Four Years after the Coup the EU Should Increase Support for Myanmar’s Resistance

Four years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s citizens continue – without any significant outside help – to fight the military that has plunged the country into crisis. In the face of failed regional efforts to resolve the conflict, the EU and its member states need to rethink their strategy towards Myanmar and increase their support for those resisting the junta.

• The civil war in Myanmar shows no signs of abating. Despite controlling less than 50 per cent of the country, the military has announced a plan to hold sham elections later this year.

• Heavily invested in Myanmar’s liberalisation in the ten years prior to the coup, the EU has since scaled back its support considerably. The Bloc’s current strategy is driven by alignment with ASEAN’s failed Five-Point Consensus, which has remained limited to calls for the cessation of violence and dialogue – demands ignored by the military thus far.

• The EU’s reluctance to increase support for the resistance is likely also informed by its disappointment in the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar’s largest opposition party, that formed an elected government between 2016 and 2021, as well as other political actors who championed democracy but supported the military’s scorched-earth campaign against the Rohingya minority.

• Yet, the current multifaceted resistance should not be equated with the previous NLD government. There are multiple options for increased support that would strengthen the prospects for democracy and thus align with the EU’s own goal of a values-based foreign policy.

Policy Implications

The EU should increase support for the resistance in Myanmar by strengthening state-building and state services provided by the resistance. Greater advocacy and resources for community-based organisations are needed. Also, working more closely with the National Unity Government, ethnic armed organisations, and partners in the region. Doing so would be a continuity, increase the chances of peace, and signal a values-based foreign policy still matters.

Too Little EU Support for Myanmar’s Resistance

Myanmar is experiencing an unprecedented state of crisis. As of September 2024, over 27,000 people had been arrested for their resistance to the military coup taking place on 1 February 2021, with at least 5,350 civilians having been killed since. More than 3.3 million people have been displaced by the war that Myanmar’s military is waging against the country’s population (UN News 2024). Some 43 per cent of the population are estimated to be exposed to the violent conflict that has engulfed most of the country. Myanmar’s economy is in shambles, with rising inflation and ever-higher prices for food and fuel driving more and more people into poverty. The military and its State Administration Council (SAC), a body formed to mimic a semblance of political legitimacy, only has effective control over less than 50 per cent of the country. Where it does enjoy authority, the state is failing.

So far, the resistance – made up of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), the National Unity Government (NUG) created by lawmakers in the 2020 general elections, anti-military militias called “People’s Defence Forces,” and civil society – has not been able to topple the junta. Since the military first couped itself to power in 1962, no uprising or revolution has been as successful in fighting the armed forces’ dictatorship. The year ahead will likely be a pivotal one for Myanmar. The military plans to hold sham elections without the largest opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), in a bid to increase its legitimacy. The NUG has announced reforms and a cabinet reshuffle for early this year and wants to create “a tipping point in 2025, a similar situation to Syria when al-Assad fled the country” (Duwa Lashi La 2025). To put an end to the conflict, the resistance needs to be in the strongest possible position going forwards.

The multifaceted resistance has been able to exert pressure on the military without significant outside help. Western countries and regional organisations like the EU, who were heavily invested in strengthening democracy in Myanmar during the brief period of liberalisation between 2011 and 2021, have scaled back their support considerably in recent times. The Bloc has imposed sanctions on 106 individuals and 22 entities, issued an arms embargo, and appointed a Special Envoy on Myanmar. Despite the growing need for it, however, EU development aid to the country has been cut by 70 per cent since the coup (Crisis Group 2024) and instances of direct support for the resistance have been scarce.

This is surprising for three reasons. First, the Bloc still claims to pursue a foreign policy based on the values enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, among them democracy, freedom, and human rights. If this is the case, then there is hardly a better opportunity to illustrate what a values-based foreign policy might look like than Myanmar where a multifaceted but largely ill-equipped resistance is fighting a modern military that is trying to re-establish total control over the country and its people. Second, the EU did pursue a values-based foreign policy in the ten years before the coup. By promoting democracy, offering capacity-building, development aid, investment, and closer cooperation, the Bloc created relationships and an obligation to those in the country who were genuinely pursuing democratic reform. Reducing support in a moment of stark authoritarian resurgence and leaving local partners hanging undermines the very notion that EU foreign policy was values-based to begin with. Third, any shortcomings of approach might be defensible if the EU was supporting the effective policy or policies of other stakeholders, say international or regional partners. In the case of Myanmar, though, the Bloc has merely limited itself to championing ASEAN’s failed Five-Point Consensus (5PC).

