Ten Things to Watch in India in 2026

Strategic hedging is now critical for India. Balancing its interests with those of BRICS peers while also concluding important trade deals will remain challenging. Relations with the US being complex, India may seek limited rapprochement with China. Faultlines on regional issues, internal security, and domestic politics are likely to persist. Here are ten things to watch as regards India in 2026.

• International: Holding the BRICS presidency will test India’s multi-alignment strategy. As part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, New Delhi is likely to look for partners beyond the US.

• Regional: India–China relations may improve diplomatically but are unlikely to resolve high-politics issues such as border disputes. Ties with Pakistan are set to remain strained, if not worsen. Elections in Bangladesh and Nepal may require India to adopt pragmatism in its “Neighbourhood Policy.”

• Trade and Energy: India’s attention may shift towards increasing trade and technology cooperation with the EU. Liberalisation of civil nuclear energy production could strengthen relations with traditional partners in the field such as Australia, France, Japan, Russia, and the US.

• Domestic: The five state assembly elections are unlikely to reflect the “national mood” but may still reveal issues of importance, particularly around incumbency. The Maoist insurgency may be defeated, but tensions in Manipur could deepen. The centenary of India’s most influential Hindu nationalist movement may signal a recalibration of Hindutva ideology, with implications for narratives on domestic cohesion and sovereignty.

Policy Implications

Indian strategy will be anchored in proactive, interests-based engagement. Europe’s relevance as a stable economic, technological, and defence partner has the potential to rise. Progress on trade, technology, civil nuclear cooperation, and a shared outlook for the Indo-Pacific can cement this. Taking a pragmatic approach to India would also allow Europe to strengthen its footprint in the region.

India’s BRICS Presidency

India’s assumption of the BRICS presidency in January 2026 represents a critical test of New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy in times of global turmoil. While, in line with its erstwhile G20 presidency, it will aspire to championing Global South interests, it also needs to avoid entrapment in a Chinese-dominated anti-Western coalition. The nature of India’s presidency may, in fact, become an indicator for whether BRICS is genuinely able to function as a platform for developing-country cooperation or will instead become constrained by great-power rivalry – particularly with China’s presidency looming in 2027.

India has responded by emphasising a “humanity first” approach, spotlighting development priorities while playing down contentious issues like further BRICS expansion and de-dollarisation. Last year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed redefining the BRICS acronym as “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability,” signalling this strategic pivot. The presidency’s success thus depends on navigating several landmines: consolidating membership without alienating potential applicants; addressing local currency-lending initiatives without enabling yuan dominance; and, maintaining strategic autonomy while conveying to Washington and Brussels that cooperation with Western partners remains possible and desirable. From a broader geopolitical perspective, India is likely to walk a tightrope between keeping its engagement with BRICS modest to avoid further confrontation with the US and leveraging its presidency to catalyse a more assertive collective Global South stance vis-à-vis the North American country.

New Delhi, thus, will likely concentrate on less divisive issues in terms of agenda-setting: AI governance, data sovereignty, and digital trade norms, alongside traditional Global South priorities, including the reform of international institutions for better representation and climate finance. Of specific interest to observers will be how – especially in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – BRICS under Indian leadership will deal with the US’s breach of international law in Venezuela (and potential threats to do so elsewhere). This situation underscores the predicament that comes with multi-alignment for India. The latter may, in fact, temporarily steer BRICS towards development-focused multilateralism in 2026, but rotating presidencies create few lasting legacies. With diverging member priorities and China’s turn at the helm already set for 2027, little is set in stone beyond the year ahead.

Recalibrating Security Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

India’s Indo-Pacific outlook in the months to come will be marked by a deliberate scaling back of reliance on the US and a recalibration of external partnerships. Donald Trump’s tariffs, growing embrace of Pakistan, and transactional way of working with allies have reinforced perceptions in New Delhi that Washington’s Indo-Pacific agenda is losing coherence. By prioritising domestic retrenchment and publicly pressuring its allies, the US has undermined its logic of cultivating Asian partnerships to balance China and weakened its Indo-Pacific strategic framework accordingly. This underscores US volatility and the need for India to strengthen its own security network as well as take on a greater leadership role in the region.

