GIGA Focus International Edition English

Buying Peace? The Political Economy of Power-Sharing

Nummer 9 | 2015 | ISSN: 1862-3581


  • Using a power-sharing arrangement to integrate insurgents into a country’s political system, either by granting them government cabinet posts or greater territorial autonomy, has become an increasingly common method by which to pacify violent conflicts. However, power-sharing reinforces patterns of corruption and patronage, which are detrimental to sustainable peace and development in the long run. This is especially problematic as some of this corrupt behavior is fueled by official development assistance.

    Analysis

    Power-sharing institutions have been empirically shown to prolong peace after civil conflict. Nevertheless, an often overlooked but central mechanism to this is that powersharing institutionalises access to state resources for both the government and rebels. Political elites from both sides often divert state income to finance their political support networks or simply to enrich themselves, creating a political economy of corruption and patronage.

    • Power-sharing often ends long-running bloodshed. But by simply buying off violent state and non-state actors, it frequently fails to address the root causes of conf lict. Furthermore, by institutionalising self-enrichment and clientelism, powersharing may actually inhibit post-conflict political and economic development in the long run.

    • Post-conflict countries with power-sharing institutions are, on average, more corrupt than post-conflict countries without power-sharing institutions—at the same time, official development assistance to power-sharing countries has increased.

    • Post-conflict Liberia and Aceh, Indonesia, show that the political economy of power-sharing is at play in both political power-sharing arrangements (whereby political office is distributed amongst former belligerents) and territorial power-sharing arrangements (whereby greater territorial autonomy is granted to a rebel group).

    • International donors need to be aware of the inherent dilemma in buying peace through power-sharing: securing peace in the short term can result in increased corruption. Although corruption may be a necessary side effect of ensuring immediate peace, international assistance should focus on reducing corruption in the long run.


    Fußnoten



      Forschungsschwerpunkte

      Wie man diesen Artikel zitiert

      Felix Haaß, und Martin Ottmann (2015), Buying Peace? The Political Economy of Power-Sharing, GIGA Focus International Edition English, 9, Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-453152


      Impressum

      Der GIGA Focus ist eine Open-Access-Publikation. Sie kann kostenfrei im Internet gelesen und heruntergeladen werden unter www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/giga-focus und darf gemäß den Bedingungen der Creative-Commons-Lizenz Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 frei vervielfältigt, verbreitet und öffentlich zugänglich gemacht werden. Dies umfasst insbesondere: korrekte Angabe der Erstveröffentlichung als GIGA Focus, keine Bearbeitung oder Kürzung.

      Das German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien in Hamburg gibt Focus-Reihen zu Afrika, Asien, Lateinamerika, Nahost und zu globalen Fragen heraus. Der GIGA Focus wird vom GIGA redaktionell gestaltet. Die vertretenen Auffassungen stellen die der Autorinnen und Autoren und nicht unbedingt die des Instituts dar. Die Verfassenden sind für den Inhalt ihrer Beiträge verantwortlich. Irrtümer und Auslassungen bleiben vorbehalten. Das GIGA und die Autorinnen und Autoren haften nicht für Richtigkeit und Vollständigkeit oder für Konsequenzen, die sich aus der Nutzung der bereitgestellten Informationen ergeben.

      Dr. Felix Haaß

      Dr. Felix Haaß

      Ehemals GIGA-Teammitglied





      Benachrichtigungen

      Melden Sie sich hier für E-Mail-Benachrichtigungen zu GIGA-Aktivitäten an

      Soziale Medien

      Folgen Sie uns