Bangladesh’s Democratic Transition: Revolution and Its Discontents

Ten months after a mass uprising toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime, Bangladesh is gearing up for its next general election in April 2026. The interim government, headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, wants to carry out substantial reforms but faces challenges due to a fractured political landscape.

• Bangladesh requires deep institutional reforms to consolidate its democratic foundations. Yunus insists that all major reforms will be consensus-based, but the agenda for this collides with the impending election, posing questions on implementation as well as post-election endurance.

• Political competition is intensifying, with new parties and coalitions emerging. The major frontrunner, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, is eager for early elections. Islamist parties and student leaders are attempting to increase their appeal to their support bases by forming new alliances or parties, respectively.

• Despite the popular support for key institutional reforms, setbacks to implementation could arise from political disagreements. Concurrently, the government must take initiatives to maintain the public’s backing if it is to deliver meaningful political change.

Policy Implications

EU states must act quickly on this rare opportunity to support Bangladesh’s democratic transition. The Bloc should bolster the government’s reform agenda via financial and technical assistance to increase the capacity of key institutions. It should also invest in grassroots initiatives aimed at promoting political literacy and citizen rights, helping foster a culture of political accountability.

Bangladesh after the Revolution

Bangladesh is emerging from a political earthquake. In August 2024, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was installed as the head of an interim technocratic government amid overwhelming public expectations of restoring democracy and stability to the country. Six months on, Bangladesh is preparing for a general election to be held in April 2026 that the interim government will oversee. At the same time, the Yunus administration is also keen on enacting substantial reforms to existing state structures, as weakened by years of democratic backsliding. Yet post-uprising euphoria has given way to the necessity of the interim government facing daunting challenges, including resurging political rivalries and differing party positions on reform proposals. The trajectory of Bangladesh’s democratisation – and how effectively the interim government handles the reform process and elections – will have far-reaching implications for the country’s future and international partnerships, including with the European Union.

What happened

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League (BAL), would become increasingly autocratic over her 15-year stint in power starting 2009. In mid-2024, under the auspices of the youth-led “quota movement” over government jobs, escalating protests culminated in the storming of state buildings including the PM’s residence. On 5 August, Hasina resigned and fled to India amid widespread violence and chaos with military, student leaders, and opposition parties scrambling to reach a transitional arrangement. The eventual compromise arrived at was an interim government made up of technocrats, civil society figures, and student representatives headed by Yunus as Chief Adviser.

Appointing Yunus – a globally respected economist – proved a masterstroke in legitimising the interim government, whose constitutional position remains dubious (Ahmad 2024). Since the 2011 abolition of the caretaker government provision it contained, Bangladesh’s Constitution has no clear allowance for a non-political interim regime. Prior to that, the caretaker government’s term was limited to only three months, with its sole responsibility being overseeing the next election. Given the extraordinary circumstances of Yunus’s takeover, however, the president invoked the Constitution’s seldom-used Article 106, which allows the president to decide on a significant public matter after legal consultation with the Supreme Court. Additionally, in November 2024, the interim government approved a special ordinance (gazette issuance pending) to consolidate its tenure, actions, and scope (The Business Standard 2024).

Since the government’s constitutional footing remains tenuous, its legitimacy rests on striking a delicate balance between popular demands for reform and political pressure to hold elections. Initially, all major parties – including the main opposition one, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – offered to support Yunus’s interim government. Ten months in, though, and power struggles have intensified between the BNP and its new rivals – the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the student-led National Citizen’s Party (NCP). The latter two have taken opposing stances to the BNP on key issues such as reform and the timing of elections, resulting in frequent public altercations. Although Yunus initially remained vague regarding the polling date, in his latest televised address to the nation on 4 June he announced that the election will be held in the first half of April 2026.

