How Unpredictable Is Trump's Foreign Policy Set to Be?

From Erdoğan in Turkey, to Duterte in the Philippines, Orbán in Hungary, and Modi in India: the foreign policies of populists in power are more predictable than is often assumed, write Prof. Dr. Sandra Destradi and Dr. Johannes Plagemann in their forthcoming book Populism and Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press).  

Foreign Policy Under the Sign of Populism: What Might Shape Trump's Second Term in Office

Amid the ongoing speculation around the likely foreign policy trajectory of Donald Trump's second presidency, one thing looks certain: it will be fundamentally different from his first. Trump blamed those advising him and disloyal bureaucrats for the failure to achieve many of his foreign policy goals at the time. Instead of representatives of the now definitively disposed of foreign and security policy establishment, as before, only the most loyal companions and MAGA adherents will have the president's ear going forwards. No more resistance, just Trump's own instinct. Abroad, many people are anxiously awaiting the most unpredictable president in United States history.  

And indeed, the case of populists elsewhere also shows that they strongly personalise foreign policy decision-making and thus make it more impulsive. In other words, personal relationships replace formal processes; situational emotions are deemed more important than tradition and convention. A personalised foreign policy is guided more by a leader’s own instincts than advice from ministerial bureaucracies and experts. And yet, populists are not entirely unpredictable either. This is evident from a look at other ones already in power. Under them, foreign policy is not only personalised but also politicised. What does that mean? Even more so than conventional politicians, populists use certain foreign policy issues – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, or conflicts in the Middle East – to mobilise their own supporters. This limits their scope for action. Because giving in becomes a political risk at home. In fact, the unpredictability of Trump's first term was so high precisely because it was never known to what extent his advisers committed to mainstream foreign policy would be able to assert themselves. This may well be different from January 2025 onwards. As in other populist-led states, the president will be able to rely on a now-institutionalised environment made up of political allies. “Project 2025,” a detailed government programme from the MAGA-affiliated Heritage Foundation, is evidence of this. So what do the experiences with other populists tell us about what we can expect in terms of foreign policy from a second Trump administration? 

Between Pragmatism and Provocation: What the Cases of India and Turkey Reveal about Populist Foreign Policy  

Both India and Turkey have been firmly in the hands of right-wing populist leaders for years now, offering an interest point of comparison. Erdoğan became his country's prime minister for the first time in 2003 and has ruled Turkey as executive president since 2014. Modi was first elected prime minister in 2014 and was confirmed in office for the second time in spring 2024. In both countries, these populist leaders promised to fight corrupt elites including representatives from the traditional foreign and security policy establishment. Foreign policy decision-making takes place more than ever within a close circle formed around the populist leader. According to numerous accounts, Erdoğan and Modi have personalised decision-making in this realm. And under both leaders, the foreign policy establishment has shed its skin. Opportunism on the one hand and professionalisation on the other have led to a partial alignment of established and new elites. The extent of the change taking place in the two countries’ respective foreign policies is very different, however – and indicates where we can expect radical breaks under Trump and where we should not.  

To put it very simply, Turkey has turned away from the West since the beginning of the 2010s. European Union accession, long one of Ankara’s central goals, is now a long way off. At the same time, Erdoğan has managed to domesticate the Kemalist military, which has traditionally dominated foreign and security policy. Erdoğan regularly rails against obscure powers, Western imperialists, and “crusaders” who want to get their hands on Turkey. Instead of the pro-Western pathway of his predecessors, Erdoğan preaches a new Muslim nationalism. At the same time, he is now more reliant than ever on the military's security paradigm – for example, in his policy towards Kurds. Erdoğan provokes his Western NATO partners to the extreme, but then regularly shows himself to be pragmatic in the final reckoning. The "refugee deal" with the EU in 2016 is the best example of this. He also allowed Sweden and Finland joining NATO to be bought off politically. In 2017, Erdoğan accused Angela Merkel of using the methods of the Nazis, only to call her a "friend" years later. This has not harmed him domestically. Military escalation over Turkey’s maritime borders with NATO partner Greece has not occurred. Instead, Erdoğan is stirring up trouble where he can afford it – in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example. Further proof of his pragmatism: despite their differing interests in Syria, Erdoğan is managing to maintain a resilient relationship with Putin's Russia. The Turkish leader’s criticism of the Muslim Uighur minority’s oppression in China has now fallen silent. Instead, the power-conscious president wants to lead his country into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization dominated by Russia and China, as well as into BRICS+. 

In India, Modi has over the years replaced the old foreign and security policy establishment, as tied to predecessor Nehru, with loyalists from his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the organisations associated with it. Think tanks from the Hindu nationalist universe now set the tone in New Delhi. Modi surrounds himself with advisers who come from other parts of the country and who do not frequent the Indian capital’s traditional foreign policy clubs. At the same time, the party lacks qualified personnel; as such S. Jaishankar, the current foreign minister, was recruited from the ranks of the bureaucracy. He, in turn, has skillfully adopted the nationalist tone of his prime minister. The result is a foreign policy that, like with other populists, is primarily carried out in the service of domestic objectives, but which does not deviate fundamentally from the approaches taken by previous governments. India’s G20 presidency last year was exemplary: what was new was the enormous effort that the Modi government made to harness the presence of the heads of state of the world’s most important economic powers for his own domestic gains. Posters with Modi's portrait appearing all over the country testified to the summit’s occurrence, despite the actual significance of it, as expected, remaining limited. Still, the Indian public became more aware herewith of the government’s claim that India was finally achieving its “rightful place in the world.” At the same time, in Modi’s speeches given to domestic audiences there are hardly any references made to the ongoing border disputes with powerful neighbour China – despite historically poor relations between the two states. Instead, New Delhi has tried to score points domestically from public disagreements with Canada or the Maldives. The already-strained relationship with predominantly Muslim Pakistan is also a prominent election issue for Hindu nationalists. Putin's Russia, on the other hand, remains a popular partner, not least thanks to its cheap oil. Modi has moved closer to the West without allowing himself to be instrumentalised against China or Russia and continues to steer clear of binding alliances. The reason for such continuities in Indian foreign policy is obvious: Modi is not fighting for the independence typically longed for by populists. This was already the declared goal of his non-populist predecessors. 

Independent, Transactional, Calculable: Populists’ Foreign Policy Signature 

What these and other right-wing populists have in common when it comes to foreign policy is the search for independence, the weakening of binding alliances, and the adoption of grand gestures – always with an eye on the mobilisation of domestic support. Still, populists do not necessarily abandon pragmatism outright. Rather, they are transactional in their foreign relations and employ selective references to the core ideology of their populist base where doing so does not bring sizeable political costs. None of this is particularly pleasant, but it is not entirely unpredictable either. One can only hope that it also applies to a superpower set to be ruled once more by an ageing populist leader now in the twilight of his political career. 

Dr. Johannes Plagemann is a Senior Research Fellow at the GIGA.

Prof. Dr. Sandra Destradi is Professor and Chair of International Relations at the University of Freiburg.