Dastan Jasim

Clingendael Institute CA The Hague: 28/06/2022

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is going through challenging times. The launch of Turkey’s next operation against the PKK puts the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in a difficult position between a major economic partner and its fellow Kurds. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) faces a milder version of the same dilemma due to its greater distance from Turkey, but this is likely to grow more acute with time and include the additional complexity of tension with Iran.

Moreover, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) find themselves in opposing alliances in the protracted process of government formation, which stands in contrast with their ability over the past 15 years to form a united front. In Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniya, both the KDP and PUK face growing protests to their rule as socio-economic problems mount that Kurdistan Regional Government policies do not manage to address effectively, in part due to the region’s financial difficulties - aggravated by the recent ruling by the Federal Supreme Court assessing KRI oil exports as unconstitutional.

Roiled by such regional, domestic and local problems, it is not clear whether the political renewal that seems required to put the KRI on a more promising development track can be realized. On the one hand, one can imagine that the mix of top-down and bottom-up pressure incentivizes Erbil and Baghdad to institutionalize and upgrade their federal arrangements. This would require overcoming mistrust and a shift from transactional approaches to building a more strategic partnership. On the other hand, geopolitical tensions between Turkey, Iran and Baghdad may cause divides within the KRI to widen, ultimately creating zones of influence.

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Washington, D.C.: 10/05/2022

Religious freedom in Syria remains threatened from numerous quarters. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad systematically discriminates against members of religious groups outside the President’s own Alawi branch of Islam, destroys religious minorities’ houses of worship during clashes with opposition groups, and actively strips both religious minorities and the Sunni Muslim majority of their autonomy and religious authority. Armed opposition forces and militant Islamist groups target vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities in their attempts to wrest power from the Assad regime and one another. The al-Qaeda offshoot Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continues to brutalize and displace religious minority communities in the northwestern region of Idlib, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has increased its presence in eastern Syria, waging almost daily attacks and destabilizing the region for religious minorities. Turkish-supported Syrian armed opposition groups leverage their Turkish financing and military support to wage campaigns of religious and ethnic cleansing in Afrin.

In contrast, there are promising environments for religious freedom and intrareligious cooperation in Syria, including areas in the north and east governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

What is the status of religious freedom in each of Syria’s regions and under each of these political authorities? How can U.S. government policy support Syrian-led efforts to create a political solution for the country that encompasses and actively advances religious freedom? Witnesses will document religious freedom conditions throughout the country and make recommendations for U.S. policy in relation to religious freedom in Syria.