The Reform Agenda

On taking office, Yunus appointed 15 independent commissions of experts to recommend necessary reforms across key state institutions. The most significant ones among these are those relating to the Constitution, police service, judiciary, public administration, the electoral process, and anti-corruption endeavours. These independent commissions held several rounds of talks with political parties, civil society members, and various other stakeholders to take stock of how different parts of the Bangladeshi populace envisioned reform shaping up in practice. Several commissions also undertook public surveys to gather insights on related expectations. The resulting recommendations were submitted in mid-January 2025. Some key reform proposals emerging here are:

• Create several guarantor institutions (i.e. independent election and anti-corruption commissions), as well as a National Constitutional Council as a meta-guarantor institution to increase checks and balances.

• Create a bicameral legislature with the National Assembly or lower house (elected at the national level) and Senate or upper house (elected via proportional representation), both with four-year terms.

• Consolidate economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights into a single, enforceable charter titled “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.”

• Impose a two-term limit on the PM’s tenure.

• Decentralise the higher judiciary by establishing permanent High Court benches in all divisions.

• Establish a Judicial Appointments Commission, to be staffed by the Chief Justice and six other members, for all Supreme Court appointments.

• Reinstate the provision of a poll-time caretaker government.

• Install legal provisions to support the independence and authority of the National Election Commission, helping facilitate free and fair elections.

• Undertake nationwide initiatives to educate citizens on electoral processes and their rights.

• Impose strict financial oversight on campaign spending, limiting candidates’ budget per voter to BDT 10 (EUR 0.076).

• Reduce the number of ministries and directorates so as to streamline operations and enhance bureaucratic efficiency.

• Consider creating a non-partisan independent police commission, after further expert consultations on its framework, to ensure the professional and politically neutral operation of the force.

• Revise outdated colonial-era laws, including a possible overhaul of the Police Act dating from that time to nurture greater public responsiveness as well as accountability.

• Undertake comprehensive training programmes focusing on human rights, conflict resolution, and modern policing techniques.

• Adopt European crowd-control models as well as a five-step plan on the legitimate use of force, based on UN peacekeeping guidelines, for consistent police handling of illegal assemblies.

Crucially, Yunus insists that any major reform initiatives must be implemented based on consensus to avoid accusations that the unelected interim administration is exceeding its mandate. To that end, on 12 February of this year the government established the National Consensus Commission (NCC), chaired by Yunus and comprising the heads of six sectoral commissions. The NCC was tasked with building agreement nationally on the implementation of recommended reforms as regards the Constitution, electoral process, public administration, judiciary, police, and the tackling of corruption. It compiled a spreadsheet listing 166 key proposals drawn from these commissions’ reports, distributing the document to 38 political parties for their feedback by mid-March (The Daily Star 2025). Most parties have now submitted their opinions in response, and the Commission is currently holding further discussions with them to identify areas of political consensus that could serve as the foundations for a national charter – therewith helping nurture a more robust democracy. Despite broad public support for extensive reform after years of misrule, however, the looming election deadline has complicated matters. The BNP is outright against the interim government enacting significant changes, arguing that an unelected regime should not bind the hands of an elected successor. JI and the student leaders, by contrast, both urge that key reforms (such as concerning a constitutional overhaul or local elections) be completed before the national polling to cement the uprising’s gains. Meanwhile, the deposed BAL is completely marginalised in national politics having been excluded from all formal talks and political activities.

Party Politics amid a Changed Domestic Landscape

The frontrunner

Hasina’s fall shattered the country’s dominance by a single party, opening up its notoriously intense and often violent political landscape to competition once more. With the BAL marginalised – its senior leaders in exile or hiding – attention has shifted to the main opposition, the BNP. The latter has historically positioned itself as a nationalist, centre-right party with a more conservative stance on social and economic issues compared to its key rival, the BAL. The party’s core support comes from nationalists, anti-BAL voters, business elites, religious conservatives, and certain regional strongholds.

Previously politically outmanoeuvred and plunged into disarray by Hasina’s repressive tactics, the BNP has seen an incredible reversal of its fortunes since her ouster. Many criminal cases against BNP leaders have been dropped, and hundreds of its activists jailed under the erstwhile regime have been freed (The Financial Express 2025). However, the BNP now faces its own internal challenges after years out of power: its 79-year-old matriarch Khaleda Zia is in fragile health, and her son Tarique Rahman, the party’s de facto leader, remains in London in self-exile, addressing party events only virtually. Many expected Rahman to return immediately after Hasina’s political demise, but he remains abroad – citing a lack of personal security and appropriate timing as his justifications for so doing. The Zia family’s absence has left a void of leadership in the country. Zia returned to Bangladesh in early May, but Rahman did not accompany her as expected. BNP cadres are eager for him to return, as it would likely energise the party’s base and bolster its position as the frontrunner in the upcoming election.