While the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US – has thus far been a useful channel for coordination on maritime security, as aiding capacity-building and signalling support for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, strained India–US relations of late have called its future into question. The annual Quad Leaders’ Summit, originally scheduled for November 2025, was quietly postponed without an announcement of a future date, indicating little political interest in the institution’s continued existence. In 2026, Indo-Pacific watchers will be keen to see how the Quad evolves and whether it can withstand geopolitical instability. India’s silence or heavily reduced participation will indicate its quiet recalibration of priorities and that New Delhi sees diminishing returns from expending political capital on the framework. Its choices will reflect whether it continues to view the Quad as an effective hedge against China – especially as a cautious thaw in relations therewith is underway – or as a liability tied to US unpredictability.

Following the intense geopolitical turbulence of last year, New Delhi will both seek to build bridges and repair old ones. It has, for instance, renewed focus on diversifying its partnership with ASEAN, where it sees greater strategic comfort and normative alignment. The declaration of 2026 as the “India–ASEAN Maritime Year” reflects efforts to foreground maritime cooperation and position the partnership as a powerful basis for global stability and growth. It is embedded in Modi’s MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) policy, announced last year as an upgrade of India’s maritime doctrine. Success or failure will also be dependent on the China variable. New Delhi’s focus on aligning with European partners, particularly France and Germany, on the Indo-Pacific is another example of this.

Overall, India’s approach is one of seeking strategic autonomy. At a time of high geopolitical risk and great uncertainty, the challenge will be to translate rhetoric into sustained action. The Quad’s undetermined fate leaves a capability and signalling gap; if New Delhi is indeed serious about reducing reliance on the US, relations with ASEAN in the months ahead will illustrate whether it has the capacity to build more credible security partnerships and bring about a qualitative shift in the nature of its regional role. Successfully turning normative alignment into concrete security outcomes would show that India can act as a “net security provider” without anchoring itself to US-led frameworks and help define its real Indo-Pacific weight.

A Cautious Thaw in Relations with China

Sino–Indian relations may be set to see a warming at the diplomatic level, but the structural drivers of rivalry endure. The core issue here is one of position: the two countries are in long-term competition over status and influence across Asia, including regarding the Himalayas and Indian Ocean. While India has not yet demonstrated the capacity to lead the continent at large, a China-led Asia is an outcome entirely unacceptable to New Delhi. Certain diplomatic channels have been cautiously reactivated between the latter and Beijing, yet the border remains heavily militarised, and nationalist fervour constrains compromise. Their unresolved territorial dispute remains the most visible flashpoint, though the underlying stakes extend well beyond the immediate military balance. One further dimension is the triangular entanglement between themselves and Pakistan, which came to the fore during India’s 2025 conflict with its northwestern neighbour. Beijing’s strategic partnership with Islamabad continues to shape Indian threat perceptions and crisis calculations as well as Chinese policy, reinforcing broader strategic rivalry.

The nature of Indian engagement with the US going forward remains uncertain. If a tacit bargain between Trump and Xi Jinping emerges, the terms could affect India’s strategic space — for example, by recalibrating great-power priorities in Asia or concessions made to China. At the same time, Trump-era tariffs, especially high on Indian exports, have complicated economic ties and may have slowed the intertwining of Sino–American and Sino–Indian rivalries; this dynamic will have to be closely watched in the months to come. Multilateral forums such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will remain arenas of managed co-existence rather than substantive convergence. China’s dominance in BRICS poses challenges as India assumes the chair, requiring New Delhi to balance advocacy for reform with hedging against its northeast neighbour’s excessive influence.

