This paper assesses the extent to which elected power holders informally intervene in the judiciaries of new democracies, an acknowledged but under‐researched topic in studies of judicial politics. The paper first develops an empirical strategy for the study of informal interference based on perceptions recorded in interviews, then applies the strategy to six third‐wave democracies, three in Africa (Benin, Madagascar and Senegal) and three in Latin America (Argentina, Chile and Paraguay). It also examines how three conditioning factors affect the level of informal judicial interference: formal rules, previous democratic experience, and socioeconomic development. Our results show that countries with better performance in all these conditioning factors exhibit less informal interference than countries with poorer or mixed performance. The results stress the importance of systematically including informal politics in the study of judicial politics.
in: Ruby B. Andeweg / Robert Elgie / Ludger Helms / Juliet Kaarb / Ferdinand Muller-Rommel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming July 2020
GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 06/2019
in: Alexander Baturo / Robert Elgie (eds.), The politics of presidential term limits, Oxford University Press, 2019, 473-494
in: Alexander Baturo / Robert Elgie (eds.), The politics of presidential term limits, Oxford University Press, 2019, 339-361
in: Oxford University Press (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia , Oxford University Press, 2019