On Sanctions and Inducements – Dealing with Nuclear Proliferation

The effects of international sanctions on the internal politics of states that violate nuclear non-proliferation commitments remain a matter of contention. What conditions influence how positive and negative inducements operate? How have sanctions, trade, aid, investments, diplomacy, financial measures, and military threats affected different groups in states suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons? How, when, and why are those effects translated into compliance with non-proliferation rules? In her research, Prof. Etel Solingen has been examining who wants nuclear weapons and who renounces them. Another focus is on diplomacy, persuasion, and coercion to counter non-proliferation violations. Etel Solingen is Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict at the University of California Irvine and former president of the International Studies Association and Chancellor's Professor. Her book Nuclear Logics received the American Political Science Association’s Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award and the Robert Jervis and Paul Schroeder Award. She chaired the Steering Committee of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and served in the APSA’s Presidential Taskforce on U.S. Standing in World Affairs. Her research interests include globalisation, regionalism, international institutions, transnational diffusion, historical institutionalism, technology, and democratisation, among others.

Selected Publications:

• Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East

• Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation

The GIGA Distinguished Speaker Lecture Series brings leading minds in academia and policy from all over the world to Hamburg to stimulate public exchange on key global developments.