Maduro Out, but Trump Still In: What Now for Venezuela and Cuba?

It took the US military just a few hours to remove Maduro from power. However, Trump’s boastful assertion that the United States will “run the country” is certain to induce a tug-of-war between many actors for months and years to come. As the United States has placed its bets on the old elite of long-time Maduro loyalists to guarantee stability and US interests, what chance is there for a democratic opening in the country? Will the Venezuelan government enter into a new phase of “coercive negotiations” with the United States, or will the country become a long-term de facto US protectorate? Given that the military raid on Venezuela comes as part of the US claim to the Americas – North and South – as its exclusive zone of influence, what will the implications be for the region? And what will its immediate effects be on Cuba, which has lost not only its closest political ally but also its key source of oil? With the economy spiralling and the threat of the United States stepping up its pressure growing, how will Cuba’s socialist regime – and the island’s people – brace themselves for the deep crisis to come?

Key takeaways from the event

Cuba

Political Outlook

• Large-scale social uprising unlikely.

• No organized opposition or strong civil society (unlike Venezuela).

• Regime remains internally coherent and aligned.

• Castro legacy still connects key state institutions.

• Castro-linked leadership likely key contact point in any U.S. negotiations.

U.S. Position

• No appetite for military intervention (“boots on the ground” unlikely).

• Negotiations more probable than direct action.

• U.S. understands Cuba’s fragile geopolitical/economic position.

• Continued blockade seen as low-risk, high-pressure strategy.

• “Strangulation” approach considered effective without military escalation.

Geopolitical Constraints

• Limited alternatives for Cuba if blockade continues.

• Key allies weakened or unavailable:

  • Russia & China distracted by other priorities.

  • Venezuela weakened.

  • Mexico under U.S. pressure.

• Attempts to import oil (Africa, Colombia) disrupted by U.S. pressure.

• Oil shipments unlikely to reach Cuba without military escort.

Humanitarian Risk

• Next 4–6 weeks highly uncertain (As of: early March).

• Without oil:

  • Hospitals risk losing electricity.

  • Food distribution collapses.

  • No fuel for cooking or refrigeration.

• Most likely short-term scenario: humanitarian crisis.

Domestic Mood

• Atmosphere stagnant and tense.

• Persistent fuel shortages.

• Business closures.

• Public appears to be “waiting” rather than mobilizing.

Venezuela

Political Developments

• Maduro less central in public narrative.

• Rapid legislative changes to appease Washington:

• New oil/minerals law (tax incentives, private investment powers).

• Amnesty law (partial release of political prisoners).

• Opposition leader María Corina Machado unlikely to benefit from amnesty.

Economic Outlook

• Oil production rising gradually.

• International investors re-entering cautiously.

• Environment remains high-risk:

  • Impunity.

  • Institutional weakness.

  • Unstable socio-economic conditions.

  • Small/mid-level investors more interested than major corporations.

Likely Scenario

• Economic stabilization under current elites.

• Stabilization ≠ democratization.

• Limited political liberalization so far.

Elite Dynamics

• No visible internal fractures currently.

• System operates transactionally.

• Elites united as long as collective survival intact.

• True transition would likely fracture coalition.

• Security elites (Padrino López, Diosdado) incompatible with full transition.

• Elites delaying transition to preserve unity and power.

Faction Roles

• Rodríguez faction: diplomatic arm (U.S., Iran, Europe).

• Security elites:

  • Retained due to their stabilizing/destabilizing power.

  • Made indispensable within system.

Armed Forces

• Focused on stability.

• Lower ranks rotated and monitored to prevent dissent.

• High ranks reshuffled and coopted via corruption.

• Institutional loyalty maintained through control mechanisms.

Paramilitary Groups

• Colectivos (linked to Diosdado Cabello):

  • Ideological orientation.

  • Funded/armed via Interior Ministry.

  • Decentralized networks.

  • Major instability risk if unchecked.

U.S. Strategy Constraints

• Weakening security elites risks internal conflict.

• Washington understands destabilization risk.

• Current strategy:

  • Maintain repressive apparatus.

  • Gradually shift power toward pro-transition actors.

Civil Society

• Stronger and more active than Cuba’s.

• Monitors transitional process closely.

• Fact-checks prisoner releases.

• Publicly challenges amnesty loopholes.

• Denounces repression.

• Provides real potential for democratic transition—if leveraged effectively.

Speakers: Jesús Renzullo is a Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies and has been following events in Venezuela closely for years. Prof. Dr. Bert Hoffmann is a Lead Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies and will return from a visit to Cuba shortly before the GIGA Talk. Moderator: Prof. Dr. Merike Blofield is Director of the GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies and a Professor of political science at the University of Hamburg.