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Emerging Non-OECD Countries:
Global Shifts in Power and Geopolitical Regionalization

Sören Scholvin
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GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21
20354 Hamburg
Germany
E-mail: info@giga-hamburg.de
Website: www.giga-hamburg.de
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Abstract

Various concepts ascribe key roles to emerging non-OECD countries in regional and global politics. This paper highlights how these concepts hint not only at a shift of global power but also at geopolitical regionalization: according to the theory of hegemonic stability, regional powers (a subcategory of emerging non-OECD countries) are key actors in overcoming international anarchy and establishing cooperative and stable relations within their regions. Because of the different impacts of different regional powers, which are categorized in this paper using typologies of hegemony, the logic of international relations varies from one region to another. From a theoretical point of view, this means that international relations theories have to make region-specific adaptations.

Keywords: regional powers, hegemonic stability, geopolitics, regionalization

Sören Scholvin

is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Geography of the University of Hamburg and a member of the Regional Powers Network (RPN) at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Contact: scholvin@giga-hamburg.de

Website: http://staff.giga-hamburg.de/scholvin
Zusammenfassung

Aufsteigende Nicht-OECD-Staaten: globale Machtverlagerungen und geopolitische Regionalisierung

Emerging Non-OECD Countries: Global Shifts in Power and Geopolitical Regionalization

Sören Scholvin

Article Outline

1 Hegemonic Stability: How Regional Hegemons Overcome International Anarchy
2 The Hierarchy of Powers: How Emerging Non-OECD Countries Affect Global and Regional Dynamics
3 Emerging Non-OECD Countries: Concepts Regarding the New Key Actors in Global and Regional Politics
4 Regional Hegemony: Hierarchy instead of Anarchy via Cooperative Leadership
5 Regional Powers and Their Regions: A Geographical and Political Research Agenda

1 Hegemonic Stability: How Regional Hegemons Overcome International Anarchy

During the last two decades, the distribution of power in international relations has changed. Emerging non-OECD countries have become key actors in global and regional politics, taking on specialized roles in their regions and posing a counterweight to traditional superpowers and great powers. As David Lake (2005: 11-17, 28, 2007: 50-56, 71-73, 79) argues, international relations are not always characterized by anarchy but are very often characterized by hierarchy. In a hierarchy, dominant states take on special roles, meaning that they provide a stable order for the entire system and contribute disproportionately to the production of collective goods; this in turn gains them the support of minor states, which become their subordinates. To maintain the order of the system, dominant states receive the right from their subordinates to intervene against noncompliant subordinates. As long as such interventions are considered to be just by the majority of the subordinate states, the hierarchy is stable.

Moreover, once a dominant state has acquired the power resources necessary to guarantee nonviolent interaction within its region, compliance with economic liberalization, and so on, there are high economies of scale for leadership; that is, the inclusion of additional subor-
dinates into the system is cheap compared to the costs of building the system. Dominant states therefore strive to expand their spheres of influence.

Hegemonic stability theory similarly suggests that dominant states, or hegemons, are responsible for the transformation of anarchy into guaranteed patterns of interaction among states. According to Robert Gilpin (1981: 29), hegemony is a situation in which “a single powerful state controls […] the lesser states in the system.” If hegemons take on the outstanding role described by Lake and transform their systems from anarchy to hierarchy, the structure of international relations varies from one (regionally limited) system to another.

In this spirit, Douglas Lemke (2002: 49-57) refines classical power transition theory, arguing that there is not one international hierarchy of powers but a series of parallel and superposed hierarchies. Every subsystem functions according to the same logic as the overall system—with a dominant state on top and instability resulting from shifts in power. Global powers can interfere in the regional systems. They tend to do this whenever the regional hierarchy contradicts their preferences. Regional stability will be most likely if the regional hierarchy of power is stable and the regional status quo conforms to the interests of globally dominant powers. However, if there are regional shifts in power or the regional status quo is at odds with the interests of globally dominant powers, regional instability will occur.

Before comparing various concepts regarding emerging non-OECD countries and analyzing the role of regional hegemons in detail, the paper outlines a hierarchy of powers in order to fit emerging non-OECD countries within it. With the help of these three analytical steps (hierarchy of powers, concepts regarding emerging non-OECD powers, the role of regional hegemons), two guiding questions are answered: What shifts in power are associated with emerging non-OECD countries, and how do they shape geopolitical regionalization? The article, which is primarily intended to provide an overview of the current state of research on emerging non-OECD countries and bring the various approaches together, concludes with a potential research agenda based on the answers to these two questions.

2 The Hierarchy of Powers: How Emerging Non-OECD Countries Affect Global and Regional Dynamics

Realism, the predominant school of international relations, is imprecise on a hierarchy of powers. For Kenneth Waltz (1979: 129-131), countries which can handle all the problems that occur in international politics are “great powers.” Territory, resources, population and economic, military and political capacities and stability are the indicators to which he refers. John Mearsheimer (1990: 7), who focuses on military capacities, argues that great powers are those states which have a reasonable prospect of defending themselves independently against the leading state of the system. Yet the indicators proposed by Waltz and Mearsheimer do not lead to a clear hierarchy.
Other famous scholars also provide nothing more than helpful hints regarding a hierarchy of powers. Hedley Bull (2002: 194-222) emphasizes that great powers play a special role in the international system. The term great powers (in plural) implies that there is more than one great power; that is, there is a club of states called great powers that share certain characteristics which distinguish them from other states. First of among these characteristics is military potential. Great powers are stronger than other states. Additionally, they possess special duties and rights. This implies that others see them as great powers. According to Bull, this makes great powers system stabilizers. They preserve the balance of power at the global and at their regional level.