Despite these leadership issues, the BNP remains the central political power in post-uprising Bangladesh and many see the party as the government in waiting. According to a recent opinion poll conducted by a Bangladeshi consulting firm, the BNP is the top choice in the next election: some 41.7 per cent of voters noted their preference for the party to take office (Innovision Report 2025). It is particularly popular among older, millennial, and female voters, alongside enjoying greater support in rural and semi-urban areas. The BNP’s most prominent rival is its former alliance member JI, with 31.6 per cent voter support according to the same survey. JI’s increasing popularity and the dynamism of domestic politics inform BNP’s current programme, as focused on calling for elections and promoting the party’s vision through its 31-point charter as well as unofficial campaigning.

Notably, the BNP is also opposed to any significant reform endeavours prior to the election and has downplayed the interim government’s mandate in this regard. Its leaders have repeatedly questioned the purview of the “unelected” Yunus administration on substantial reform. At the same time, the party continues to promote its institutional-reform plans – taking shape concretely as “Vision 2030” and the aforementioned 31-point plan, unveiled in 2016 and 2023 respectively (The Week 2025). These documents focus specifically on decentralisation, electoral transparency, and economic restructuring; however, the plans lack clarity on both implementation and safeguards, raising questions around their feasibility and durability.

Islamist alliances

Alongside the BNP, Bangladesh’s largest and most organised Islamist party, the JI, has also become a significant political force since Hasina’s downfall (T. Ahmed 2025). Ideologically closer to the BNP, JI has maintained a political and electoral alliance with the former for decades. The Islamist party was also part of the last BNP-led coalition government between 2001 and 2006. But when Hasina and her BAL party returned to power in 2009, JI came under tremendous political pressure. The Hasina regime consistently branded the latter an anti-liberation force for its connections to the Pakistani authorities during the armed conflict of 1971 eventually leading to Bangladesh’s independence, as seeing its top leadership later executed for war crimes. Moreover, the Supreme Court de-registered the party in 2013, ruling that it was unfit to contest elections as its charter was in breach of the Constitution (Al Jazeera 2013). JI’s formidable student wing – the Islami Chhatra Shibir, which provides street muscle during political protests – was forced to go underground in most public universities. Days before Hasina’s resignation on 5 August 2024, her government banned both JI and Shibir under terrorism legislation (later revoked by the interim government).

With the interim government taking charge, though, JI has since taken a seat at the table in all political negotiations, boosting its standing. The Islamist party’s renewed importance in national politics has been crucial for the regrouping and indeed expansion of its organisational structure, having been weakened by prolonged persecution under the Hasina regime. As noted, JI currently enjoys considerable voter support but needs to regain its registration if it is to contest the next election. The party is currently waiting for a hearing by the Supreme Court’s Appellate Division of its appeal against the 2013 ruling. JI firmly supports the interim government’s reform agenda and seems less willing to hurry the administration regarding polls. Additional time being taken to prepare for the latter may suit JI, as it waits for registration once more and seeks to regroup.

Simultaneously, it is also strengthening its links with other smaller Islamic parties with an eye on forming an Islamic coalition ahead of the election. In late January, JI’s Ameer (party chief) met with the country’s second-largest Islamic party, Bangladesh Islami Andolan; they subsequently announced plans to contest the upcoming election under a single guise (BDnews24.com 2025). A larger Islamic coalition taking shape is likely to improve JI’s overall electoral performance, as it would hereby be able to capitalise on the regional voter bases of some of these smaller parties. Further, JI’s established organisational structure and moderate political Islam could make it a potential uniting force here. Although JI has not run as an independent political party since 1999 – thereafter it was always a BNP coalition partner, also using the latter’s Sheaf of Paddy electoral symbol –, according to recent opinion polls voter support has increased significantly: it is now poised to become the main opposition party should the BNP win the next election (Innovision Report 2025).

