Since 01/2024 Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Bergen (UiB)
Since 10/2023: Associate at the GIGA Institute for Asian Studies
01/2022 - 09/2023: Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute for Asian Studies and in the project “COVID-19 and Executive Personalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and the MENA Region”
01/2021-02/2021: Lecturer, Randolph-Macon College
06/2020: PhD Political Science, Stanford University
Education: PhD Political Science, Stanford University; MA Political Science, Stanford University; BA Political Science and International Relations, Korea University
How do chief executives personalize power? In this paper we conceptualize the personalization of executive power based on observable processes initiated by the chief executive looking at personnel management, institutional engineering, and coercion.
Since normalizing ties in 1992, South Korea’s narratives on China have evolved. Using computational text analysis of scholarly articles, op-eds, and polls, this article compares elite, public, and academic view, showing growing polarization since 2015, especially after THAAD and COVID-19.
This note presents a novel dataset on career transitions of elites in North Korea across state, party, military, and parastatal sectors. Organization- and position-level information enables analysis of elite management, offering new insights into authoritarian politics and personalist regimes.
How does China signal foreign policy intentions to domestic and international audiences during territorial conflicts? While China can signal its resolve by provoking nationalism at home, doing so may risk appearing threatening to neighbouring countries in the region. We argue that China resolves the dilemma by sending different types of messages to domestic and international audiences.
When asked about general views of China, 81 per cent of South Korean respondents expressed negative or very negative sentiments. That is more than in any of the 56 countries surveyed worldwide. What makes South Koreans so negative about China? And what are the foreign policy implications?
Lectures
Ewha Womans University (EWHA) | 14/10/2023
Computational Methods in Political Science Research: Examples from Social Media Data and News Data
Organiser: Ewha Womans University (EWHA)
Dr. Esther Song (Speaker)
Talk given at Computational Social Science Workshop, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, Seoul South Korea. The talk focused on introducing graduate students at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Ewha Womans University on how computational social science methods can be used in political science research. Examples were drawn from Dr. Song's recent research published or forthcoming in Journal of Chinese Political Science, Asian Survey, and Korea Observer.
Personnel Management as a Credible Commitment Mechanism: Evidence from North Korea
ECPR General Conference 2023, Charles University, Prague
Organisers: European Consortium for Political Research
Dr. Esther Song (Speaker)
Dr. Esther Song presents her paper "Personnel Management as a Credible Commitment Mechanism: Evidence from North Korea" at the ECPR General Conference 2023 in Prague. The presentation is part of the panel " Personalisation and regime legitimacy in autocracies", chaired by her. Co-Chair is GIGA expert Dr. André Bank.
Air pollutants allegedly originating from China have become a thorny issue in South Korea. By examining social media data, new reports, and a unique survey data collected in South Korea, this article examines how media reporting on transboundary air pollution issue negatively affects Sino-Korea relations.
Recent polls suggest anti-Chinese sentiment is on the rise in South Korea. Statistical analyses show that such negative feeling is strongly correlated with growing support for alignment with the US. These findings carry key implications for the Yoon administration’s foreign policy orientation.
When asked about general views of China, 81 per cent of South Korean respondents expressed negative or very negative sentiments. That is more than in any of the 56 countries surveyed worldwide. What makes South Koreans so negative about China? And what are the foreign policy implications?
COVID-19 generated significant anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea. Domestic elite-level narratives regarding China at the pandemic’s onset were highly polarized: conservative parties advocated border shutdowns, emphasizing China as originating the virus, while progressive parties warned that this would incite xenophobia. Did these narratives shape anti-Chinese sentiment, and what are their foreign policy effects?
Air pollutants allegedly originating from China have become a thorny issue in South Korea. By examining social media data, new reports, and a unique survey data collected in South Korea, this article examines how media reporting on transboundary air pollution issue negatively affects Sino-Korea relations.
Recent polls suggest anti-Chinese sentiment is on the rise in South Korea. Statistical analyses show that such negative feeling is strongly correlated with growing support for alignment with the US. These findings carry key implications for the Yoon administration’s foreign policy orientation.
When asked about general views of China, 81 per cent of South Korean respondents expressed negative or very negative sentiments. That is more than in any of the 56 countries surveyed worldwide. What makes South Koreans so negative about China? And what are the foreign policy implications?
COVID-19 generated significant anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea. Domestic elite-level narratives regarding China at the pandemic’s onset were highly polarized: conservative parties advocated border shutdowns, emphasizing China as originating the virus, while progressive parties warned that this would incite xenophobia. Did these narratives shape anti-Chinese sentiment, and what are their foreign policy effects?
Air pollutants allegedly originating from China have become a thorny issue in South Korea. By examining social media data, new reports, and a unique survey data collected in South Korea, this article examines how media reporting on transboundary air pollution issue negatively affects Sino-Korea relations.
Recent polls suggest anti-Chinese sentiment is on the rise in South Korea. Statistical analyses show that such negative feeling is strongly correlated with growing support for alignment with the US. These findings carry key implications for the Yoon administration’s foreign policy orientation.
When asked about general views of China, 81 per cent of South Korean respondents expressed negative or very negative sentiments. That is more than in any of the 56 countries surveyed worldwide. What makes South Koreans so negative about China? And what are the foreign policy implications?