Martin Wight's analysis of the global hierarchy of powers provides a foundation for classifying states. Wight (1978: 50-52, 63-65) distinguishes between global great, global middle, and regional great powers. The interests of “global great powers” span the whole international system. Metaphorically speaking, their foreign secretaries have to deal with the entire world. Yet having interests all over the world is not a sufficient criterion for membership in this group. As Wight highlights with the examples of Portugal before the Revolution of the Carnations and the Netherlands until 1947, global great powers have to possess the means to act decisively in every part of the world.

“Global middle powers” differ from minor powers due to the fact that they can impose high costs on global great powers in conflicts. Middle powers cannot win these conflicts, but great powers suffer relevant losses as a result of them. Moreover, whenever one great power competes with another great power, both seek the support of middle powers. This means that in contrast to minor powers, middle powers possess a geostrategic relevance beyond their borders. Only one other group of states, “regional great powers,” fulfills this criterion; they are defined by the same characteristics as global great powers except that their interests and means of power are regionally limited.1

Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel (1970: 14-17) offered a more detailed classification: First, the Soviet Union of the Cold War era and the United States were seen as “primary powers” because they were active worldwide and possessed clear material and ideological advantages compared to all other states. Second, China, France, Great Britain, Japan and West Germany were, and still are, “secondary powers,” with more limited power resources than the two primary powers (now only one: the US). They were (and are) not active in every part of the world. Third, “middle powers” such as Australia or Canada only played a peripheral role outside their regions due to a lack of power resources. This is still the case. They usually concentrate on a limited number of policies and cannot coerce other major states. Therefore, they behave more cooperatively and favor institutionalization as a means to limit the arbitrariness of superior powers. Fourth, states not totally confined to one region were classified as “minor

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1 Another category is omitted here because it is not relevant anymore: Wight (1978: 56) defines those states which have attained an outstanding position in Europe due to their control over resources and territories outside Europe as “world powers.”
powers.” These countries, such as Cuba, Egypt, or Israel, often long for the partnership of superior powers in order to strengthen their regional influence. While all states which belong to these first four categories are active, the members of the two remaining categories are passive. “Regional states” such as Ethiopia or Tanzania exert little influence beyond their borders and even then only on their direct neighbors. “Microstates,” such as Malta or Haiti, and colonies do not exert any relevant influence.

However, this focus on the global level is problematic. It neglects the fact that certain states may possess key roles in their regions—they may even be more important than primary and secondary powers there—without being globally active. Considering the shift towards the regional level after the end of the Cold War, a categorization put forward by Detlef Nolte is more helpful. Nolte (2006: 21-22) defines those countries which possess enough resources to exert a key influence in political and military terms worldwide as “superpowers.” Today, only the United States fits into this category. China, the European Union, Japan, and Russia are “great powers” because they hold the potential to become superpowers, are regarded and treated accordingly by others, and wield decisive power in some parts of the world. In other regions their influence is not decisive but is still relevant, meaning that they have to be taken into consideration. This aspect is what distinguishes great and “regional powers.” The influence of regional powers is limited to one region. Regional powers like Brazil or South Africa possess a leading role in their region, which makes them relevant partners of the great powers in their region.

In addition to Nolte’s categories, three echelons of power distinguished by Joseph Nye (2004: 4) stress key shifts in power: In the military echelon, the United States is still undoubtedly dominant and can act unilaterally. This is different in the economic echelon. There, the United States is an important actor, but on account of its lack of dominance, global economic issues are handled multilaterally. In the third echelon, which includes issues ranging from global environmental problems to the social causes of terrorism to pandemics, the United States is just one actor among many and does not possess a special role. Regarding the emergence of non-OECD countries, Nye’s arguments support the thesis that actors below the global level have become more relevant. They not only constitute a new category in the hierarchy of powers, but they also, and more importantly, change the interaction between the global and the regional scale—they are, as shall be elaborated in the next section, forces of geopolitical regionalization.

Samuel Huntington’s (1999) term “uni-multipolar world order” captures this change. It describes the simultaneous existence of a single superpower, the United States, and many great powers. In contradiction to Nye, Huntington claims that the United States disposes of superior power resources in all relevant domains, thereby making the international system unipolar. However, the United States is unable to act alone. For example, it has to cooperate with great powers in order to make economic sanctions work or to obtain resolution from the
United Nations Security Council legalizing military action. This makes the international system multipolar.

Looking at the global-regional interplay, Huntington argues that “secondary regional powers” are key allies of the United States in this uni-multipolar world. States like Argentina, Saudi Arabia, or Ukraine face strong great powers in their neighborhood and long for opportunities to balance against them. By looking at the global–regional interplay in this way, Huntington avoids analyzing international relations from a strictly top-down perspective according to which states which only possess influence below the global scale are always the objects and never the subjects of power politics. He acknowledges that less powerful states—secondary regional powers—are important features of the international system. Their existence affects the dynamics of their regional level because they drag the superpower into regional affairs. At the global level they strengthen the superpower vis-à-vis the great powers. Table 1 provides a ranked overview of the categories of powers just introduced.

