Europe’s Quest for Critical Raw Materials in Latin America

For Europe, diversifying imports of critical raw materials (CRM) has become a strategic imperative to safeguard the energy transition, mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities, and reduce structural dependencies in the digital, defence, and aerospace sectors. Of the 34 CRM listed by the EU, 25 are extracted in Latin America, highlighting its strategic importance in the global resource landscape.

• With the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and the 2025 RESourceEU Action Plan, the EU seeks to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of CRM for its industries and strengthen its resilience vis-à-vis external pressures.

• The EU–Mercosur agreement and the modernised EU–Chile trade agreement are expected to enhance the EU’s ability to secure access to CRM, as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile occupy strategically significant positions in global supply chains.

• The EU has signed Memoranda of Understanding with Argentina and Chile on the development of sustainable raw materials value chains, while a comparable agreement with Brazil is under negotiation.

• Structural bottlenecks persist on both the EU and Latin American sides regarding the development of processing and refining capacities for CRM, resulting in dependencies upon third countries, particularly China.

• The EU and Latin American countries share an interest in reducing unilateral dependencies as a basis for deeper cooperation. However, divergent priorities shape this cooperation, as Latin American partners seek to expand downstream industrial capabilities beyond the mere extraction of CRM.

Policy Implications

The EU faces competition in securing access to CRM. To establish itself as a preferred partner in Latin America, it must align its strategy with its partners’ priorities, particularly their interests in industrial development and technological cooperation. Declaratory commitments and programmatic announcements need to be backed by credible financial resources and concrete investment.

Supply of Critical Raw Materials as a Security Risk

On her way to Asunción for the signing of the EU–Mercosur agreement on 17 January, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen made a stopover in Brazil. At a joint press conference with Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, she highlighted the strategic importance of CRM for relations with Mercosur, especially Brazil, stating,

Europe and Brazil are moving toward a very important political agreement on critical raw materials. It will frame our cooperation on joint investment projects in lithium, nickel, and rare earths.

Critical raw materials (CRM) are integral to the manufacturing of batteries, electric vehicles, power grids, jet engines, advanced defence technologies – and semiconductors, which underpin artificial intelligence. Their availability directly affects energy security, the pace and feasibility of the green transition, and the operational readiness and technological superiority of the defence sector, which has gained importance due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the perceived unreliability of the United States, and Europe’s policies of rearmament.

Under the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), the European Union lists 34 critical raw materials – based on their importance for the EU economy and the risk of supply disruption – of which a subset of 17 are classified as strategic raw materials (SRM). These SRM are deemed particularly essential for the green and digital transition, as well as for defence and aerospace applications. Copper and nickel were included on the CRM list due to their classification as SRM.

In parallel, in December 2024 NATO published a list of 12 defence-critical raw materials (DCRM) that are considered indispensable for the production of advanced defence systems and equipment. Except for beryllium, all of these materials are likewise designated as SRM under the CRMA. Demand for CRM for energy and digital transitions overlaps with demand from the defence sector. This overlap creates the risk that, under geopolitical pressure, the EU could prioritise the needs of the defence industry over not only those of the energy transition but also its climate commitments.

The EU’s commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050 and a renewable energy share of at least 42.5 per cent by 2030 necessitate the large-scale diffusion of electric vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines, smart grids, and storage batteries, which requires minerals with highly specific performance characteristics, including electrical conductivity, thermal stability, low mass, and magnetic properties – linking climate ambition directly to the geopolitics of CRM. Of the 34 CRM identified by the EU Commission in 2024, 26 (15 out of 17 SRM) are needed for key renewable energy technologies.

