The EU and Latin America: Reassessing the Strategic Partnership

The upcoming EU–CELAC Summit in Colombia on 9–10 November 2025 offers an opportunity to take stock of the state of interregional relations. Both the EU and Latin America have in recent times experienced an erosion of global influence and bargaining power amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. The key question is whether – and, if so, in which areas – their strategic interests align.

• Europe’s edge in terms of soft power appears to be on the wane in Latin America. China’s image in the region now rivals that of the EU.

• Latin America and the EU share a common interest in strengthening economic ties as both aim to enhance their strategic autonomy. For Latin America, the EU represents an opportunity to diversify trade and foreign direct investment beyond China and the US.

• For the EU, Latin America represents an important market and a major investment destination – currently exceeding capital flows from China. The region also serves as a key supplier of critical raw materials, a role that is expected to become even more significant in the years ahead.

• The EU has signed memoranda of understanding on sustainable raw-material value chains with Argentina and Chile, and it has advanced and modernised its trade agreements with Latin American partners. The signing and ratification of the EU–Mercosur agreement will be a decisive test of the EU’s credibility in Latin America.

• The strategic visions of the EU and Latin America diverge in the areas of geopolitics and defence policy, as well as regarding respective approaches to the emerging world order.

Policy Implications

The convergence of strategic interests between the EU and Latin America in the economic domain is a solid basis for intensified cooperation but must translate into tangible outcomes beyond summit diplomacy. A genuine strategic partnership will also require closer cooperation on security and defence and greater alignment in responding to the shifting dynamics of the international order.

Strategic Partners in Decline

At the first Latin American–European Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, the goal of establishing a “strategic partnership” was announced. Since then, the term has resurfaced repeatedly in official declarations. In a recent resolution, for example, the European Parliament (2025) asserted the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to be “natural strategic partners.” With the upcoming EU–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in Colombia, it is timely to reconsider whether “strategic partnership” remains an adequate conceptual framework for understanding EU–Latin American relations. Such an assessment must take into account both regions’ relative decline in terms of global influence, their overlapping and divergent interests, and the differing strategic orientations that have emerged. As a recent study notes,

the relational nature of strategic partnership also implies that the EU itself is a strategic partner, with whom other global players want to engage in comprehensive agreements for their mutual interests. (Muftuler-Bac et al. 2022: 5)

Ultimately, a strategic partnership is a two-way endeavour: it presupposes mutual recognition of strategic significance and a shared perception of relevance in addressing global challenges.

The relative decline in Latin America’s global relevance over the past few decades, as compared to other regions of the world, has often been noted. But Europe, too, is in decline. As former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi observed in his speech of 22 August 2025:

For years the European Union believed that its economic dimension, with 450 million consumers, would itself bring geopolitical power and leverage in international trade relations. This year will be remembered as the year in which that illusion evaporated […]. Europe is ill-equipped in a world where geo-economics, security, and the stability of supply sources, rather than efficiency, shape international trade relations.

Europe’s capacity to exert influence and attract partners is diminishing. The Ukraine conflict and Donald Trump’s second presidency have contributed to this situation. The former has laid bare the EU’s lack of hard power in the form of military resources, although this could change in the medium term. It has also exposed Europe’s dependence on the US security umbrella, making it vulnerable to external pressures and limiting its much-vaunted “strategic autonomy.” The EU, facing trade-policy pressure from the Trump 2.0 administration, conceded to a suboptimal agreement. From both an economic and security viewpoint, this decision may appear understandable; nevertheless, it has undermined the EU’s credibility. The contrast becomes particularly evident when comparing the Bloc’s response to US tariffs with China’s more assertive stance hereon. In Latin America, perceptions of European weakness and excessive accommodation are widespread – especially since the Brazilian government adopted a far more defiant position towards US pressure, invoking national sovereignty in the face of the North American country’s interference in judicial proceedings against former president Jair Bolsonaro. Yet, in practice, nearly all Latin American countries have at some point yielded to US demands, whether concerning tariffs or the deportation of migrants.