**Table 1: The Hierarchy of Powers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Power</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superpowers / primary powers</td>
<td>Decisive influence all over the world</td>
<td>USA, (USSR)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great powers / secondary powers</td>
<td>Relevant influence all over the world, decisive in some regions only</td>
<td>France, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle powers</td>
<td>Too weak for independent global politics, relevant partners of great powers</td>
<td>Australia, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional powers / regional great powers</td>
<td>Strong focus on their regions, leading role in their region, relevant partners of great powers</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary regional powers</td>
<td>Limited to their regions, face stronger states nearby and thus seek external partners for balancing, relevant partners of superpowers</td>
<td>Argentina, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor powers</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Cuba), Egypt, Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional states</td>
<td>Limited influence on direct neighbors, otherwise irrelevant</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microstates</td>
<td>No relevant influence beyond their borders</td>
<td>Malta, Haiti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

### 3 Emerging Non-OECD Countries: Concepts Regarding the New Key Actors in Global and Regional Politics

#### 3.1 Emerging Non-OECD Countries in Development Studies

Emerging non-OECD countries are regarded as the new key actors in global and regional politics. In the development studies literature, Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy (1996, 1998) maintain that so-called “pivotal states” (Algeria, Egypt, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico,

² The USSR and Cuba are both included in this table as examples taken from Cantori’s and Spiegel’s work. This reflects the situation of 1970. Both countries have experienced a decline in power since the end of the Cold War.
Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey) should become the focal points of American commitment in the third world. Because of their economic and political relevance, these countries determine the development of their regions.

Similarly, the term Ankerländer (anchor countries) coined by the German Development Institute (DIE) describes large developing countries that are likely to play a central role in global and regional governance (BMZ 2004, Eßler 1999, Stamm 2004). The criterion that indicates whether a developing country is an anchor country is its share of the economic output of its region. In order to determine the anchor-country status, the largest economy’s share of the region’s overall GDP is measured. Then, this share is subtracted from the overall GDP and the shares of the remaining countries are calculated. Those with the largest economy in the region or at least 20 percent of the remaining GDP are defined as anchor countries. This criterion applies to Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.

According to the DIE’s concept, their dominant share of the economic output gives these countries a determining role in regional economic development. This role is reinforced by the fact that anchor countries’ economies are more diversified and carry out a higher share of industrial production than ordinary developing countries. They are growth engines for their region. Their economies are so large that their own prosperity is expected to lead to prosperity in the neighboring countries; conversely, recession in anchor countries is expected to lead to recession in the neighboring countries. At the global level anchor countries’ economic size gives them a crucial role in key issues such as climate change and poverty reduction.

Some scholars from the DIE (Humphrey & Messner 2006: 2-4) add more criteria: Anchor countries play a key role in regional institutions. They are members of the G20, possess a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or strive for one, are in the process of realizing an important military build-up, took an active role in the negotiations around the WTO summit in Cancún, invest in international cooperation, and are new donors of foreign aid.

Yet the various anchor countries are far from being alike. They vary considerably in terms of their governmental systems, prosperity, and economic size as well as in terms of their capacities in various policy areas. Their divergent levels of economic power and policy-specific relevance mean that there are tremendous disparities within this group of states—as the comparison of China, a (future) global great power with high relevance for climate change, and Iran, an economically underdeveloped rentier state with high relevance for security policy, highlights.

China and India play a special role among all anchor countries. They are the “new drivers of global change.” Growing production and trade, vast financial reserves, and high emissions of carbon dioxide are the central features of China and India’s economic development, which is fundamentally different from the economic rise of tiger states like South Korea or Taiwan because of the former two countries’ large populations. China and India are not just emerging economies, as the tiger states were in the 1970s, but drivers of global change: their
rise is expected to cause a shift in power at the global level (Humphrey/Messner 2005, 2006: 1-2, Messner/Humphrey 2006). Cooperation with China and India is essential for the management of global problems such as climate change and underdevelopment (Messner 2007). Moreover, global stability will only be maintained if the first world engages and cooperates broadly with China and India in order to avoid the conflict-laden balancing strategies which may result from a status quo–oriented first world facing Chinese and Indian revisionism.

Closely linked to the idea of the new drivers of global change is the “BRIC” concept, which is based on the works of scholars from Goldman Sachs (O’Neill 2001, 2005: 3-9). This concept holds that Brazil, Russia, India, China and sometimes also South Africa (thus making the acronym “BRICS”) are emerging powers. With the exception of Russia, these countries were the leaders of the global South at the WTO summit in Cancún. Brazil, India and South Africa have initiated close economic and political cooperation. What distinguishes them from other non-OECD countries is that they possess enough resources to exert a decisive influence on global governance.

Sometimes a larger group, referred to as “BRICSAM”, is analyzed. It includes Mexico (which is already a member of the OECD) and sometimes even Indonesia. The main criteria for BRICSAM countries are that they are diplomatically active at the global level; that they claim to represent the global South; and that they are recognized as the key actors of the global South by the global North, something which results in efforts to establish institutionalized patterns of cooperation between BRICSAM and, for example, the G7 (Cooper/Shaw/ Antkiewicz: 2008).