A report by the European Court of Auditors (2026) shows that for most CRM the EU is dependent on imports from non-EU countries. For 10 of these materials, the EU is entirely reliant on external suppliers. Within the EU, there are currently no significant rare-earth mines, only limited extraction facilities for other CRM, and just a small number of processing plants. The refining and processing of CRM has become increasingly concentrated in a small number of countries. According to the IEA (2025: 62–63), the combined market share of the top three refining nations for key energy minerals increased from approximately 82 per cent in 2020 to 86 per cent in 2024. The IEA’s assessment of announced projects suggests that progress towards more diversified refining supply chains will remain slow, as the combined share of the top three countries is projected to decline only marginally, to approximately 82 per cent, by 2035.

A more detailed assessment by the IEA covering 20 energy-related strategic minerals demonstrates China’s dominant position in global refining. It is the leading refiner of 19 of the 20 minerals analysed, with an average market share of around 70 per cent. In 2024 China accounted for approximately 90 per cent of refined rare-earth elements required for the production of permanent magnets, which are essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, digital technologies, and artificial intelligence infrastructure. China also holds a dominant position in the processing of minerals critical to semiconductor manufacturing. It refines 95 per cent of the world’s high-purity silicon. In addition, with a market share of 44 per cent China is the world’s leading producer of refined copper, a material essential for power transformers, electrical wiring, and on-chip circuitry in data centres. Furthermore, globally China accounts for about 99 per cent of the refined gallium supply, which is indispensable for advanced transistor-based power electronics and optical computing technologies (IEA 2025: 247-253).

As highlighted by the IEA (2025: 64), the geopolitics of CRM has become increasingly shaped by export controls. As of October 2025, more than half of 20 energy-related strategic minerals were subject to some form of export restriction. Recent policy actions illustrate the increasing use of export controls as a tool of political leverage. In December 2024 China restricted exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony – minerals essential for semiconductor manufacturing – to the United States. In April 2025 the Chinese government expanded export controls to include seven heavy rare-earth elements, as well as related compounds, metals, and magnets. These measures were further tightened in October 2025 to cover parts, components, and assemblies produced using Chinese materials or processing technologies. These developments underscore the strategic vulnerabilities associated with highly concentrated supply chains and highlight how control over CRM processing can translate into broader industrial, technological, and geopolitical leverage.

The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and the RESourceEU Action Plan

The RESourceEU Action Plan of the European Union from December 2025 states that “the diversification of critical raw materials supply must become an EU top political priority over the coming years.” Building up processing and refining capacities within Europe or in reliable partner countries (“friendshoring”) is essential to reduce structural dependencies on highly concentrated refining hubs.

Adopted in 2024, the CRMA represents the EU’s effort to institutionalise a coordinated approach to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of CRM for the industry, enhancing the EU’s resilience to external pressures, and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. The CRMA sets non-binding targets (“benchmarks”) for 2030 for domestic (EU) extraction (at least 10 per cent), processing (at least 40 per cent), recycling (at least 25 per cent), and import diversification (not more than 65 per cent from any single third country) of SRM (unprocessed or at any stage of processing), giving special consideration to countries with which the EU has established a strategic partnership, a free trade agreement, or other forms of cooperation covering raw materials.

Four imported SRM relevant for the energy transition – lithium (Chile), magnesium, gallium, and rare-earth elements for permanent magnets (all China) – currently exceed the 65 per cent threshold. According to an assessment of EU policy on CRM for the energy transition by the European Court of Auditors (2026), the estimated capacity for processing of CRM in the EU accounts for about 24 per cent of the supply, far from the 40 per cent target for 2030. In the case of lithium and rare earth, the processing capacity is zero.

However, the EU does not want to passively capitulate to the various dependencies. The Commission has already approved 60 Strategic Projects under the CRMA to increase EU capacity to extract, process, and recycle SRM and diversify EU supplies. Thirteen projects are located in countries outside of the EU, including one in Brazil, the São Miguel Paulista Restart Project, a nickel and cobalt refinery. It is estimated that the project can cover approximately 3 per cent of the EU’s annual nickel consumption and 4 per cent of the EU’s annual consumption of cobalt, which is also of relevance for the defence industry.