In this complex international environment, where both the EU and Latin America find themselves on the defensive, the key question is where their strategic interests converge. According to the resolution recently adopted by the European Parliament (2025)

the EU-LAC partnership should be built on a logic of shared strategic autonomy, reduced external dependencies and the defence of the multilateral rules-based order as its guiding principles.

Europe’s Waning Soft Power

Common values, together with the EU’s normative appeal as a political and societal model, are frequently invoked to underscore the special relationship between the two world regions. A survey conducted in September 2021 by Latinobarómetro (FES, NUSO, and Latinobarómetro 2022) revealed that Latin Americans associate the EU with leadership in areas such as environmental protection, human rights, peace, poverty and inequality reduction, and humanitarian aid. By contrast, the EU was perceived as considerably less influential – or even weak – in domains such as science and education, economic competitiveness, military capability, and technological innovation. In short, the Bloc was credited with significant soft power but limited hard power. Since then, the increasing salience of geoeconomic and geopolitical dynamics has only further accentuated this imbalance.

According to the most recent Latinobarómetro survey data (2024), 58 per cent of Latin Americans hold a positive opinion of the EU – a modest increase compared to previous years. China, however, enjoys similarly high approval levels (54 per cent), while the US – albeit prior to Trump’s second presidency – registered significantly higher ratings (73 per cent). Remarkably, despite its war of aggression and a decline in support, Russia still obtained an average approval rating of 37 per cent across Latin America. When asked to assess bilateral relations as “good” or “bad,” positive assessments for China (64 per cent) ranked ahead of the EU (57 per cent), though both trailed behind the US at 72 per cent here (Russia 44 per cent). If soft power is understood as the “power of attraction,” Europe continues to command considerable goodwill in Latin America. Yet China’s perceived standing is now close to that of the EU, while the US remains more favourably looked on – a dynamic that may once again shift under Trump 2.0, as it did during his first term in office.

Europe’s advantages in terms of soft power – often seen as compensating for its relative lack of hard power – appear to be on the wane, with the Bloc losing traction and influence in an era dominated by power politics. Concurrently, the common foundations for a values-based foreign policy between Latin America and Europe also appear to be crumbling. This is reflected by, among other indicators, divergent voting patterns at the United Nations.

Europe’s Economic Power and Latin America’s Strategic Resources

“It’s the economy, stupid.” This famous catchphrase from Bill Clinton’s 1992 election campaign applies not only to domestic politics but also to foreign policy and international affairs. While the prospect of economic gain and enhanced prosperity can provide incentives for foreign policy engagement, underlying economic realities simultaneously impose constraints and dictate priorities. The scope and direction of external action are shaped hereby accordingly.

A recent study by the Georgetown Americas Institute (Cornejo, Estevadeordal, and Talvi 2025: 7) contends that, within the current geopolitical constellation, deepening economic integration between the EU and LAC constitutes not merely a trade opportunity but a strategic imperative. In this context, trade policy increasingly functions as an instrument of economic security. Related agreements, meanwhile, have evolved into “strategic platforms to reinforce resilience, diversify dependencies, and shape global standards” (Fasulo 2025: 23).

Both Latin America and the EU are pursuing economic diversification in aiming to mitigate the risks associated with the weaponisation of interdependence and to secure issue-specific partnerships. Within this context, they may figure as complementary components of each other’s diversification strategies, although these simultaneously encompass a broad range of external actors. Yet, these respective diversification efforts do not always seem headed in the same direction: those they engage with are often assessed differently by the EU and Latin American countries, as illustrated by the cases of China, Russia, or Iran. Moreover, within an increasingly complex network of global economic relations, neither region necessarily constitutes the other’s primary partner of choice.

Latin America is an important trading partner for the EU, but its degree of significance should be put into perspective. According to data from DG Trade and Economic Security, in 2024 Latin American countries as a whole accounted for a mere 5.5 per cent of the EU’s external trade (exports 5.8 per cent, imports 5.2 per cent). Its share therein has increased slightly since 2020 (exports 4.8 per cent, imports 4.6 per cent), but remains below the overall figures for Switzerland (6.5 per cent) and the UK (10.1 per cent). Brazil, the EU’s most important trading partner in Latin America, accounts for 1.8 per cent, which is lower than India (2.5 per cent) and South Korea (2.4 per cent). In terms of total trade volume, Latin America is far behind the US (17.3 per cent) and China (14.6 per cent). However, considering only EU exports, the gap between China (8.3 per cent) and Latin America (5.8 per cent) is less stark.