At other times South Africa is totally excluded because of its relatively low growth rates and relatively small economy. This approach focuses on the enormous economic growth and size of Brazil, China, India, and Russia. Its adherents predict that these four countries, which are already the global growth engines today, will dominate the world economy in terms of economic output by 2050 (Wilson/Purushothaman 2003). They thus draw, like those who favor BRICS over BRIC, a sharp line between these and other emerging countries, also known as the “N-11”, or next 11 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam).

The N-11 are also realizing rapid economic development, but they have not reached the size of the BRIC countries. Very optimistic analyses (Wilson/Stupnytska 2007) predict that the N-11 may challenge the first world within the first half of this century; however, even the most optimistic scholars admit that there is a big gap between the N-11 and BRIC. Only Mexico and South Korea, and to a lesser degree Turkey and Vietnam, possess the faint potential to be able to compete with BRIC.

From a methodological viewpoint, the concepts regarding emerging countries presented so far highlight two things: First, in many cases (anchor countries, BRIC) very simple indicators of hard-power resources are used to determine which countries fall into the category of emerging states. The methodological depth of the concepts presented above increases with the
analytical depth: the more elaborate description of anchor countries, for instance, is based not only on economic output but also on activities in other policy areas, a leadership role, and governance functions. Second, political science is often merged with political advice and political ideology: the concepts presented so far are not scientifically objective but rather tend to legitimize certain policies (for example, privileged cooperation with China and India).

3.2 Regional Powers and Geopolitical Regionalization

If more than just development-policy aspects are taken into consideration, the rise of some non-OECD countries is seen as coming along with the decline of the United States as a unipole. Graham Fuller and John Arquilla (1996: 609-611) link this decline to the fact that the United States cannot maintain its global hegemony. While immediate threats such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism still result in American interference, softer issues such as democratization, ecological matters, and human rights no longer cause the United States interfere in what have become regional affairs. In addition, the cost of equipment and troops is low in emerging countries compared to in the first world. The former can easily build large armies. Their economic growth strengthens this capacity. This means, on the one hand, that interventions in the non-OECD world are not only considered unnecessary by the American public but have also become more costly and risky for the American military. On the other hand, emerging non-OECD countries are gaining the ability to exert military power beyond their borders and thus to manage regional affairs.

Due to their key role as regional players, which results from their relevance in regional economics and in regional security policy, emerging non-OECD countries are essential partners for those states which currently dominate at the global level. In the German political consultation and political science discourse, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) puts this perspective most bluntly (Husar/Maihold 2009: 7-27): in order to shape global politics and contain regional risks, cooperation with “leading powers” is indispensable to German foreign policy. Hence, scholars from the SWP analyze possibilities for potential cooperation with leading powers on different policies at the global and regional level. In correspondence with this practical interest, these scholars define leading powers as states which are able to constructively or deconstructively shape specific international policies, either alone or by mobilizing other states and nonstate actors. In contrast to the following definition of regional powers, leading powers assume their role on a rather ad hoc basis and in relation to single policies only.

The first list of criteria for regional powers was put forward by Øyvind Østerud. Østerud (1992: 6, 12) claims that a country is a regional power if it is part of a geographically delineated region, is able to withstand any intraregional coalition, exerts a high influence in all regionally important affairs, and has the potential to become a global great power. Nolte (2006: 25, 28, 2007: 9-15) renders this list more precise by adding some features: First of all, the region
has to be delineated in terms of its self-understanding. Regional powers strongly influence this self-understanding: they construct their region. A mere surplus in power resources does not make a regional power. Dense cultural, economic, and political links expressed in regional governance structures are also necessary. Closely linked to this point is the role of regional powers as agenda-setters.

Moreover, as Andrew Hurrell (1995: 38, 2000: 3) and Maxi Schoeman (2003: 353) highlight, regional powers need to be accepted, or at least not directly contested, by relevant actors inside and outside their region. In this spirit, regional powers have to fulfill their role by representing their region at the global level and providing an ordering principle for their region. To summarize Stefan Schirm’s (2005: 110-111) definition, regional powers are the accepted rule makers; they possess power over resources which they transform into power over outcomes. In comparison to most concepts presented so far, this definition adds a crucial qualitative feature to those emerging non-OECD countries which assume a regional leadership role. It is not sufficient to possess more hard-power resources and to interact closely with neighbor states. Leadership requires, firstly, a vision for how to use one’s superiority (and the will to do so). Secondly, leadership requires followers who, for whatever reason, accept the special role of the leader and take up a subordinate role.

In this context, Wight’s (1978: 34-36) association of dominance and a legitimizing objective, which is questioned by others as illegitimate and suppressive, becomes interesting. Revolutionary states in particular, such as France after the French Revolution, claim to have a legitimate duty to export their revolution; they seek to impose their ordering principle on their neighbors. From the viewpoint of the revolutionary state, this is legitimate and is even beneficial for its neighbors. The revolution is too good to remain limited to one country. The neighbors, however, perceive this as an imperialist project. If one transfuses Wight’s observation to regional powers, it becomes apparent that they dominate and provide an ordering principle for their region; they understand this as an act of benevolence, but it causes permanent criticism and pressure for them to legitimize their role.