While India’s “Look/Act East Policy” has deepened ties with ASEAN through so-called “Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships” and initiatives regarding trade, infrastructure/physical connectivity, and people-to-people cooperation, it is also marked by trepidation given China’s massive influence in the Southeast Asian region and New Delhi’s comparatively much slower pace of engagement therewith. Many challenges remain, including infrastructure-building delays, political instability in Myanmar, and uneven economic integration. Beijing’s by now well-established Belt and Road projects and security initiatives challenge India’s ability to offer credible alternatives. Sustained engagement with ASEAN will be a strategic priority and a test of New Delhi’s capacity to translate intent into tangible regional influence. Finally, one overlooked arena is peripheral geopolitics – namely in South Asia and the Indian Ocean – where small shifts in elite politics can rapidly reconfigure the regional balance. Whether China consolidates further gains in South Asia at India’s expense will be among the most consequential variables shaping the next phase of Sino–Indian competition.

Stalemate in India–Pakistan Relations

Following the killing of 26 civilians by Islamist terrorists in Pahalgam, Kashmir, in April 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor – a series of missile strikes on Pakistani sites that escalated into reciprocal attacks on airbases and other military infrastructure involving drones, aircraft, and missiles. After three days of fighting, the conflict halted without clear victory for either side. Officially, the Indian government maintains that the resumption of Operation Sindoor is possible at any moment, presumably to uphold the threat of force. Further developments in these two nuclear-armed states’ relations is thus a key thing to watch in 2026.

Tepid improvements in India–China ties, the South Asian country’s interest in stability amid great geopolitical uncertainty, painful strikes on both sides, as well as the inevitability of nuclear deterrence may contribute to the rivalry’s peaceful management. Yet, other factors suggest renewed standoff may prevail. For one thing, both sides publicly claimed victory, thus creating outsized expectations regarding future conflicts and reducing India’s ability to effectively deter its northwestern neighbour. In fact, Pakistani army chief General Asim Munir’s popularity surged as a result of the fighting; he also won unexpected international support, being granted two in-person meetings with Trump in 2025 alone. Despite Kashmir seeing less deadly violence in recent years, India remains unable to pre-empt future terror attacks in the region, as illustrated by what happened in Pahalgam (as well as other incidents before and after). Indeed, growing repression at the hands of India’s security forces, repeated Internet blackouts, a controlled media, and the loss of political rights continue to fuel anger among Kashmir’s Muslim-majority population. Pakistani intransigence regarding its territorial claims to the latter and the absence of any sort of structured dialogue to resolve said dispute and its underlying causes may also set the tone for the months ahead. Moreover, as India’s attempts to isolate Pakistan internationally failed, the 2025 conflict has left New Delhi scrambling for alternative means to inflict pain on its neighbour.

The suspension of the “Indus Water Treaty” regulating Pakistani access to water flowing downstream from India was one of them; Islamabad continues to call for its resurrection, albeit without success thus far. Progress being made or not on such vital areas of cooperation as this one would be a bellwether for the overall trajectory of the two countries’ relations in the near future. Pakistan also blames India for supporting violent groups along its borders with Afghanistan as well as separatists in Baluchistan operating against the central state. Meanwhile, Islamabad has established new ties with the interim government in Dhaka. How far these respective theatres continue to merge must be kept under close scrutiny in the year ahead.

Elections in Bangladesh and Nepal

Political transitions in Bangladesh and Nepal may make 2026 a demanding year for India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy. Neither election is likely to cause a rupture, but both may require pragmatic adjustment. New Delhi may have to come to terms with shifting political alignments and a more pronounced contest for influence in its neighbourhood, particularly as involving China.

The 12 February 2026 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, to be held alongside a referendum on state reforms, may unfold amid tensions linked to Sheikh Hasina’s 2024 removal and her continued residence in India. Dhaka’s interim authorities have requested her extradition under a 2013 treaty, yet New Delhi may decline in instances like this: that is, where the case is deemed political or due-process concerns persist. Since extradition appears unlikely, this may remain a recurring point of friction. The return of Bangladesh Nationalist Party acting chair Tarique Rahman after 17 years in exile may expand the political field and reduce reliance on leader-centric diplomacy, even if a post-Hasina government proves to be less aligned with India.