Latin America is a key supplier of critical raw materials (CRMs) to the EU, playing an increasingly strategic role in the Bloc’s efforts to secure resilient and sustainable supply chains for these essential resources. Of the 34 items on the EU’s list of CRMs, 25 are extracted in Latin America. The region holds the world’s largest reserves of niobium, natural graphite, fluorspar, and rare-earth elements. Brazil, home to more than 90 per cent of global production, is by far the leading supplier of niobium. South America is rich in lithium and copper – resources essential for the green and digital transitions – with 79 per cent of the EU’s refined lithium imports originating from Chile (European Parliament Briefing 2024). Reflecting the extent of CRMs’ strategic importance to the EU, the latter signed memoranda of understanding with Argentina and Chile in 2023 to strengthen cooperation and promote sustainable raw-material value chains.

From a Latin American perspective (considering all countries together), the US remains the most important trading partner, accounting for 42.9 per cent of total trade (exports and imports combined), followed by China (20.1 per cent) and the EU (12.1 per cent). If the trade shares of India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam are combined, these Asian countries together account for 12.3 per cent of Latin American trade. However, the aggregated figures are strongly skewed by the high share of US trade with Mexico, which accounts for 60.8 per cent of total trade and 83.1 per cent of Mexican exports. In many other Latin American markets, China has overtaken the US as the most important trading partner. This trend is also evident in the context of Mercosur, where China, with a 26.8 per cent share, is the leading trading partner, ahead of the EU (16.9 per cent) and the US (14.1 per cent).

In 2023, EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Josep Borrell announced the “Year of Latin America in Europe,” expressing the hope that the EU–CELAC Summit in Brussels (17–18 July) would provide new momentum for the deepening of ties. Expectations were that the long-pending EU–Mercosur agreement would be signed and that the modernisation of the agreements with Chile and Mexico completed. The “Advanced Framework Agreement” and an “interim Trade Agreement” (iTA) with Chile were indeed signed in 2023 (on 13 December), being approved by the European Parliament on 29 February of the following year. The iTA entered into force on 1 February 2025, after Chile completed its ratification process. It is the first EU trade agreement that contains a specific chapter dedicated to energy and raw materials. The negotiations on a “Modernised Global Agreement” (MGA) with Mexico were concluded on 17 January 2025. On 3 September, the Commission proposed that the European Council sign both the MGA and an iTA.

The EU–Mercosur Agreement: The Missing Link

The EU–Mercosur agreement has been in negotiation for 25 years now. A draft agreement was first reached in June 2019. Five years later, on 6 December 2024, both sides approved a number of changes and additions to the text. Finally, on 3 September 2025, the European Commission proposed that the European Council sign the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and an iTA. The latter only requires ratification by the European Parliament, and will be repealed and replaced by the EMPA once it has been fully ratified by all national parliaments.

It sent a negative signal to Latin America that the only article in the European Parliament’s October resolution on the EU’s political strategy for the region that failed to pass (259 in favour, 269 against, 97 abstained) concerned the EU–Mercosur agreement. Beyond the protectionist considerations partly driving this outcome, the vote reflects a notable mistrust of Latin American partners regarding compliance with environmental standards and the Paris Agreement – an attitude that should not be so pronounced within the framework of a strategic partnership. Moreover, the EU’s rhetoric of assuming a more geopolitical role is undermined by protectionism and a rather parochial worldview, exposing a persistent gap between strategic ambition and political reality.

According to optimistic long-term projections, the removal of both tariff and non-tariff barriers could increase trade flows between Mercosur and the EU by approximately 37 per cent (Berganza et al. 2025; Cornejo, Estevadeordal, and Talvi 2025). Once the aforementioned agreement is ratified, the EU’s network of trade agreements with LAC will cover about 97 per cent of the region’s gross domestic product. Despite this extensive framework, its potential is unlikely to be fully realised – at least initially – as the EU’s agreements with Latin American countries and trade blocs remain largely unconnected. This fragmentation – particularly in relation to rules of origin – hampers the development of both bi-regional and intraregional value chains. An optimistic estimate suggests that a fully integrated EU–LAC economic area could increase interregional trade by up to 70 per cent, while also boosting intra-Latin American trade (Berganza et al. 2025; Cornejo, Estevadeordal, and Talvi 2025). In this context, free trade agreements with the EU could play a pivotal role in promoting Latin American economic integration.