Given this structural obstacle to the realization of followership, Daniel Flemes (2008: 14) proposes five features which make minor states accept regional powers’ leadership: First, there have to be common interests. Second, the regional power needs the material capacity to provide incentives and to contribute disproportionately to the production of collective goods. Third, a compatibility of norms and values has to lead to the moral authority and legitimacy of the regional power. This is based on a common understanding on the part of all relevant countries, by the elites in specific and the people in general. Fourth, the regional power has to restrain its use of power and share it by giving minor states leading roles in certain policy areas. Fifth, consensual, democratic, and reciprocal institutions should form the basis of regional leadership and followership.

Miriam Prys’s (2008a: 7-11, 2008b: 101, 2009: 197-209) contributions may serve as an analytical framework for the study of interstate relations with a focus on regional powers. Prys
uses three dimensions to describe hegemonic relationships: First, the self-perception and perception of the potential hegemon. This means more than just willingness to dominate. It includes the type of hegemony the hegemon’s elite chooses. In combination with this, the way minor states regard the hegemon is essential. This strongly affects their acceptance of a hegemon’s special role as regional leader. Second, the projection of interests and values as a process in which a hegemon tries to promote its vision via mediation in conflicts, material incentives, or institutionalization. Third, the provision of public goods as a key feature of hegemony. This is useful in order to describe in which policy areas and by which means a regional power is active.

In addition to these three dimensions, Hurrell (2008: 7-11) emphasizes regional-global interaction because, firstly, the regional orders created by regional powers interact closely with the processes of globalization, a fact which is most evident in economic issues (for example, the promotion of trade liberalization in regional economic organizations). Secondly, global dynamics, in security policy for instance, provide opportunities for regional powers to strengthen their position, either as partners of the United States or as its adversaries. Thirdly, regional powers shape the international system at the global level (unipolar or multipolar, centered or regionalized), and their role (one state among many or leaders of their region) is shaped by this system.

Prys’s (2008a: 12-13, 2008b: 100-101, 2009: 209-212) distinction of an outside-in and an inside-out dimension of regional hegemony goes in the same direction. She suggests that influences from the outside, for example, the support or opposition of the global great powers, significantly affect a regional power’s potential and behavior. From the inside-out perspective, the question of whether a regional power uses its region as a stepping stone on the way to the status of a global great power or seeks to gate-keep in its region in order to remain the dominant actor without external interference is critical.

To summarize, the way in which the definition of regional powers has been outlined in the previous paragraphs highlights a methodological shift from static geographical and hard features (for example, delineated region, surplus in power resources) via process-oriented aspects (for example, dense cultural, economic and political links; agenda-setting) to soft factors (for example, regional self-understanding, accepted role as regional leader). As the following section shows, the methodological pluralism of the hard and soft characteristics of regional powers shapes not only their definition but also the study of their effects on regional stability. Table 2 summarizes the concepts regarding emerging powers.
Table 2: Concepts Regarding Emerging Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Authors/institutions</th>
<th>Rough definition</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pivotal states</td>
<td>Chase, Hill &amp; Kennedy</td>
<td>Non-OECD partners of the United States which determine regional development</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchor countries</td>
<td>DIE (Stamm)</td>
<td>Non-OECD partners in German development policy which determine regional development</td>
<td>Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New drivers of global change</td>
<td>DIE (Messner &amp; Humphrey)</td>
<td>Large emerging powers which strongly influence global governance</td>
<td>China, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>Leaders of the global South which are realizing rapid growth and possess the resources to influence global governance</td>
<td>Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICSAM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, (Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Large emerging economies which will challenge the first world by 2050, engines of global growth</td>
<td>Brazil, China, India, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emerging non-OECD economies which are far smaller than BRICS</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading powers</td>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Ad hoc leaders in single policy areas with constructive and deconstructive potential, partners in German foreign policy</td>
<td>Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary regional powers</td>
<td>Huntington</td>
<td>States which face strong neighbors and long for external balancing partners</td>
<td>Argentina, Great Britain, Japan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional powers</td>
<td>GIGA</td>
<td>Regionally dominant states and leaders of their region</td>
<td>Brazil, China, India, Iran, Japan, South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

4. Regional Hegemony: Hierarchy instead of Anarchy via Cooperative Leadership

4.1 Modes of Regional Hegemony

As the comparison of the concepts regarding emerging non-OECD countries has stressed, the way a dominant state applies its power is certainly no less important than its mere surplus of power resources. A surplus of power resources does not automatically mean de facto dominance because the surplus is not necessarily utilized. This implies that while studies of emerging non-OECD countries may start by ranking them according to their hard-power resources, a study of how the surplus of power resources is used is an absolutely essential second step.
Lake (1996: 5-22) argues that the intensity of the control exerted by a dominant state over others depends on the costs of governance and the likelihood of opportunist behavior. Stronger control by the dominant state renders defective behavior less likely. However, the costs of governance also rise with the level of control because control has to be achieved via coercion, which requires resources. This means that alliances, where every state remains sovereign, offer the lowest governance costs but the highest risk of opportunist behavior. Empires which have total control over the subordinates guarantee that opportunist behavior is almost impossible. Yet empires are the most expensive form of control. The optimal relationship is thus a balance of the risk of opportunism and the costs of governance. Both vary from case to case.