Presented just weeks after the coup, in April 2021, the 5PC was never a sophisticated policy, rather only what, as the lowest common denominator, ASEAN member states could all agree on. Stipulating that “there shall be [an] immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint” and that “constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution” (ASEAN Secretariat 2021) at a time when the military began gunning down civilians already indicated a certain lack of understanding as to what was transpiring. Four years later, the military has not shown the slightest indication that it might be interested in complying with the 5PC and continues to commit atrocities time and again, for example in deliberately targeting the civilian population.

ASEAN has been divided on how to engage with the junta and in consequence how best to approach the realising of the 5PC’s objectives. Thailand, which has a particularly important role in the conflict as Myanmar’s neighbour and host to a significant number of refugees who have fled the latter since the coup, has been a strong advocate for working more closely with the military and hosted their foreign minister at dialogue forums in 2022 and 2023. This, however, prompted Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to decline invitations to said meetings. Undeterred, Thailand is pushing for more dialogue with the junta and included the State Administration Council’s (SAC) Foreign Minister Than Swe in informal consultations on the sidelines of regional talks in December 2024 while refraining from inviting representatives from the NUG.

Notably, the shortcomings of the 5PC have been readily acknowledged, not least by EU Special Envoy on Myanmar Igor Driesmans. During the Asia Security Summit in May 2024, Driesmans noted that

violence has not ceased – on the contrary – and we are far away from a constructive dialogue among all parties. I think it is fair to say that the junta has been unwilling to implement the Five-Point Consensus in earnest. (Driesmans 2024)

In October, ASEAN also noted what it deemed “substantially inadequate progress in the implementation of the 5PC” (ASEAN Secretariat 2024).

The EU and Myanmar: The History of a Deteriorating Relationship

Considering its extensive investment in strengthening democracy in Myanmar prior to the coup, why is the EU now not doing more? The unwillingness to support those resisting the coup more vigorously can only be understood in the context of Western engagement with the country in the previous decade. When Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD were first voted into parliament in the 2012 by-elections, many in the West began viewing Myanmar as proof that democracy was of continued appeal globally and that a democratic transition could still work even after decades of dictatorship. That the Southeast Asian country is strategically situated in China’s backyard was a welcome bonus. Myanmar became a popular destination for Western politicians visiting in ever-greater numbers, from United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron in 2012 to German President Joachim Gauck and United States President Barack Obama both in 2014. Along with this went investment and thus deeper economic ties.

In 2013, the EU had re-opened its market to Myanmar under the “Everything But Arms” scheme (European Commission 2013), established a EU Delegation to and in the country, as well as convened a EU–Myanmar Task Force to support democratisation in the country. It also deployed a substantial mission, with around 100 observers, to monitor the 2015 general elections, inserted itself in the peace process, and eventually introduced a strategy titled “A Special Partnership for Democracy, Peace and Prosperity” that included democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance as key areas of engagement. Yet, by the time the military staged a coup on 1 February 2021, the relationship between Myanmar and the EU had already turned icy due to the junta’s violent campaign against the Rohingya minority in the country having enjoyed strong support from pro-democracy political parties like the NLD and their constituents. The crimes against the Rohingya – in relation to which Karim Khan, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, applied in November 2024 for an arrest warrant for SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing on the charge of having committed crimes against humanity (ICC 2024) – remain at the core of the fractured relationship between those fighting for democracy in Myanmar and the EU.

When the military, under the leadership of Min Aung Hlaing, then Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, started to ramp up its scorched-earth campaign against the already heavily persecuted and disenfranchised Muslim minority in 2016 and 2017, pro-democratic leaders in Myanmar – most notably Aung San Suu Kyi and many NLD politicians – began defending the junta’s actions. The move revealed deep-seated racism and a willingness to trade the NLD’s human rights-based political platform for the support of voters among whom the Rohingya’s persecution was extremely popular. Aung San Suu Kyi eventually went as far as leading the Myanmar delegation to the International Court of Justice, where The Gambia had filed a motion, to defend her country’s generals and make the case that no genocide had occurred (McIntyre and Simpson 2023).

To the EU and the Western governments that had sought deeper engagement it all looked like old wine in new wineskins. More importantly, politicians who had championed support back home for the Southeast Asian country were now facing increasing criticism themselves. In the words of Scot Marciel, former US Ambassador to Myanmar, “they felt they got burned for supporting the NLD” (Marciel 2024). The EU considered suspending Myanmar from the general preferences scheme that gives access to the Bloc’s common market; Germany’s development minister at the time axed his country’s entire development funding for Myanmar after a visit to a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh. Rather than seeking to salvage the relationship with the West, which has never recovered since, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD increasingly began courting China and India instead.