Intensified trade with Latin America, though valuable, will fall short of fulfilling Europe’s broader trade diversification objectives. The potential for expansion remains limited, not least due to persistent structural asymmetries. Moreover, the size of the Chinese and other Asian markets – particularly India’s – will prevent the EU’s share of Latin American trade, especially exports, from increasing. Both the EU and Latin American countries are seeking to diversify their trade relations – with Asia, for example – meaning that neither side is the sole option, and not necessarily always the first choice. As a result, the EU and China are competing in Latin America, for instance via such respective endeavours as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway. For the EU, a trade agreement with India may ultimately be more important in the long term than one with Latin American countries as a whole.

European Investments Ahead of Chinese Capital Flows

While the EU has lost market share in terms of trade with Latin America, particularly to China, its companies have performed better in terms of foreign direct investment. The Bloc asserts that European companies hold the largest stock of FDI in Latin America, far exceeding that of China, although no recent data are available to substantiate this claim. Data from those countries reporting the origins of FDI inflows (related to the immediate source of capital, as potentially different from the actual location of the entity making the investment) show that as of 2024 the US had consolidated its position as the region’s largest investor, accounting for 38 per cent of the value invested, up from a figure of 34 per cent for the previous year. The relative share of investment originating from the EU – excluding Luxembourg and the Netherlands (9 per cent together), which owing to their favourable tax regimes are frequently used by multinational corporations as intermediaries to invest in third countries – fell to 15 per cent of the regional total in 2024, the lowest figure since 2012. In those LAC countries reporting on origins, Chinese FDI accounted for only 2 per cent of total inflows in 2024 (CEPAL 2025). Using additional data sources (Dussel Peters 2025), the share of Chinese investment in LAC was estimated at 4.8 per cent in the same year (2020–2024: 7 per cent), itself the lowest level since 2012.

In the area of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) targeting regional assets, the US remained the leading country of origin, accounting for 34 per cent of the total figure – including 6 of the 20 largest transactions taking place (compared with 2 from the EU, 2 from China, and 4 from the UK). EU companies (20 per cent) constituted the second-largest source of M&As (CEPAL 2025). According to Eurostat data, in 2023 Brazil (3.4 per cent) and Mexico (2.3 per cent) absorbed a share of EU residents’ investment stocks comparable to that of China (2.5 per cent) (excluding Hong Kong, 0.9 per cent), and Russia (2.4 per cent).

A Widening Political Divide Between the EU and Latin America

A recent study (Mesquita and Luciano 2025) shows that the EU and Latin America have diverged in their voting behaviour at the UN over the past decade. Nevertheless, the degree of convergence remains somewhat higher than with countries in other regions. The differences between EU and Latin American countries are particularly pronounced in votes on issues related to human rights, disarmament, and nuclear weapons/proliferation.

For the EU, geopolitical and geoeconomic interests have gained in importance. With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Bloc faces a direct security threat that has caused its political priorities to shift – with a marked increase in defence spending being just one example. Under Trump 2.0, relations with the US (including American security guarantees) are being fundamentally called into question. While the current US president’s aggressive trade policy affects both regions, their own positions towards China and Russia currently diverge. In Latin America, despite some critical voices, the East Asian country continues to be perceived above all as a an opportunity and a partner in economic diversification. In Europe, by contrast, a more critical outlook prevails here in emphasising the risks of dependence on China as well as highlighting its role as a key economic supporter of Russia. Against this backdrop, Brazil’s membership in the BRICS is viewed as problematic from a European perspective. While the South American country tends to see its role in BRICS as that of a bridge to the Global South, Europe perceives the membership of China, Russia, and, more recently, Iran as troubling, increasingly framing this group as an anti-Western project.