Developing on a similar approach to the rational choice regarding different levels of control for regional powers, Thomas Pedersen (2002: 688-693) argues that whether states opt for “cooperative hegemony” depends on three factors:

First, the ability of states to make minor states accept and follow their ordering principle. This requires a medium level of regional polarity because if polarity is too high, dominant states will not need to make concessions and will prefer unilateralism. If polarity is too low, dominant states will not be able to carry the costs of cooperative hegemony. External threats lower the costs of cooperative hegemony given that the minor states’ security is increased by bandwagoning with hegemons in order to confront the external threat.

Second, domestic factors within the dominant state, which influence the probability of cooperative hegemony. The political thinking of the hegemon’s elite and its political system is relevant. Autocratic and centralized states are less likely than democratic and federal countries to choose cooperative hegemony: in the first case domestic factors contradict the principles of cooperative hegemony whereas in the second they match.

Etel Solingen (1997, 1998: 22-48, 62-87, 2009: 11-18) suggests that governing coalitions of social forces are either internationalist, meaning that they favor free trade because this serves their economic interests, or isolationist, meaning that they favor economic closure in order to be protected from international competition. While internationalists strongly support cooperation with neighbor countries and regional integration, isolationists ideologically reject everything they perceive as being foreign influence. If a region is characterized by internationalist rule, it will evolve cooperatively to a zone of peace and stability. In contrast, isolationist governing coalitions tend to handle their conflicts violently, so that regions dominated by isolationist rule are instable and laden with armed conflicts.

Third, the fact that cooperative hegemony will only occur if the dominant state expects higher gains from it than from other ordering principles. The costs of cooperative hegemony, the level of regional economic interdependence, and discourses that enforce regional integration affect the choice of the ordering principle. The characteristics of the dominant state, such as weakness in key aspects of power (for example, economic dependence on others or a disadvantageous geostrategic location), declining dominance, and a high level of soft power, favor cooperative hegemony.
Given that regional powers do not necessarily choose cooperative hegemony, the ideal types of regional dominance, as elaborated upon by Sandra Destradi (2008: 8-15), are a helpful mode of categorization: First, Destradi argues that dominant states can act as empires. They impose de facto political control over others which remain de jure sovereign. Empires limit the sovereignty of their subordinates substantially via coercion and imposition. This imposition includes the use of military power as a last resort. Empires prefer unilateral action. On account of their highly aggressive and intimidating nature, empires are accompanied by the dissatisfaction of subordinates, which long for the fall of the empire and perform resistance according to their calculations of rational action.

Second, Destradi uses the term hegemony in distinction from empire. For her, hegemony is a more subtle and less aggressive way of influencing one’s neighbors. The means of hegemony range from the exertion of pressure and the provision of material benefits to the discursive spread of a hegemon’s norms and values. Hegemons balance between the pursuit of their interests and respect for the interests of their subordinates. A minimum degree of consensus and normative persuasion is what hegemons, in contrast to empires, need in addition to hard-power resources.

Most of the time, hegemony ensures the compliance of subordinates via nonviolent means. Coercion is necessary in rare cases only. Hegemony, achieved via the disproportionate contribution to the production of collective goods which guarantee followship, will be rational for dominant states if the costs of providing collective goods are lower than the costs of creating an empire by force. This suggests that hegemons pursue an altruist discourse and claim to act in the common interest of all in order to disguise the fact that their actions are exclusively motivated by their individual interests.

Yet because hegemony offers many ways for dominant states to act as hegemons, Destradi (2008: 15-18) further distinguishes between hard, intermediate and soft hegemony. Under hard hegemony, the dominant state uses pressure to make its subordinates adapt its policies. This works more subtly than in empire, for instance, via economic and financial sanctions instead of military force. However, the only reason for minor states to comply is their calculation of rational action, which tells them that the costs of noncompliance are higher than those of accepting the hegemon’s demands. The hegemon therefore only possesses pseudo-legitimacy. Common values do not exist and, as in the case of an empire, the subordinate states long for the hegemon’s fall.

Intermediate hegemony, in contrast, rests on the provision of material benefits in order to make subordinates acquiesce. The hegemon stresses common interests and does not employ sanctions vis-à-vis its subordinates. Intermediate hegemony is what Klaus Knorr (1975: 7, 24-25) calls “reward power”—the subordinates comply because they are rewarded for compliance instead of being punished for noncompliance. Hence, subordinates are more willing to accept the hegemon, which possesses partial legitimacy.
Lastly, soft hegemony is built on the hegemon’s efforts to change the norms and values of its subordinates. They comply voluntarily; thus, Destradi’s soft hegemony matches Pedersen’s cooperative hegemony. Sanctions and material incentives are replaced by the socialization and ideological persuasion of the elites of secondary states; this is similar to Nye’s “soft power.”

According to Nye (1990: 181-182, 2004), there are two types of power: Hard power results from economic or military superiority. In terms of hard power, A gets B to do something which contradicts B’s preferences but becomes rational for B because A threatens to use or uses its power to make B comply. Soft power works indirectly. Whenever A uses soft power, B’s preferences change and become compatible with A’s preferences long before a conflict occurs. A makes B think that it shares A’s preferences. Hence, “Soft Power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Nye 2004: 5). Accordingly, soft hegemony offers full legitimacy to the hegemon because subordinates internalize the distribution of power and the special role of the hegemon. They understand the status quo as being compatible with their interests.3

Figure 1 provides an overview of the analytical framework for regional powers, combining the modes of hegemony with Pryss’s analytical categories:

Figure 1: A Framework for the Analysis of Regional Powers

Source: Author’s own compilation.