Security concerns add complexity: in a reply to the Lower House of the Indian Parliament, Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai reported 1,104 so-called “infiltration attempts” along the India–Bangladesh border and 2,556 arrests for unauthorised entry between January and November 2025 (Jain 2025). In Indian official parlance, “infiltration” is shorthand for detected unauthorised crossings linked to border-security concerns; because the term is politically charged given the domestic debate on migration, identity, and religion, such rhetoric may serve to harden suspicions in India and trigger wariness in Bangladesh too, adding strain to bilateral ties even though the figures alone do not indicate who crossed, why, or the presence of any actual danger. Attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh – with dozens of fatalities, alongside other episodes of violence occurring in late 2025 on into 2026 – have provoked great concern in India, leading to official calls for Dhaka to ensure the protection of those in question. Still, economic interdependence tempers the risk of sustained estrangement: India–Bangladesh trade reached USD 13.51 billion in the financial year 2024–2025 (IBEF 2025). Even though this represents only about 0.8 per cent of total Indian trade, it still matters because Bangladesh is a key South Asian export market and New Delhi runs a large surplus (about USD 11.46 billion in exports versus USD 2.05 billion in imports); political tensions or border delays can quickly disrupt trade and connectivity (trade and logistical routes as well as people-to-people transit and transport linkages) in eastern India.

The elections scheduled for 5 March 2026 in Nepal, following the Gen-Z protests of 2025, may restore political stability. Nevertheless, respective parties may make stronger statements about India and China on the campaign trail to signal to voters that they are advocates for Nepali sovereignty. Structural asymmetries continue to define ties. Nepal’s customs data, supported by that from the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, show India as its largest trade partner, accounting for about two-thirds of merchandise trade and providing transit routes for almost all of its third-country dealings. This dependence affords New Delhi leverage but also necessitates restraint, since overt pressure can provoke a nationalist backlash and strategic hedging. Nepal’s second-largest source of imports is from China (around 13–14 per cent of total in 2022, holding steady per a Nepal Rastra Bank report); Beijing is also an important investor, which helps explain why Kathmandu keeps the option of closer China ties alive when seeking to manage current dependence on India. At the same time, Nepal’s first power exports to Bangladesh via India’s grid in 2025 (40 megawatts) underscores India’s central role in regional energy connectivity and Kathmandu’s attempt to balance economic diversification with reliance on its much larger neighbour’s infrastructure.

With elections in Dhaka and Kathmandu occurring within weeks of each other, India may place a premium on institutional steadiness, predictable trade and transit arrangements, and security coordination that avoids politicisation.

Rebalancing Partnerships through Trade and Tech

New Delhi enters 2026 with three strategic priorities in terms of trade and technology: managing strained ties with the US, accelerating trade negotiations with Europe, and advancing its ambitions around critical and emerging technologies. Key developments to watch include whether and how India can secure trade breakthroughs, forge partnerships to diversify energy- and technology-supply-chain dependencies, and translate its technology goals into resilient, trust-based strategic partnerships.

From being one of the most optimistic countries to secure a trade deal with the US in early 2025, India enters the year ahead as one of the most heavily tariffed economies globally. Washington’s use of trade levers to pressure New Delhi over its continued imports of Russian oil has, in tandem with other compounding factors, strained India–US relations greatly. Trade negotiations in late 2025 reached an impasse, with energy and agriculture emerging as key areas of concern. As talks continue, potential breakthroughs may lie in energy – should India be able to make a credible commitment to purchase US resources – or in critical minerals, where both countries share an interest in reducing dependencies on China and strengthening alternative supply chains.

With the US increasingly seen as a challenging partner, attention has shifted to Europe. Negotiations over a free trade agreement (FTA) have gathered pace accordingly. Following strong political momentum in the year just gone, the EU and India concluded FTA negotiations on 27 January during the visit of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa to New Delhi. Both leaders were invited as guests of honour to India’s Republic Day on 26 January, ahead of the EU–India Summit the following day.