Moreover, in December 2025 the EU Commission presented its “RESourceEU Action Plan” with the objectives of “accelerat[ing] the achievement of the CRMA objectives” and “chart[ing] a path towards a faster diversification of CRMs supply chains.” According to the EU, as part of a “Team Europe” approach the plan will mobilise EUR 3 billion in EU funding over the next 12 months to provide direct support to the CRM value chain. In addition, the plan foresees the establishment of a European Critical Raw Materials Centre in 2026, with a mandate to help secure access to CRM for European industries.

The immediate focus of RESourceEU is on rare-earth permanent magnets, raw materials for batteries, and defence-related raw materials. According to optimistic estimates, planned and ongoing projects could reduce the EU’s dependence on a single country of origin by 30 to 50 per cent by 2029 at the latest. In such an optimistic scenario, respective to 2025 levels the EU would reduce its dependency on any single third country by 2030 along the rare-earth value chain from 95 to 42 per cent in extraction, and from 100 to 60 per cent in processing and recycling. For permanent magnets, dependency is projected to decline in the same time frame from 90 to 80 per cent. In the area of space and defence-related raw materials, the expected reduction is from 31 to 26 per cent for tungsten, from 71 to 17 per cent for gallium, and from 45 to 0 per cent for germanium (Factsheet RESourceEU Action Plan 2025). These are ambitious targets, and achieving them will require close cooperation with international partners. For several CRM and SRM, Latin America represents a particularly important and promising partner.

CRM in EU–Latin American Relations

According to the RESourceEU Action Plan,

to diversify EU CRM supplies, the Commission is pursuing on behalf of the EU and in cooperation with Member States a pro-active CRM diplomatic agenda.

A prominent illustration of this agenda is the Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) with Chile, in force since February 2025, which modernises and substitutes the trade part of the EU–Chile Association Agreement in effect since 2003. The ITA includes both a chapter on energy and raw materials and a chapter on trade and sustainable development. In this sense, the agreement represents a test case for the EU’s ability to secure not only reliable but also sustainable supplies of CRM (Dünhaupt 2025).

Moreover, since 2021 the EU has signed 15 strategic partnerships on raw materials with resource-rich countries worldwide, including two with Latin American partners – Argentina and Chile – in 2023. The RESourceEU Action Plan emphasises the launch of bilateral negotiations with Brazil as “a strategic partner with important value chains on rare earths, niobium, nickel, graphite, lithium manganese and aluminium.”

The MoU for the strategic partnerships between the EU and Latin American governments place particular emphasis on local value creation and the development of open, fair, and competitive markets for critical raw and processed materials. However, these memoranda do not create rights or obligations under international or domestic law. They also neither contain binding financing commitments nor guarantee preferential access for the partners. In this respect, FTAs differ, as they establish legally binding commitments and more clearly defined frameworks for economic cooperation.

When the first draft of the EU–Mercosur Agreement was presented in July 2019, the debate over CRM and SRM had not yet reached the level of prominence it has today. By the time the agreement was signed and provisionally put into effect in early 2026, geopolitical shifts had significantly elevated their strategic relevance. EU data on CRM imports by country show that Brazil accounts for 12 per cent of the EU’s aluminium/bauxite, 13 per cent of its natural graphite, 82 per cent of its niobium, 8 per cent of its manganese, 9 per cent of its silicon metal, 7 per cent of its vanadium, and 16 per cent of its tantalum, while Argentina contributes 6 per cent of the EU’s lithium imports. As the world’s largest producer of copper and second-largest producer of lithium, Chile also plays an important role in the EU’s CRM diversification strategy: the EU sources 14 per cent of its copper and 79 per cent of its lithium from Chile. Other Latin American countries – apart from Mexico, which supplies fluorspar – play a less prominent role as providers of CRM (see Table 1).