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3 Destradi (2008: 18-22) introduces the category of leadership for dominant states which do not pursue their individual interests but noncoercively guide a group of states so that their common interests are realized. However, it appears to be very problematic to distinguish what Destradi understands as leadership from subtle hegemony. Whenever it seems as if a dominant state acts in the interest of the common good, or as a leader in Destradi’s terms, serious concerns about the ideological disguising of its individual interests or an ideological construction of the common good—which coincides with the individual interests of the dominant state—have to be raised. Hegemons that appear to fit into the category of leadership are, from the viewpoint of this text’s author, soft hegemons that are advancing highly ideological discourses.
4.2 Regional Powers as Noncoercive Hegemons and Leaders

As mentioned above and further stressed by the different modes of hegemony, soft factors become essential when analyzing more than whether a certain state possesses enough power resources to be a hegemon. In order to act as de facto regional power, a country needs not only need sufficient power resources but also soft skills in leadership. Nannerl Keohane understands leadership as cooperative guidance: “Leaders make decisions. They listen to proposals […] from others. They assemble resources and deploy incentives, both rewards and sanctions […] They identify strategies for solving problems, and they attempt to persuade […] or force others to follow” (Keohane 2005: 707).

The key point regarding this understanding of leadership is that it excludes pure coercion. In accordance with Gramsci, Robert Cox (1977: 387, 1983, 1986: 251) argues that hegemony and leadership can be distinguished from imperialism by their consensual nature—the elites of secondary states are aware that they benefit from voluntary subordination. The hegemon accepts short-term losses and expects to gain in the long run. Moreover, it appears to be characteristic of leadership that hegemons make concessions to minor states on issues where the interests of these individual minor states are strong so that in return for making concessions, the hegemon is able to realize its overall interest of preserving its preferred system order.

However, a Gramscian understanding of hegemony is still about a dominant state getting others to do what it wants them to do. This means that regional powers, acting as cooperative hegemons, do not use coercion but rather cooperation and subtle means in order to realize their preferences and make others comply. In this sense, Pedersen (2002: 681-686) argues that regional integration can be a policy pursued by a dominant power. The dominant state seeks to bundle the power resources of its region in order to enhance its foundation for global power politics. Access to economic assets such as markets and resources becomes easier, and institutionalization offers the chance to form the region according to the dominant state’s preferences.

Michael Mastanduno (2009) describes American unilateralism in this spirit as a combination of system-making and privilege-taking—privileges for the United States in exchange for an order which is beneficial to the followers. The key element of such an approach is that the dominant power acts cooperatively because otherwise anti-hegemonic balancing is very likely. John Ikenberry (2001: 28) suggests that this type of leadership rejects overtly malign domination and works in a consensual, institutionalized and reciprocal manner. Cooperative hegemony gives minor states rights of participation similar to those of a concert of powers, even though it is still unipolar. Charles Kupchan (1998: 42-62) pleads for regional “benign unipolarity” as a replacement for the Pax Americana. Benign unipolarity comes into existence when peripheral countries take up subordinate roles to a regional core, thereby limiting the latter’s exercise of power. This leads to mutual trust and a common identity among the peripheral states and the core.
What is crucial to regional security dynamics is the fact that whenever benign unipolarity is the rational option for a dominant state, open conflict and coercion become self-defeating because they render the voluntary subordination of peripheral and minor states impossible. Even open conflict and coercion vis-à-vis extraregional countries become unattractive for a state trying to build benign unipolarity because behaving in this way discredits its cooperative identity. In other words, Kupchan’s concept of benign unipolarity highlights even more clearly than Keohane’s understanding of leadership and Pedersen’s cooperative hegemony that regional powers and regional hegemons may transform the logic of interstate relations within their system and overcome international anarchy.

The focus on cooperative hegemony goes along with the observation that while regional powers are generally supported by first world countries, their most difficult task is gaining the followership of their neighbors. Analyzing the failure of Brazil and India to reach their goals in the ongoing debate about a reform of the United Nations Security Council and the modest achievements of the G20 in the wake of the summit in Cancún, Flemes (2008: 4, 24) and Schirm (2008) conclude that in order to obtain their neighbors’ followership, emerging powers have to act benevolently. As already indicated above, they have to be committed, credible and trustworthy, and they have to include their neighbors’ interests in their policies and provide incentives to them. Moreover, it is essential that the economic, political, and security policies and systems of the potential hegemon are recognized as role models by its neighbors. A failure to meet these three criteria leads to failure in regional leadership, as the Brazilian and Indian cases demonstrate.

With regard to elite networks, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 283) maintain that the elites of secondary states internalize the norms articulated by the hegemon and therefore favor policies that are consistent with those preferred by the hegemon. In this spirit, Dirk Nabers (2008: 8-9, 12, 14-17, 20) argues that leadership and hegemony are dependent on each other because leadership requires the inclusion of what potential followers want and hegemony results from the affirmation of a regional power’s leadership project by minor regional states.