At the time of writing, reports indicated that the agreement would not extend to “sensitive agriculture issues” (Dutta Mishra 2026). When the text becomes public, in addition to agriculture, key areas to watch will include how the two sides have navigated other contentious issues: India’s demand for zero-duty access for its labour-intensive sectors like textiles, gems, and jewellery or the EU’s “Carbon Tax” (or Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) affecting products like steel and cement (The Hindu 2025). Additional indicators of the deal’s depth will include provisions on automotives, where proposals for joint manufacturing intended to encourage tariff reductions were tabled, as well as exclusions and possible concessions on garment duties (Business Standard 2025). Given the push to conclude talks by early 2026, the substance of the just announced EU–India deal will matter as much as the headline victory of having reached one. This can be assessed by comparing it with the UK–India FTA and the EU–Indonesia agreement on timelines, climate-focused agreements, and sensitive sectors.

Beyond trade, technology cooperation is a key aspect of India’s external economic strategy, particularly as ties with the US remain fraught at present. New Delhi has intensified efforts to deepen its alliance with like-minded partners like the EU in the realm of tech. This cooperation aligns closely with India’s three flagship technology missions in AI, semiconductors, and quantum technologies, all launched within the past five years, in seeking to concentrate policy attention and financial investment on critical and emerging technologies. Progress is expected across all three areas in the year ahead, with early momentum likely around the India AI Impact Summit scheduled for 16–20 February. This event is expected to showcase India’s approach to AI-use cases and governance, with an emphasis on practical applications and scale rather than binding regulations. Cooperation on critical and emerging technologies served as a central pillar of India’s trust-based partnership with the US. As 2026 plays out, India may well seek to adapt this model to strengthen its strategic partnership with Europe and other like-minded partners.

Nuclear Power Expansion Drive to Start

In late December, the Indian government enacted a major reform of its civil nuclear framework with the passage of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (SHANTI), following parliamentary approval and presidential assent. The law is intended to unlock nuclear energy as a more meaningful pillar of India’s clean-energy transition and to address long-standing structural and legal bottlenecks in the sector. The year ahead will be the first in which the Act moves from legislation to implementation.

SHANTI substantially liberalises the erstwhile state monopoly on civil nuclear power by permitting the licensed participation of private domestic firms and foreign partners in reactor construction, operation, and financing. However, sensitive segments of the nuclear-fuel cycle, such as uranium enrichment and waste management, remain under exclusive central government control. The Act also clarifies operator liability and compensation mechanisms in the event of a nuclear accident, addressing a key concern that had constrained foreign participation for six decades hitherto.

Nuclear power currently contributes less than 4 per cent of India’s electricity generation, across 24 reactors with an installed capacity of about 8.8 gigawatts. SHANTI is expected to accelerate capacity growth towards India’s target of a 100 GW nuclear fleet by 2047. This new framework opens the door to innovative technologies, including small modular reactors, positioning nuclear energy as a low-carbon baseload complement to rapidly expanding renewables. In 2025, non-fossil sources accounted for 51.5 per cent of India’s total installed electricity capacity, with solar accounting for more than half, followed by wind power, bioenergy, and the small-hydro sector.

India already maintains civil nuclear-cooperation agreements with Australia, France, Japan, Russia, and the US. By easing liability uncertainties, SHANTI could unlock stalled civil nuclear projects with France and the US. It could also lead to India’s expanding bilateral nuclear cooperation with Australia, Japan, and Russia to diversify and limit dependence, as well as to a more explicit inclusion of nuclear power in New Delhi’s climate and energy diplomacy. While opposition parties staged a parliamentary walkout, their objections focused on regulatory safeguards and institutional oversight rather than nuclear expansion per se. Detailed rules are expected to be published in the coming months, suggesting that implementation challenges may be procedural – with limited protests around safety and liability to ensue.

State Assembly Elections

In 2026, such elections are due in Assam, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and the Union Territory of Puducherry. These voting rounds will show whether the main national opposition party, Congress, and powerful regional parties – such as the Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu – can hold their voter bases or defend their turf against the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) highly organised, well-funded electoral machine. They will also test whether these parties can neutralise the BJP’s “double‑engine” pitch: namely, the claim that a state will do better if the same party governs both state and the national government. Also set to be revealed is what works in each state in the current phase of Indian politics: brand Modi, incumbent performance, religious or regional identity-based politics, local issues, campaign strategies, or pre-poll alliances and post-poll coalitions.

