indications of Israeli disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion in Europe. These indications are among the reasons why the Netherlands added Israel to its list of countries posing a national security risk in July this year (Schmeller 2025). How, then, do survey participants perceive the German media’s reporting on events in Gaza and the wider Middle East region?
Figure 10. On German Media Coverage as regards the Middle East
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,043).
Thirty-nine per cent consider German media coverage of the Middle East to be balanced overall. Only 37 per cent disagree with this view and 24 per cent do not know (see Figure 10). Forty per cent believe pro-Israeli voices are given more space in the news and discussion programmes than pro-Palestinian ones; 27 per cent disagree and one-third (33 per cent) are unable to judge either way. When asked whether the German media too often adopts the position of the Israeli government, 43 per cent agree, 27 per cent disagree, and 30 per cent have no opinion on the matter. Just under one-third (30 per cent) believe that German media coverage has contributed to the dehumanisation of Palestinians. Thirty-eight per cent disagree with this statement while 32 per cent have no opinion on its veracity.
Pro-Palestinian Slogans and Understandings of Anti-Semitism
Slogans used by the pro-Palestinian protest movement are often interpreted by political decision-makers, authorities, and the media as expressions of hatred towards Israel or even generally classified as anti-Semitic. At the same time, there have now been a number of court rulings clarifying that the use of many of these slogans is not punishable by law per se. How, then, do those living in Germany interpret two selected slogans frequently used at demonstrations?
Twenty-seven per cent interpret “Free Palestine” as a call for the destruction of the State of Israel (see Figure 11 below). Thirty-one per cent do not know how to interpret this statement, and 43 per cent disagree with such a framing. “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!” is considered by 32 per cent of respondents, meanwhile, to be a clear call for the destruction of the State of Israel. Thirty-four per cent disagree, while 35 per cent do not know whether that is true or not.
In June 2025, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights criticised the German authorities’ handling of freedom of assembly and expression in connection with Gaza in an open letter to Federal Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt and warned against interpreting criticism of Israel as inherently anti-Semitic (O’Flaherty 2025). What do respondents say about this issue?
A large majority (61 per cent) believe that criticism of Israel should be distinguished from anti-Semitism. Only a minority (12 per cent) disagree with this statement; 27 per cent have no opinion on the matter (see Figure 11). However, there is no majority position on whether the use of terms such as “genocide” or “apartheid state” in connection with Israel should be interpreted as anti-Semitic. For example, around one-in-five people (22 per cent) agree with the statement that describing Israel’s actions in Gaza as genocide is anti-Semitic. Forty-four per cent reject this statement and 34 per cent do not know. A similar picture emerges with regards to the statement: “It is anti-Semitic to describe Israel as an apartheid state.” Here, 38 percent of those surveyed reject this statement, 25 per cent agree with it, and 37 per cent have no opinion. Twenty per cent agree with the idea that it is anti-Semitic to call for sanctions against Israel. Twenty-eight per cent have no opinion on the matter, while a narrow majority (52 per cent) reject it. When asked whether boycotting Israeli products should be interpreted as indicative of an anti-Semitic attitude, just under one-quarter (24 per cent) agree; 28 per cent do not know. Forty-eight per cent of respondents reject this statement, meanwhile.
Figure 11. On Pro-Palestinian Slogans and Understandings of Anti-Semitism
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,036).
In November 2024, the Bundestag passed the resolution “Never again is now – protecting, preserving and strengthening Jewish life in Germany.” This was followed in January 2025 by one “Resolutely countering anti-Semitism and hostility towards Israel in schools and universities and securing free discourse.” Although neither resolution is legally binding, meaning they do not constitute laws, they are often used as guidance by state institutions and other actors. Both have been heavily criticised. The main claim made here is that they are based exclusively on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of “anti-Semitism.” Not intended as a starting point for legally binding regulations (Stern 2019), it carries the risk of political instrumentalisation: that is, the abuse of the term “anti-Semitism” as a way to stifle legitimate criticism of the State of Israel and restrict fundamental rights like the freedom of expression as well as art and science (e.g. Ambos et al. 2023). Since only 18 per cent of respondents say they have heard of the resolutions, a detailed presentation of opinions on them is not provided here.