This renunciation of the analysis of only hard-power resources becomes most apparent in Nabers’s approach. For him, power derived from material capacities has to be transformed into leadership via a discursive process. After a crisis, competing discourses, supported by competing states, emerge and accentuate different concepts of hegemony—or to put it simply, there is discursive competition between states claiming a hegemonic role. When one discourse finally becomes dominant, it constitutes an interpretative framework for political action. One powerful state assumes hegemony and leadership, whereas its former rivals regress to a minor status. In other words, leadership is most effective when subordinates share the leader’s concept of hegemony and the leader’s vision of international order and internalize it as their own.

In contrast to the adjustment to coercion, the internalization of followership results from learning in a discursive process. Constructivists argue that this usually occurs in multilateral negotiations and makes participants pursue mutually beneficial interests. Methodologically,
this means that the evolution of discourses, and not hard-power resources, has to be analyzed in order to gain insight into regional powers and interstate relations.

However, not only constructivism but also realism can explain why cooperative behavior is proposed in this paper as the most efficient approach for regional powers. From a realist point of view, cooperative behavior results simply from regional powers’ lack of power compared to established great powers. Flemes (2007a: 9, 2007b: 16-22, 2008: 3-4) compares regional powers to classical middle powers, which pursue multilateral and noncoercive approaches in foreign policy. Robert Keohane (1969: 298) defines middle powers as states whose leaders realize that they cannot act alone and therefore need to assemble a small group of other states around them in order to become influential. Cox (1996: 245) attributes a significant role to middle powers in international institution-building because it is in this way they try to create a predictable and stable environment for themselves.

On the global scale, neither Brazil nor India nor South Africa can be successful alone. Even in their own regions, coercion-based approaches would hardly enable them to attain their goals. As middle powers, they have to unite at the global level and take on the role of speakers for the global South so that they can jointly act vis-à-vis the great powers. This implies that their regional approaches cannot be predominantly coercive. In order to be successful on the global and, to a lesser extent, the regional scale, regional powers, like middle powers, share “the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, […] to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and […] to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy” (Cooper/Higgot/Nossal 1993: 19).

In contrast, power transition theory\(^4\) stresses the superiority of regional powers vis-à-vis their neighbors as an explanation of regional stability: Simply speaking, states which possess an equal level of power risk conflict because all of them think they might prevail. If the distribution of power among states is unequal, everyone knows who will win a confrontation. Therefore, confrontations are avoided, or at least do not escalate, because the weaker side gives in.

Lemke (2002: 118-145, 2008) demonstrates empirically that the stronger regional hegemons are, the more peaceful their region is and the more advanced regional institutionalization is. Although it is not always based on the best correlations, his analysis confirms the theory of power transition and hegemonic stability. From a methodological viewpoint, Lemke’s contribution shows that in-depth analyses of the regional powers do not necessarily need to be confined to discourses. Lemke (2002: 98-99, 2008) uses military strength, population and economic output as indicators of hegemony. In contrast to the qualitative method—discourse analysis—which results from Nabers’s conceptualization of leadership, Lemke works with quantitative data and correlations.

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\(^4\) Classical power transition theory, which is about a dominant state on top and great and middle powers as subordinates, in contrast to realist balancing logic, is based on the works of Organski (1958). Tammen and Kugler’s (2000) volume contains recent contributions on this theory. Lemke (2002: 21-46) provides an introduction to it.
To summarize, most analyses suggest that the most effective approach for regional powers is cooperative hegemony. By acting as cooperative hegemons, they restructure their (regionally limited) systems and create an environment highly favorable to interstate cooperation. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, this already happens because of the pure dominance of regional powers in terms of hard-power resources. Both of these positions imply that the logic of international relations varies from region to region and that international relations theories have to take regional specificities resulting from regional power relations into consideration.

5 Regional Powers and Their Regions: A Geographical and Political Research Agenda

Two areas for further investigation can be derived from the current state of research on regional powers presented above:

First, regionally dominant states act as empires, hard hegemons, intermediate hegemons, soft hegemons, or totally restrain from regular dominance depending on their calculation of rational action. This leads to regional variations in the logic of interstate relations. If a regional power acts like a cooperative and soft hegemon, the overall interaction within its region will be more cooperative and the region will be more stable. Intermediate hegemons, hard hegemons and empires create fundamentally different logics of regional interaction—they provide different regional-ordering principles. The absence of de facto regional hegemony leads to another region-specific mode of international relations. This leads to the first question: How do regional powers empirically affect the patterns of interstate relations in their regions?

Second, in spite of the detailed discourse on how regional powers behave vis-à-vis superior and inferior states and which countries qualify as regional powers, no clear delineation of regional powers’ regions exists. Yet given that the region and its delineation are essential to the concept of regional powers, it would be worthwhile to analyze the spatial extent of the influence of each regional power. Investigations of this question may be based on political geography—its traditional realist (e.g., Deudney 1999, 2000, Mackinder 1890, 1904, Spykman 1938, 1942), moderate realist (e.g., Lacoste 1984, 2008, 2009, Taylor/Flint 2000) and constructivist (e.g., Agnew 1994, Agnew/Corbridge 1995, Dalby 1991, Ó Tuathail 1996, Ó Tuathail/Dalby 1998) branches. Following the development of a concept regarding geopolitical regionalization in this way, indicators in accordance with this theoretical background and the specific empirical matter of regional powers should be developed and applied in case studies.
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