The war in Ukraine has become the elephant in the room for bi-regional relations between the EU and Latin America (Verdes-Montenegro 2025). Before Trump’s second presidency, most Latin American governments had voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, with a higher proportion of them doing so than in other regions. However, they have not joined in with Western sanctions and have rejected European requests for support in the supply of ammunition and weapons. This behaviour reveals an underlying ambivalence on how to proceed: while there has been formal condemnation of Russia’s full-scale invasion within the framework of the UN there remains reluctance to incur political, economic, or strategic costs through the imposing of sanctions or other forms of direct pressure.

On 24 February 2025, only five Latin American governments – among them Chile and Mexico – voted in favour of a UNGA resolution supported by Ukraine, the EU countries, and other Western states, with the opposition of the US and Russia; as for the rest of the region’s countries, nine – including Cuba – abstained, three did not take part in the vote, while only Nicaragua voted against. In a second vote held on the same day, as concerning another resolution (“The Path to Peace”) originally introduced by the US but later amended and revised by European countries, seven Latin American counterparts voted in favour, one against, seven abstained, and four were absent.

The Joint Declaration of the 2023 EU–CELAC Summit, held in Brussels, did not mention Russia or condemn its aggression. But it reaffirmed the commitment of signatory states

to the Charter of the United Nations and International Law, including the need to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all nations.

The Nicaraguan government managed to delay the adoption of the joint declaration, which it ultimately did not accept, because of the paragraph included therein on the conflict in Ukraine. From a European perspective, the declaration on the Ukrainian conflict was ultimately rather disappointing.

The Ukraine war could once again become a contentious issue at the forthcoming EU–CELAC summit. Proposals to omit the topic (Verdes-Montenegro 2025) are unlikely to succeed. On the one hand, in the resolution adopted on 8 October of this year, the European Parliament recommended that the parties to the upcoming summit

strongly condemn Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, in particular all of its serious violations of international law and international humanitarian law, and provide diplomatic, financial, and military support to Ukraine.

On the other, the EU should, on a matter of existential importance to its own security, urge its strategic partner to take a clear and unambiguous position. Interestingly, the European Parliament’s resolution regarding the EU’s political strategy on Latin America mentions Russia 13 times and China a total of 9 (the US only 4 times). The respective positions of the EU and Latin American countries on the Gaza conflict and related policies towards Israel may become another source of contention at the upcoming summit. Yet, on this issue, significant internal divisions exist within the two blocs as well.

Europe and Latin America are, as such, each seeking to position themselves against the backdrop of a changing global landscape and diverging geopolitical interests. It would be naïve to assume that these differing threat perceptions and geostrategic considerations have no impact on the nature of their cooperation. On the Latin American side, some intellectuals advocate a policy of “active non-alignment.” This would limit the possibilities for strategic partnership, which presupposes agreement or alignment on key principles of international politics. The ambition, supported by some Latin American governments, to build a post-liberal international order no longer dominated by the West undermines the prospects for such partnership. Moreover, it is far from evident that Latin America’s position in any new order would be stronger than it is within the current one. In European eyes, this new international order should instead be built upon, and further developed from, the foundations of a reformed liberal international order – an objective that will, however, be difficult to achieve during Trump’s second term.

Juan Battaleme (2025), Secretary of International Affairs at Argentina’s Ministry of Defense and former Academic Director of the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), argues that

Europe has failed to include Latin America as part of its security and defense strategy, prioritizing instead the social and cultural dimensions of the relationship.

This omission, he contends, has created a strategic vacuum increasingly filled by extra-regional actors whose geopolitical interests diverge from those of Europe. Against this backdrop, Battaleme advocates for a genuine security partnership between the two regions that is underpinned by a comprehensive strategic roadmap for defence and security cooperation and encompasses such domains as intelligence sharing, joint training, and maritime security.

For Europe, it is both logical and timely to intensify the security dialogue with Latin America, though such engagement will not extend to all countries of the region. The recent shift to the right in several Latin American states may open up opportunities for closer alignment on geopolitical issues. With EU member states now substantially increasing their levels of investment in defence, prospects also emerge for enhanced cooperation between the two regions’ defence industries – with Brazil’s particularly important here. Ultimately, however, the EU “is likely to exercise discretion in choosing its partners, favouring those who can offer both political alignment and industrial reliability” (Malamud and Schenoni 2025: 12).