The fact that the NUG – the organisation that serves as the political face of the resistance, especially internationally – was in no small part created by influential NLD politicians who now play important roles in it has made increased support from the EU unlikely. This is particularly true because the persecution of the Rohingya continues. While the NUG has made some important steps towards recognising the minority group’s persecution, both it and others in the resistance at times still do not position themselves clearly against the atrocities being committed. The NUG is caught between a rock and a hard place because it does not have extensive military might itself. On Myanmar’s battlegrounds, the most significant resistance to the junta comes from EAOs like the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. Yet, the AA has also ramped up its attacks against the remaining Rohingya in western Myanmar. The NUG cannot criticise the AA openly because the armed group’s military strength is too important a piece in the puzzle when it comes to pushing back against the junta. However, not calling out severe human rights violations amongst its allies makes the NUG look like it might not take its democratic agenda all too seriously and does not invite stronger support from actors like the EU.

How Pro-Democratic Objectives Have Shifted

The current multifaceted resistance should, however, not be equated with the previous NLD government. Indeed, the 2021 coup prompted many in Myanmar to take a more critical look at the ten years leading up to it. In this light, existing shortcomings of the resistance and the challenges it faces should not be a deterrent but a starting point for closer engagement and increased support.

Some of the resistance’s most significant objectives were formulated in the direct aftermath of the coup. The initial response was led by students, workers, and other groups at the grassroots level (Aung and Campbell 2024) who managed to mobilise generation Z, rather than by experienced politicians. Since Aung San Suu Kyi was imprisoned on the day of the coup along with other senior NLD leaders, the party’s remaining leadership had to first gather their bearings and find a common position. Having just won a landslide victory in the 2020 general elections and with decades of experience as regards making difficult compromises, the NLD initially preferred a return to the status quo of the preceding decade. Yet, the new generation of protestors was quick to formulate a different agenda, one that called for the complete removal of the military from politics and a new federal constitution.

This aspiration was appealing to many of Myanmar’s powerful EAOs, who similarly had no interest in the return to a status quo that had long seen them disenfranchised. A new constitution that would expand federalism and provide greater autonomy to the country’s ethnic minorities provided a powerful basis for coalition-building. Senior politicians opposed to the junta were conscious of the new agenda that had now taken shape. A series of members of parliament, mostly from the NLD, formed the so-called Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) representing those who had been elected to office in the 2020 elections. The CRPH subsequently published the “Federal Democratic Charter” that outlined core goals as well as the steps for the creation of the NUG and an advisory body, the National Unity Consultative Council, made up of the resistance’s different constitutive organisations.

The NUG’s founders and supporters view it as an interim government that will manage affairs until the next elections. Other terms that are at times used to describe the NUG, like “shadow government” or “government in exile,” can be misleading. It is neither simply trying to mimic the SAC nor is it situated in one central location outside Myanmar where it operates as a government in waiting. While not a perfect term, “interim government” is in many ways a more fitting description for the NUG’s nature. Since the latter acts as the interim executive, it is widely perceived as the most important of the three provisional branches of government – but all of them are significant. Importantly, the CRPH and the NUG, both of which count a multitude of NLD politicians among their ranks, also benefit from the long-accrued political capital of Aung San Suu Kyi, who – more than her party – continues to be revered by people throughout the country.

The current resistance thus brings together three broader groups: EAOs, politicians from parties opposed to the military (most notably the NLD), as well as political grassroots organisations. This has two consequences. First, it has made the resistance resilient. No collective opposing military oppression in Myanmar has ever been even remotely as successful as they in keeping pressure on the junta. Second, there is now an opportunity for genuine reform that completely reimagines democratic structures and processes in the country beyond the erstwhile status quo that safeguarded the military’s independence and its influence on national affairs.

Opportunities for Greater EU Engagement

Prior to the 2021 coup, the EU and many of its individual member states were advocates for dialogue between the military, the democratically elected government, and EAOs. Similar to many other observers, the Bloc reasoned that, within the hybrid-regime system that the junta had created through the 2008 Constitution, peace and stability were not to be had without the armed forces’ involvement. In stark contrast, the latest coup showed that these outcomes will remain elusive without civilian oversight of the military. As multifaceted and fragmented as it is, the resistance is united in its quest to create a political system that is radically more democratic than anything Myanmar has ever previously experienced. The EU should support this aspiration in three important ways.