The new player

While shattering the BAL’s standing, Hasina’s ouster has also significantly reduced public trust in Bangladesh’s zero-sum political duopoly. This sudden shift in climate has both created a power vacuum and allowed new forces to emerge. In the last ten months alone, around 20 new political parties have surfaced (F. Ahmed 2025). With its emergence even predating the PM’s downfall, the earlier-mentioned NCP, headed by the uprising’s student leaders, is among the most consequential of these actors now finding unprecedented relevance. Launched in February 2024, the NCP has become a powerful political force with a strong support base among youth and urban voters. It has positioned itself as a centrist party and aims to usher in a “new era” in Bangladesh through fundamental changes to the Constitution and state institutions to reduce the chances of another autocratic regime ever emerging.

However, the NCP has faced criticism for accommodating conservative Islamist ideals while lacking a clear ideological positioning of its own. Despite identifying as centrist, the party’s actions and associations so far indicate a more centre-right stance. It maintains close relations with the two largest Islamic groups, JI and the Qawmi Madrassah-based pressure group Hefazat-e-Islam, and has sidelined liberal voices among its rank and file. Ahead of the election, the NCP may find it difficult to distinguish itself from other centre-right parties such as the BNP and JI due to this ideological ambiguity (Mostofa 2025). Moreover, it has also been accused of having enjoyed the favouritism of the interim government as a way to undercut the BNP, a claim made especially by the latter itself (Majumder 2025). The NCP’s convenor Nahid Islam had resigned from his ministerial post just days ahead of the party’s launch.

Notwithstanding, the NCP remains forceful in pushing through its political agenda focusing on three main issues: resisting the BAL’s resurgence in national politics; bringing Hasina and her party members to trial for the violence witnessed during the July uprising; and, demanding substantial state reform, including convening a Constituent Assembly to introduce a new Constitution. Many find these ideas too radical in the current context, not to mention unachievable due to the interim government’s limited remaining time in office.

The pariah

Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s oldest political party, which ruled the country between 2009 and 2024, is in disarray. On 15 May 2025, the interim government imposed a ban on all political activity by the BAL under the 2009 Counter-Terrorism Act, to remain in force until every pending legal case against the party and its leaders has concluded (Hasnat 2025). In October of last year, the Home Ministry had already imposed a ban on the party’ student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), designating it a terrorist entity per the same legislation. The BAL’s organisational structure is in tatters, and most of its senior leadership – including party chief Hasina – are in hiding or exile. Since 5 August, hundreds of cases have been filed against the former PM and her cabinet members on various charges ranging from murder, attempted murder, abduction, and crimes against humanity to genocide. According to media reports, Hasina alone faces around 580 lawsuits. More than 60 former cabinet members and lawmakers have also been arrested on various grounds. Alongside these legal proceedings, the interim government has taken other measures to reduce the BAL’s organisational capacity. In recent months, hundreds of BCL leaders and activists have been arrested on regular warrants as well as for “destabilising the country” through their political activities (Saad and Mollah 2025).

Despite being so unpopular, the BAL still has some followers within its own political base. Historically, in competitive elections it received around 35 per cent of the popular vote. However, the party’s unrelenting stance on the July uprising violence and callous retaliatory statements by its top leadership in the last several months pose serious doubts about its potential for reckoning, accountability, and internal reform.

Reform versus Election

Amid fears of Bangladesh returning to its corrupt and vengeful politics of old, Yunus has often stated that only through lasting institutional reform can this possibility be resisted. This mandate was further bolstered by initial public support for changes preventing autocrats from emerging again in future. Ten months after the uprising, though, both Yunus’s government and his reform agenda lack the unified political and public support they initially enjoyed, posing risks to implementation. This is mainly for three reasons.