Table 1. The Availability of CRM in Latin America and Their Share in EU Imports

Source: Author’s elaboration.

Notes: The righthand column lists the Latin American (and Caribbean) countries identified by the U.S. Geological Survey (2026) for which data on the production and reserves of specific CRM are available, irrespective of volume. The total number of Latin American countries involved per CRM may be higher, as some are likely included in the category of “other countries.” The figures on the share of EU CRM imports from Latin American countries are based on EU data; however, only countries listed by the U.S. Geological Survey are taken into account. For the other Latin American countries with CRM endowments listed in the column, no data on exports to the EU are reported. A major problem is that many of the EU’s statistics on CRM are outdated (see Sierocińska and Michalski 2024; European Court of Auditors 2026: 15–16).

† Arg = Argentina, Bol = Bolivia, Bra = Brazil, Chi= Chile, Cub = Cuba, Gua = Guatemala, Mex = Mexico, Per = Peru.

The EU–Mercosur Agreement will reduce EU tariffs on both CRM and products derived from them. While the agreement generally prohibits export taxes, the revisions adopted in December 2024 allow Brazil – unlike the other Mercosur members – to apply export duties to 23 CRM and 9 SRM. At the same time, the agreement grants the EU preferential treatment if Brazil imposes export duties on third countries; such duties are capped at 25 per cent regardless. Moreover, if Brazil negotiates more favourable export duty terms with another partner, it commits to making its “best efforts” to extend similar conditions to the EU. Export duties on CRM and SRM can provide Brazilian industry with a competitive advantage in processing these raw materials and may encourage European companies to establish production facilities in the country.

A different provision is found in the agreement between the EU and Chile: export duties on raw materials which privilege national producers are prohibited, but the agreement allows Chile to

introduce or maintain measures with the objective to foster value addition, by supplying industrial sectors at preferential prices of raw materials so they can emerge within Chile.

This is the case with lithium, where a system of preferential pricing is in place since the mineral is being used to foster industrial development in Chile – specifically through the production of higher-value-added products such as batteries. However, the results have been disappointing so far (Guajardo 2026), illustrating the difficulties of moving up the CRM value chain.

Competition for CRM in Brazil

Brazil has emerged as a pivotal actor in the geoeconomics of strategic and critical raw materials. The country ranks among the world’s top 10 producers of nickel, manganese, niobium, iron, and bauxite, while simultaneously expanding output of lithium, natural graphite, rare-earth elements, vanadium, and copper. Brazil’s potential may be even greater, given that only 27 per cent of the country’s territory has been geologically mapped (FGV 2025: 18). Brazil has already emerged as one of the five largest global lithium producers. At the same time, the country possesses the world’s second-largest rare-earth reserves – estimated at approximately 21 million tonnes – prompting some observers to describe it as “increasingly becoming the new Eldorado for rare earths” (Bompan 2026). However, while Brazil increased its production of rare-earth elements from 560 tonnes in 2024 to 2,000 tonnes in 2025, this still accounted for only 0.5 per cent of global production. A mapping of Brazilian mining projects (CEBRI 2025) indicates that, for rare-earth elements and lithium – as well as for nickel and cobalt – most deposits are still in the exploration phase or remain undeveloped.

In Brazil, the current average time between the discovery of a mineral deposit and the start of production is 17.2 years – exceeding the global average of 15.5 years – and represents a major structural bottleneck. According to a CEBRI study (2025), this pace “is not aligned with the urgency of the ongoing energy and digital transition” and “may cause Brazil to miss strategic opportunities provided by the global reshaping of mineral supply chains.”