Fostering local networks aiding the provision of services

Significant parts of Myanmar are not under the junta’s control. Depending on the specific area, EAOs or the NUG are trying to provide basic services, often relying in doing so on local community-based organisations (CBOs). The EU should strengthen its support for such initiatives and provide training to local partners that will increase their capacity to utilise humanitarian and developmental aid effectively. This would allow the Bloc to strengthen its relationships with the NUG, EAOs, and CBOs who are active in certain areas nationwide. By way of an example, if the NUG and EAOs are striving to provide basic medical services in a particular region, then the EU should provide both relevant training for that as well as the necessary resources for medical staff to treat patients, including equipment and medication. Education, similarly, is a key area where support is required. It can help build relationships of trust that will ensure that aid arrives where it is needed the most without too much bureaucracy or reliance on international non-governmental organisations who may be less cost-efficient and lack access.

Assistance with state-building

The resistance is trying to create parallel government structures and perform related functions, for example through setting up judicial bodies. EAOs who have long controlled a given territory in Myanmar have considerable experience performing state roles but might come under strain when larger areas are absorbed under their control after successful advances against the military. Elsewhere such structures have to be built from scratch, often under extremely challenging circumstances and without resources. At the same time, the resistance is trying to make plans for a future beyond military rule. Discussions between the different stakeholders range from all-encompassing aspects like the process for creating a new federal constitution to the revision of the individual laws that have long been used to disenfranchise the country’s ethnic and religious minorities, with the 1982 Citizenship Law but one example.

The EU should consult with the NUG and EAOs to determine their needs for technical support and provide training and capacity-building where necessary. It should also provide the two with targeted assistance to bolster the creation of parallel government structures and back these endeavours with all necessary resources. Doing so would show that the EU indeed “supports the NUG as the only legitimate representatives of the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar” (European Parliament 2022).

Take a more active role in championing the cause of the resistance internationally

Between the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and no shortage of violent conflicts elsewhere around the world, the ongoing situation in Myanmar is often all too easily forgotten. The EU should dedicate more resources to advocating on behalf of the resistance at international fora, coordinate with its global partners, lobby ASEAN to take more concrete steps in support of the resistance, and – most importantly – work closely with Bangladesh, India, and Thailand to foster greater understanding of the objectives to hand. If the Bloc increases its involvement along the lines of the first two recommendations, finding a way to work with Thailand will be indispensable as heightened inflows of aid would have to move into Myanmar through the border the two countries share. This should go hand in hand with lobbying the Thai government to cease arresting and detaining Myanmar citizens who have fled their country to avoid persecution. Considering Thailand’s political position vis-à-vis the junta and the resistance this will be challenging, but a look at past crises involving these Southeast Asian neighbours indicates that positive outcomes might be achievable through skilled negotiation.

International advocacy also has a second dimension to it. For too long the 5PC has created a narrative that views dialogue between the junta and the resistance as the key to the resolution of this conflict without policy tools being in place that are sufficiently conducive to such an outcome. The past four years show that without increased pressure on the military and support for the resistance, there is just no incentive for the former to enter into dialogue with the latter. The military knows that, as veteran Myanmar analyst Andrew Selth put it, “it does not have to win the war to remain in power. It just has to avoid losing it” (Selth 2022). Through increased advocacy, then, the EU can contribute to creating a greater understanding of this dynamic, and thus potentially inspire further international support for the resistance.

Pathways Forward

Four years after the coup, and with all these considerations in mind, the EU should drastically increase its support for the resistance. This would allow the Bloc to remain true to the objectives set out in its values-based foreign policy towards Myanmar in the ten years prior to the events of February 2021. Stronger such support also holds the opportunity to make a real difference in the quest to create a Myanmar radically more democratic in nature, as a country that could become a key partner in the region should the resistance succeed. This backing could inform a new “EU Strategy for Myanmar.” Despite having been watered down, the 2022 US Burma Act can serve as a helpful yardstick for rethinking the EU’s approach (Martin 2023) since the Act stipulates clear avenues for the provision of technical and non-lethal support.

When the military first began shooting at protestors in the aftermath of the coup, certain activists thought that they could attract international support based on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine. Some took to making placards saying “Responsibility to Protect Now” and “R2P for Myanmar.” A decade of representatives of Western governments coming to the country – talking in the process about the importance of human rights and democracy, as well as their inviolability – had left its mark, instilling hopes of greater support and protection for Myanmar’s population than what international partners were previously willing to provide. It is not too late to make good on this promise and thus increase the chances of democracy eventually prevailing. As the world’s most powerful regional organisation, the EU can make a real difference here.

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