First, the unity between student leaders, the BNP, and JI that brought down the Hasina regime is now fragmented; each party is competing to establish itself in the national political space. In recent months, the BNP has become visibly exasperated with the possibility of delaying national elections due to the reform process taking precedence. Its own reform plans and desire to return to power provide further incentives for this pushback. Meanwhile, JI and the NCP firmly support the interim government’s favouring of comprehensive reforms being enacted prior to the election. A longer time horizon here is useful for both parties in terms of organisational preparation and alliance-building. In tandem, deeper political fragmentation is likely to undermine the BNP’s chances of achieving an absolute majority.

Second, the Yunus government is also facing resistance from those among the business and bureaucratic elite who benefitted from the existing system and hence would prefer to maintain the status quo. This is especially pertinent to the public administration, judiciary, and economic sector. Many also doubt the ultimate longevity of reforms undertaken by an interim government, which has led to suggestions of the latter prolonging its tenure to offset this. Although Yunus still maintains that his government will not continue beyond June 2026, some of his advisors as well as NCP leaders have been advancing the idea of it holding a five-year term (Anam 2024). Among BNP members, these propositions fuel doubts about the interim government’s stated mandate and generate overall ambivalence regarding reform proposals.

Finally, aside from among political parties and elites, Yunus faces an absence of serious grassroots demand and public support for reform. Historically, Bangladesh has lacked a strong civil society and politically literate voters driving calls for accountability, transparency, and effective public policy. Although media, civil society, and urban elites do exercise some degree of leverage here, it rarely translates into sustainable pressure bringing lasting change. Despite the overwhelming initial support for political reform, the Yunus government has struggled to maintain this momentum – especially after the road map for the election was outlined.

In short, the reform-versus-election debate has now become the main source of tension in Bangladeshi politics. Any meaningful democratic progress would require all parties committing to changing the zero-sum political culture that has plagued the country for three decades (since its transition to a parliamentary democracy in 1991) and counting. As of yet, the prospects of this happening appear mixed. Despite all major parties agreeing on the necessity of reform in principle, setbacks to implementation could arise from deadlock around the sequencing and ownership of the process in practice. Yunus must strike a balance between pushing for institutional reforms to strengthen democracy and not giving Bangladesh’s bickering parties a chance to reject the entire process and take to the streets instead. If reform plans are abandoned, there is a risk that the old cycle of winner-take-all politics and partisan vendettas will simply resume under a new ruling party. Hence for lasting democratic change, all major parties will need to buy into changing the political culture and accept safeguards that limit executive power – a difficult task indeed in such a bitterly polarised context.

A Greater Role for the EU in Bangladesh

With the United States reducing its engagement in South Asia, the EU has a rare opportunity to play a more substantive role in supporting Bangladesh’s democratic transition. As the latter’s largest export destination, the Bloc holds significant economic influence here. However, its close ties with the previous regime, coupled with its reluctance to publicly criticise Hasina’s autocratic overtures, have contributed to the EU being popularly perceived as disengaged and self-serving. The current political shifts in Bangladesh provide a timely opportunity for it to restore its standing and strengthen its engagement there accordingly.

Strategically, EU–Bangladeshi relations expanding beyond just the realm of trade could yield long-term benefits for the Bloc in a pivotal geopolitical region. Moreover, as the struggle for regional influence intensifies between authoritarian China and India, supporting Bangladesh’s democratic transition will signal the EU’s meaningful presence in and continued commitment to the region’s smaller countries. In the short term, it should support the interim government’s reform agenda, particularly efforts to enhance the technical capacity of key institutions such as the Election Commission, the NCC, and the police. Additionally, once the election date has been announced, the EU should deploy an observer mission both before and during polls to assess preparedness and integrity.

Over the medium term, the Bloc should invest in initiatives aimed at promoting political literacy and citizen rights, thereby helping foster a culture of accountability. Special emphasis should be placed on supporting grassroots advocacy organisations focusing on political education and human rights – especially those with experience of working in municipalities and semi-urban areas. Concurrently, EU member states should deepen their engagement with political parties – including emerging actors – with two primary objectives. First, to signal commitment to supporting Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory via constructive dialogue with key stakeholders. Second, to promote core liberal values – freedom, dignity, equality, the rule of law – within the political establishment, encouraging future statespersons to embed these principles in public policy.

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