After intrastate conflict, what properties of interim governments increase the stability of peace? Previous research on interim governments has often relied on case studies and tends to concentrate on studying the institutional designs of interim governments as explanatory variables, while neglecting the variety of reforms such governments implement. This dataset covers a sample of all 62 interim governments that followed at least one year of intrastate conflict since 1989, and that terminated by 2012. It codes information on power-sharing, international actors and civil society in interim governments, as well as how interim governments address the war-time institutions of warring parties.
Europe, Eastern Europe, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, South-East Europe, Romania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Rio Group, Central America, Guatemala, El Salvador, Caribbean, Haiti, South America, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Africa South of Sahara, West Africa, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Central Africa, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Chad, Congo (Kinshasa), Central African Republic, Southern Africa, Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Republic of South Africa, North-East Africa, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, African islands and other African areas, North Africa, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Eastern Arabia/Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Arabian peninsula, Yemen, Western Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Asia (without Western Asia), South Asia, Bangladesh, Nepal, South-East Asia, Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, East Timor, Oceania, Melanesia, Papua Neu Guinea
