This article aims to evaluate to what extent the Argentine Senate was able to fulfil its constitutional function of controlling the Executive’s prerogative to nominate judges between 1983 and 2006, as well as to examine the factors that influenced the exercise of this role. To do so, the paper focuses on the parliamentary procedure of the proposals submitted by the Executive for the nomination of all federal judges, the members of the so-called ‘national justice’ of Buenos Aires and those of the Public Ministry. The findings show that the Senate’s powers depend on several factors, such as, the institutional resources with which presidents count in this chamber (which includes not only the size of the parliamentary majority but also their power in the Committee of Acuerdos), the category of the position to be filled (whether involving Supreme Court justices or not), presidential ambitions in other policy areas (such as re-election), and the rules regulating the selection and confirmation of candidates (such as the secrecy or publicity of the legislative process).
GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 06/2019
in: Alexander Baturo / Robert Elgie (eds.), The politics of presidential term limits, Oxford University Press, 2019, 473-494
in: Marjorie Corrêa Marona / Andrés del Río (eds.), Justiça no Brasil: às margens da democracia, Belo Horizonte: Arraes Editores, 2018, 275-308
Washington Post, Monkey Cage, 2018
Latin American Studies Association, 2017