In a rapidly changing environment – marked by the discovery of new CRM deposits and evolving demand driven by emerging technologies – time and capital are scarce resources. There is a risk that Brazil may miss the current investment window and remain confined to the role of a lower-value-added supplier, while other actors capture the most profitable segments of the value chain (FGV 2025: 69). A recent study by PwC Brazil (2025) notes several structural bottlenecks which limit the effective transformation of mineral wealth into sustained national economic development. First, private investment in mineral exploration remains comparatively weak, particularly in non-traditional segments such as rare-earth elements. Second, domestic refining and chemical-processing capacities – including the conversion of mineral concentrates into industrial-grade compounds such as oxides, carbonates, and metals – remain underdeveloped. As a result, a substantial share of extracted output is exported in raw or semi-processed form. In 2023 only 5 per cent of the lithium extracted in Brazil was processed domestically, and refined nickel accounted for less than 40 per cent of total production (CEBRI 2025: 113). Most of Brazil’s lithium – and virtually all rare-earth elements – is shipped to China for further processing, underscoring a structural asymmetry between geological endowment and control over higher-value-added segments of the supply chain. Third, investment in research and development as well as in advanced metallurgical capabilities remains insufficient, further compounded by weak forward linkages between the mining sector and higher-value-added manufacturing activities. The core challenge, therefore, is not extraction but the construction of integrated industrial value chains capable of absorbing domestically extracted or refined inputs and transforming them into high-value products and internationally competitive technologies. The MagBras initiative, a public–private partnership in Minas Gerais, is moving in this direction, aiming to establish Latin America’s first manufacturing facility for rare-earth permanent magnets – meeting this goal, however, is still a long way off.

PwC Brazil identifies three sectors as particularly promising for the development of integrated industrial value chains based on Brazil’s mineral endowment and their strategic relevance for the global energy transition: batteries and energy storage systems, electric mobility, and electronics and advanced technologies. In deliberately stark terms, the report argues that

Brazil must decide whether it will continue exporting the future in the form of raw commodities or take an active role in shaping it, with an intelligent, clean, and integrated mineral industry aligned with the new green economy (PwC 2025: 46).

Accordingly, the study calls for the expansion of strategic international partnerships, emphasising that

to accelerate technological development and secure access to premium markets, Brazil should prioritize bilateral and multilateral agreements focused on critical minerals (PwC 2025: 36).

This is where the EU–Mercosur agreement and a future bilateral agreement with the EU on CRM come into play. The EU–Mercosur agreement could strengthen Brazil’s role as a strategic supplier of CRM – including lithium and rare earths – to Europe. Yet the EU faces formidable competition, as both China and the United States are actively seeking to secure preferential access to Brazil’s resource base. In consequence, Brasília may increasingly condition the exploitation of its CRM reserves on investment in domestic refining and manufacturing capacities with the objective of constructing an integrated, end-to-end value chain within its national territory.

The new National Security Strategy of November 2025 refers to strategic resources and access to critical minerals in its delineation of US interests in the Western Hemisphere. During its first year, the second Trump administration introduced several policy tools to stimulate domestic production and processing of CRM. In addition, the Export–Import Bank of the United States launched a new financing tool, the Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative, to provide targeted financing for critical mineral projects. In this context, the US has also intensified its engagement in Brazil, particularly in the rare-earth sector, supporting exploration projects – notably those of Serra Verde and Aclara – through financing from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Competition for access to CRM is not limited to Brazil. In February 2026 the US government signed a framework agreement with Argentina – building on an MoU concluded in 2024 – aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of CRM supply chains. Following the change of government in Chile in March 2026, the United States initiated talks on closer cooperation in the field of critical raw materials.

Aware that critical raw materials – particularly rare-earth elements – can serve as a source of leverage in conflicts with the United States, the Brazilian government has responded cautiously to US overtures regarding cooperation agreements in this field. Instead, Brazil has sought to diversify its partnerships in the CRM sector. In addition to ongoing negotiations with the EU, the Brazilian government signed MoU with India and South Korea in February 2026 to strengthen cooperation on CRM, underscoring the country’s growing strategic importance in this area.