A distinctive feature of this election cycle is that the Election Commission of India’s efforts to clean up the official list of eligible voters – known as the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) – has itself become politically contentious. The Commission says the exercise is meant to remove duplicate entries and the names of voters who have moved away or died. While the national ruling coalition, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), defends the exercise, most parties not part of it – from Congress (a national opposition party contesting all five states but governing none of them at present) to regional parties not aligned with the BJP, whether they are in government or in opposition in those states – have alleged procedural lapses, irregularities, and bias. The key question, then, is whether and how SIR affects upcoming state elections.

Second aspect to closely monitor is which narrative dominates discourse and outcomes in different states: whether it is retrospective performance evaluations or identity-based polarisation. Third, is the ability of national and regional political parties to engineer pre-poll alliances and post-poll coalitions. Alliance churn and power-sharing negotiations are already visible, for instance, in Assam, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry.

In Assam, the BJP government keeps migration and citizenship centre stage. It takes a hard line on these issues, while also seeking votes on the strength of its welfare record. In West Bengal, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s TMC is seeking a fourth term on the back of highlighting its welfare schemes and portraying itself as the defender of Bengali pride. The BJP is trying to unseat her on the grounds of corruption and misgovernance allegations.

In Tamil Nadu, the ruling DMK and the opposition All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) compete over who best delivers social justice and protects both Tamil identity and state autonomy. The BJP remains a small player but is seeking a greater political role in the state going forward through an alliance with the well-established AIADMK. Tamil cinema star Vijay’s new party, Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), positions itself against both the BJP and the incumbent DMK, adding a fresh dimension to proceedings.

Kerala politics is defined by a duopoly of two alliances: the communist-led Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF). They compete over governance outcomes and welfare delivery. Identity politics and religious polarisation have less weight in Kerala, although the BJP is trying to build a Hindu voter base and become a credible contender in select constituencies there.

In Puducherry (a Union Territory that continues to seek full statehood), tensions between the lieutenant governor and the elected government have become a pertinent issue on the campaign trail. The key contest here is between the incumbent All India N.R. Congress (AINRC), which governs with BJP support, and the Congress–DMK alliance. TVK’s arrival on the scene, however, has the potential to make it a multi-cornered contest.

Internal Security: Maoist Insurgency and Manipur Ethnic Violence

Internal conflicts beyond Kashmir – namely, in Maoist-affected central India, further to ongoing insurgency in the country’s northeast – are likely to see very different trajectories in the months ahead. In February of last year, Union Home Minister Amit Shah vowed to comprehensively defeat once and for all the country’s long-running Maoist insurgency, as led by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI – Maoist), by 31 March 2026. Throughout 2025, India’s security forces pursued an aggressive strategy of forward deploying in traditional CPI – Maoist strongholds and pursuing and killing the latter’s militants and leaders, coupling this with wider schemes around surrender and development to disincentivise further rebel recruitment. CPI – Maoist suffered sustained losses throughout the year just gone, becoming dislodged from key base areas, losing its general secretary in May, and suffering several large-scale ambushes during which dozens of cadres were killed. The fact that the group has made ceasefire overtures throughout, and that Shah formally rejected these on 28 September 2025, is evidence simultaneously of both CPI – Maoist’s weakness and the central government’s own perceived position of strength.

Conflict watchers will be able to obtain an early sense of how successful the government’s strategy has been by identifying any signs of activity during CPI – Maoist’s “Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign” (TCOC) season running February–June 2026. CPI – Maoist forces appeared to largely avoid committing to their typical TCOC offensive last year, and the 2026 iteration is likely to again be heavily disrupted as a result of the security forces’ efforts. Since the government’s strategy elsewhere in the country has been to militarily erode rebel groups and force them to capitulate, as was the case with the Bodo insurgency in Assam in 2020, analysts should look out for further overtures from CPI – Maoist and government attempts to induce mass surrender as the aforementioned 31 March 2026 deadline for ending this standoff approaches.