German Remembrance Culture
Finally, the survey included several statements on the topic of remembrance culture in order to better understand the attitudes of those living in Germany on this issue. Thirty-six per cent of respondents state that, for them, “Never Again” means defending the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, 35 per cent disagree with this statement, 29 per cent do not know (see Figure 12). At the same time, 56 per cent agree that Germany’s historical responsibility should apply to Jews and not to the State of Israel. Twenty-one per cent reject this notion, while 23 per cent have no opinion on the matter. Twenty-one per cent believe that it is Germany’s historical duty to unconditionally support the State of Israel. Sixty per cent disagree with this statement, while 19 per cent do not know. Twenty-six per cent take the position that Germany has a special historical responsibility towards Palestinians. Significantly more (48 per cent), disagree; 26 per cent abstain. On the other hand, 44 per cent agree with the statement that German support for Israel’s actions in Gaza since October 2023 contradicts the European country’s historical commitment to “Never Again.” Twenty-five per cent disagree with this statement, while 31 per cent have no opinion hereon. Finally, an almost two-thirds majority (64 per cent) agree with the statement that “Never Again” means “never again for everyone” and not just for Jews. Only 13 per cent reject this interpretation, while 22 per cent do not know.
Figure 12. On German Remembrance Culture
Notes: Indicates the percentage of respondents who, on a 4-point Likert scale, either selected the response options “agree somewhat” or “agree completely” (shown as “agree”); “disagree somewhat” or “disagree completely” (listed as “disagree”); or “don’t know.” The order of the statements was randomised. As the percentages have been rounded up/down to the nearest whole number, the total does not necessarily add up to 100 per cent. Survey period: 11 to 22 August 2025 (N = 1,038).
Gaza, Israel, and German Foreign Policy: A Divide Emerges between Decision-Makers and the Population at Large
Key elements of the foreign policy principles formulated by the Federal Republic of Germany in recent years with regards to Gaza and Israel are not understood or even rejected by large swathes of those living in Germany. This includes, in particular, the commitment of many leading politicians to Israel’s security being a matter of Germany’s raison d´état. Only 10 per cent of those surveyed agree with this statement without reservation. Sixty-three per cent believe that the previous German government should have identified and condemned Israeli war crimes in Gaza from the outset. Fifty-nine per cent consider Israel’s military offensive since October 2023 to amount to genocide against the Palestinian population.
In addition, more than two-thirds (68 per cent) want the federal government to work towards ending the blockade of Gaza and establishing a permanent ceasefire. Fifty-one per cent believe that it should suspend military and police cooperation with Israel, while 53 per cent are in favour of banning the import of goods from illegal Israeli settlements. In addition, 52 per cent are of the view that Germany should have voted in favour of a review of the EU–Israel Association Agreement. Finally, a two-thirds majority support halting arms exports to Israel.
Between 20 and 30 per cent of respondents were not found to take a position on key foreign policy issues or the related actions of the German government. When assessing slogans expressing solidarity with Palestine, perceptions of anti-Semitism, and attitudes towards remembrance culture, it becomes clear that public opinion is characterised by both a lack of expertise and a high degree of uncertainty.
Overall, it can be said that a significant number of those resident in Germany are in favour of a reorientation of the country’s behaviour with regards to Gaza and Israel. The majority of those we surveyed would like to see its foreign policy be unambiguously based on international law and universal human rights. One consequence would be the avoidance of double standards – a key concern of many of those surveyed. Critical reflection on the reasons for and consequences of the evident gap between public opinion and foreign policy action is hence urgently needed. Continuing to apply principles of international law only selectively has the potential to further deepen existing divides.
Notes on the Study
Note: The study was funded by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and carried out by the authors in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Peter Wetzels from the University of Hamburg.
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