Looking Ahead: The EU–CELAC Summit in Colombia

The EU–CELAC Summit taking place in Santa Marta, Colombia, on 9–10 November 2025 comes at a turbulent moment. International politics and the multilateral system are in a state of upheaval, and Trump presents both sides with new surprises almost daily. On the one hand, there are strong arguments for Europe and Latin America to move closer together; on the other, centrifugal forces on both sides are working against this.

So, what can be expected from the summit? As Ramón Jauregui, President of the Euroamérica Foundation and former member of the European Parliament, aptly remarked: “This summit is like birthdays: at a certain age, they’re annoying, but the alternative is worse. Its very celebration is a success.” But, to stick with the metaphor, the gifts and birthday speeches will be modest. Participants will likely attempt to mend rifts and reaffirm their commitment to multilateralism. They will seek to agree on the lowest common denominator so that as many representatives as possible of authoritarian regimes, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, will endorse the final declaration. On many contentious global issues, there will be no joint position. For China, Russia, or the US, it will ultimately make little difference what the Latin Americans and Europeans agree to. More important than joint summit declarations are concrete decisions that send a political signal, such as the pending signing and ratification of the long-awaited EU–Mercosur agreement.

Battaleme, Juan (2025), Why Europe Needs Latin America, in: Americas Quarterly, 4 August, accessed 29 October 2025.

Berganza, Juan Carlos, Rodolfo G. Campos, Antoni Estevadeordal, et al. (2025), UE-MERCOSUR: ¿plataforma hacia una nueva era de integración transatlántica e intrarregional latinoamericana?, 14 January, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, accessed 29 October 2025.

CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe) (2025), La Inversión Extranjera Directa en América Latina y el Caribe, 2025, Santiago de Chile: CEPAL.

Cornejo, Rafael, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Ernesto Talvi (2025), Towards an Integrated EU-Latin America Economic Area, Washington, DC: Georgetown Americas Institute.

Corporación Latinobarometro (2024), Informe 2024, Santiago de Chile.

Dussel Peters, Enrique (2025), Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 2025, 17 March, accessed 29 October 2025.

European Parliament (2025), EU Political Strategy on Latin America. European Parliament resolution of 8 October 2025 on EU political strategy on Latin America (2025/2083(INI)), accessed 29 October 2025.

European Parliament Briefing (2024), EU–Latin America: Enhancing Cooperation on Critical Raw Materials, 13 December, accessed 29 October 2025.

Fasulo, Filippo (ed.) (2025), Diversification Through Trade: Europe’s FTA Agenda, Milano: ISPI, accessed 29 October 2025.

FES, NUSO, and Latinobarómetro (2022), What are Latin America’s Perceptions on the European Union?, accessed 29 October 2025.

Jauregui, Ramón (2025), UE-Celac: una cumbre importante, in: El País, 25 September, accessed 29 October 2025.

Malamud, Andrés, and Luis Schenoni (2025), Geopolitical Aspects of the EU-Mercosur Agreement, Study requested by the AFET committee of the European Parliament. Brussels: External Policies Analysis and Support Unit. Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, June, accessed 29 October 2025.

Mesquita, Rafael, and Bruno Theodoro Luciano (2025), Busting the Myth of Convergence Between the EU and LAC Countries: Analysis From UN Resolutions, in: Global Policy, 16, 4, 589–601, accessed 29 October 2025.

Muftuler-Bac, Meltem, Senem Aydin-Duzgit, Ezgi Uzun, et al. (2022), Conceptually Defining “Global Strategic Partner(ship)”, ENGAGE Working Paper Series No. 13, November, accessed 29 October 2025.

Verdes-Montenegro, Francisco J. (2025), La relación UE-CELAC y la guerra en Ucrania: ¿un elefante en la habitación?, in: Informe Iberoamérica 2025. La IV Cumbre UE-CELAC en Colombia: Retos y promesas, Madrid: Fundación Alternativas, 106–122, accessed 29 October 2025.