Such decisive shifts are less likely in the near future regarding India’s second major internal security challenge beyond Kashmir: Manipur. While the imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025 and the enforcement of “buffer zones” to separate the Meitei and Kuki communities has brought the scale and intensity of violence between militias from the two ethnic groups down from its 2023 peak, these buffer zones – a grid of checkpoints separating Meitei-dominated and Kuki-dominated areas – have entrenched ethnic divisions and rendered claims of a return to normalcy premature. A central government-imposed deadline for internally displaced persons to be returned to their homes by December 2025 passed without any discernible progress being made in dismantling the buffer-zone architecture, and indeed without the political will to pursue aggressive operations against either Meitei or Kuki armed groups. Acting increasingly as a safety blanket, these buffer zones are likely to persist well into 2026. Meanwhile, Manipur’s porous borders with Myanmar, where Meitei and Kuki armed groups launch attacks on Indian territory as well as fight on opposite sides in Myanmar’s civil war, will mean that the risk of flare-ups in ethnic violence instigated by Manipuri armed groups remains significant in the months to come.

Recalibrating the “Hindutva” Agenda

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the strongest proponent and organisational backbone of Hindutva ideology, entered its centenary year in October 2025 and will continue throughout the year ahead. Founded in 1925, RSS has functioned not as a conventional political organisation but as a long-term ideological and sociocultural movement, based on Hindutva, with deep cadre-based penetration across Indian society. RSS Chief (“Sarsanghachalak”) Mohan Bhagwat has used this centenary as an opportunity to call for a critical recalibration of the past 100 years and to articulate a renewed vision for the RSS. This signals not mere commemoration but the strategic reorientation of Hindutva ideology for decades to come.

RSS is the ideological wellspring of the BJP, India’s current ruling party. Over time, a number of major political decisions and dominant public discourses, whether already implemented or still gathering momentum, have reflected strong RSS influence. These include the country’s emerging “civilisational” self-positioning, the abrogation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status, the demand for a Uniform Civil Code to replace religious personal laws with common law, and the broader idea of cultural decolonisation and a self-reliant India. Institutional proximity between the RSS and the BJP is reinforced by leadership trajectories: both BJP prime ministers, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1996, 1998–2004) and Modi (2014–present), were RSS “Pracharak” (officials) in their formative years. This continuity has enabled ideological transmission without formal organisational control. The much-discussed speculative “rift” between the RSS and BJP in mid-2025, including over Modi’s succession, was put to rest when the latter attended the centenary celebrations and released a specially designed commemorative postage stamp and coin highlighting RSS’s contributions.

Widely described as a Hindu-nationalist organisation, RSS is anchored in Hindutva – which Bhagwat consistently defines as a cultural and civilisational identity rather than a religious doctrine or an exclusionary framework. He has emphasised that Hindutva rejects divisive identities such as caste, language, or region and has cautioned against interpreting RSS through the lens of the BJP, RSS’s own affiliates, or through comparisons with far-right groups. Thus, it is likely that RSS’s recalibration will focus on consolidating Hindutva as a civilisational and governance narrative rather than advancing overtly exclusionary policies towards minorities or other contentious identities. However, amid increasing political polarisation, 2026 will be a critical year for observing how RSS positions its distinct ideology, potentially shaping India’s red lines on sovereignty, culture, and security, and influencing its foreign policy stances on the neighbourhood, trade, and major powers.

This GIGA Focus deviates from the series’ typical format. It is the joint production of several GIGA Institute for Asian Studies staff members. Miriam Prys-Hansen looked at India’s BRICS presidency. Mahima Duggal authored the section on India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Manjeet S. Pardesi contributed on India’s possible ties with China, Johannes Plagemann on relations with Pakistan, and Sangeeta Mahapatra on dealings with Bangladesh and Nepal. Sharinee Jagtiani explained India’s foreign trade and technology policy. Soumya Chaturvedi wrote the section on civil nuclear energy policy as well as the part on Hindutva ideology. Chanchal Kumar Sharma addressed the implications of domestic elections. Alex Waterman oversaw the examination of internal security. Plagemann and Chaturvedi jointly edited this GIGA Focus.

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