Converging and Diverging Interests Amid Structural Challenges

At first glance, cooperation between Latin American countries and the EU on CRM appears straightforward: Latin America possesses the resources that Europe needs. Upon closer inspection, however, the relationship proves more complex. What Europe ultimately requires is not merely CRM, but raw materials that have already been refined and processed for industrial use, or downstream products such as batteries. Access to extraction alone does little to reduce strategic dependencies if key stages of the value chain remain concentrated elsewhere. A good example of this conundrum is lithium. At present, European firms lack the technological and industrial capabilities required to process lithium into cathodes, whether within Europe or abroad. China dominates virtually every stage of the global lithium-ion battery value chain in terms of both market share and production capacity, accounting for roughly 25 per cent of global mining capacity and approximately 68–70 per cent of refining capacity (Fasulo et al. 2025).

Hence, when it comes to CRM, Europe and Latin America face similar bottlenecks, despite important differences in resource endowments. Both regions remain heavily dependent on external partners – particularly China and, in the case of Latin America in the future, probably also the US – for the conversion of raw materials into industrial-grade inputs. Consequently, both Europe and Latin American countries share a strategic interest in diversifying their supply chains and reducing unilateral dependencies.

According to the RESourceEU Action Plan, strategic partnerships on raw materials

aim to benefit both the EU and its partners through local beneficiation. The creation of local added value and jobs is essential, including by enabling third countries to reinforce their capacity beyond extraction (European Commission 2025).

This formulation signals a willingness to respond to the interests of partner countries. In the context of intensifying competition for CRM and SRM, such responsiveness is not merely a gesture of goodwill but a political necessity.

For Latin American countries, this is a crucial moment to leverage their mineral endowments to promote industrialisation through domestic processing and the development of higher segments of the value chain. However, there is competition not only for access to CRM in Latin America, but also among resource-rich countries to attract foreign investment for CRM exploration and extraction. Latin American countries that also possess beneficiation, refining, and industrial processing capabilities may have a competitive edge in this context and advance further along the minerals’ downstream value chain, which could provide Brazil with an advantage in the medium term.

The key question, therefore, is whether Latin America can move beyond the mere extraction of critical raw materials in terms of value creation – and, if so, whether this would help reduce Europe’s dependence and vulnerability. From an EU perspective, the challenge lies in striking a balance between strengthening extraction, processing, and recycling in Europe in order to increase autonomy in CRM, and supporting partner countries in moving up the minerals value chain.

Much will depend on the extent to which Latin American countries are perceived in Europe as reliable partners, thereby encouraging the EU and European companies to engage in “friendshoring” in the region. Trade agreements and strategic partnerships can play an important role in fostering such trust, reinforced by previous investments and the strong presence of European companies in the Mercosur countries. Moreover, given favourable energy prices and the availability of renewable energy sources, friendshoring could in some cases be combined with “powershoring,” which refers to the relocation of energy-intensive industries to countries with low-cost clean energy.

While trade agreements and strategic partnerships can improve access to CRM and strengthen European supply security, their effectiveness ultimately depends on whether European and Latin American firms translate these frameworks into concrete investments and integrated value chains. They therefore require a strong financial component to incentivise the extraction, processing, and refining of CRM.

CRM being subject to considerable price volatility – as illustrated by the case of lithium – creates significant barriers for new market entrants. At the same time, many intermediate products derived from these materials, such as batteries, are produced by companies that already enjoy substantial technological advantages and operate in markets characterised by significant overcapacity – for example, in the case of Chinese electric vehicles and batteries.

Another challenge lies in reconciling the extraction and processing of CRM in Latin America with the EU’s high environmental standards. Ultimately, enforcement depends on the environmental regulations in partner countries and, crucially, on their effective implementation. There is also a risk that geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations could push environmental criteria into the background, or that competition for foreign investment in mining could lead to diluted standards. More fundamentally, the extraction of raw materials inherently entails significant environmental and social challenges that cannot be entirely controlled or eliminated, only mitigated.

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