

# **France, Germany, Britain – Responses of Traditional Regional Powers to Rising Regions and Rivals**

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Rough Draft

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## **Abstract:**

This paper deals with individual European responses to notions of rising powers in the world order. The study focuses on German, British, and French reactions in particular. It analyses foreign policy adjustments in response to both individual rising powers (such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) and to general shifts in French, German, and British perceptions of a world order – constituted by established as well as new powers within a changing global institutional context. The paper will compare alterations in the three countries' general foreign policy strategies, roles, and identities; will ask how each country positions itself and Europe as a whole in a new world order; and will seek to answer to what extent Europe's Big Three compete or cooperate in designing common European responses to rising powers. Based on previous conceptual work, the paper will make a normative claim and will call for a dramatic shift in the general perspective by suggesting a rethinking of Europe in a non-European, non-Western world.

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## Introduction

Reflecting upon the reactions of traditional European powers, i.e. France, Germany and Britain, to a world of newly rising regional powers means probably attempting to write the impossible article. The excellent first GIGA concept and framework document which binds all our individual papers and the entire RPN project together not only provides an inspiration for this paper but it also shows the clear limits of my broad topic: We are dealing with three regional powers in the most advanced regional institution (the EU), each used to global interactions as leaders in global governance institutions (the UN, G8, WTO etc.), each enjoying very privileged access to what could arguably be described as the world hegemon (the United States), all linked within a common ideological community (the West) that has been a global norm setter for a long time, each equipped with enormous ideational and interest- and status-based power resources that are also matched by remarkable economic and military potential and, last but not least, we are talking about three powers of the past in relative decline. They all lack confidence in facing the 21<sup>st</sup> century with new regional powers so rapidly shifting the balance of the world as they knew it. How can they respond individually and collectively to a world of rising powers and, each of them, to each of such powers? Should the three never walk alone or sometimes walk alone in that uncertain journey? Does Europe in the future need a common, but yet unknown “beast” to face American eagles, Chinese dragons, Russian bears and Indian tigers or should each of the three old Archaeopterix individually transform themselves into new birds, reptiles or mamons for the new environment?

The topic clearly bears the danger of a conceptual, theoretical and empirical overkill. It therefore forces the author to make hard choices in selecting the focus of the article as well as the reader to tolerate a somewhat superficial treatment of -- in fact -- much deeper and overlapping debates on, at least, the foreign policy adaptation of the three countries, on the relative force of France, Germany and Britain in Europe, on Europe’s role in the World, on changing world order as a result of rising powers, transnational actors and agendas as well as structural changes with regard to agents of global governance (to include NGOs, civil society and business actors) and, more recently, on a the dramatic shifts in global discourses that might -- in the not so distant future -- challenge the centrality of Western thinking and global leadership.

In accepting such a broad but fascinating task, the paper proceeds as follows: First, it briefly applies the analytical lenses of our common framework to France, Germany and Britain as relevant regional hegemonic powers in Europe. Thereby, it tries to identify what makes Europe unique in comparison with other regions. Second, it looks

at French, German and British national discourses on the changing nature of world order. Third, it examines European perceptions of other regional powers by looking at some of them individually. Fourth, it identifies common challenges for French, German and British leaders when searching for national adaptations. And finally, in the normative part of the paper, I offer concepts through which, I believe, Europe as a whole and European regional powers in their own right could improve future dialogue and engagement with regional hegemonies and diverse world regions.

## **1. Why Europe Remains Unique: Three European Hegemons Voluntarily Bound by An Integrated Region Within A Wider West Facing a World of Many Worlds That In Past Used to be Theirs**

Before assessing individual foreign policy adaptations of the three European countries, one should briefly state why European regional powers remain distinct and why they are difficult to compare with emerging powers. Europe and its regional hegemonies constitute a case *sui generis*. Europe can hardly be seen as a constitutive model for newly emerging regional leaders that clearly possess their own unique visions and narratives of regions and regional identities. However, Europe, in more modest terms, can remain a reference point and source of inspiration for others.

### **1.1. France, Germany, Britain – Regional Hegemonies, Classical Partners and Rivals and the uniqueness of the European case**

When looking at the common framework applied in this project, it is easy to identify Britain, France and Germany as regional leaders. It is widespread common sense and a rather undisputed claim. All the necessary requirements that Detlef Nolte and his colleagues at GIGA identified as prerequisites for regional powers are easily met. Britain (whether it wants it or not), France and Germany are part of an economically, geographically and political-ideationally defined region, in fact part of the most institutionally defined regional entity in world politics. All three have a long history of pretending to articulate the leading position in the region, often in concert (Franco-German axis, British-French defence initiative in St. Malo etc.), often against one another. They have always been and they remain partners and rivals in European leadership. They have had a long history of influencing the geopolitical outlook and are members in leading global fora (G8, UN, etc.). They define the ideational construction of Europe, display enormous material, institutional and ideological resources for projection

of regional power, are interconnected through the common market and common political institutions, have a great influence and designing regional governance and security structures, are recognised by outside powers as the leading powers in Europe and are integrated into interregional and global forums that represent regional interest. They are the perfect match for our conceptual wish-list.

Nevertheless, I argue, that they are so perfect that they therefore remain unique. The particular status of Britain and France as Security Council members, the post-colonial heritage, the exceptional wealth of all three, the strategic link with the US in NATO, the particular circumstances of “region building” in the post-WWII and cold war environment, the ideational commitment to European Integration as a peace project, the notion of a “European way of life as a model for other regions” and many other factors are so special that one should treat Britain, Germany and France as special when discussing adaptation strategies of regional powers.

## **1.2. The Transatlantic Dimension: Regional Hegemons in a Wider West led by the United States**

A decisive factor in assessing European countries remains the unique importance of the transatlantic alliance. In all debates in Britain, Germany and France on adaptation strategies to the emerging new global order, the United States is and will continue to be the single most important reference point. No doubt, the transatlantic divisions during the Bush administration, in particular over Iraq, have left a significant mark on strategic and geo-political thinking in Europe and one should not underestimate the depth of wounds Washington’s reputation has suffered in European capitals and worldwide. Different from most periods since the end of World War II, the United States lacks concrete European support on vital issues regarding Iran, China and other regional powers, and European confidence in traditional U.S. leadership has to some extent broken (Allin 2004; Rubin 2008). Rubin has summarised the problem as follows:

*“Not too long ago, Washington could secure international support and legitimacy with relative ease for a mission such as ejecting Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. First, European and Japanese support would be obtained. A united Europe would then make Russia more amendable. With Russian acquiescence, China would likely abstain in the UN Security Council. And little attention had to be paid to Brazil, India or South Africa. Now, there is a new power equation. Russia is more confrontational, China is an independent player, and other large powers matter.” (Rubin 2008: 102)*

Transatlantic relations came under stress not during the Iraq crisis (Andrews 2005) , but already earlier by the Bush administrations' declaration of independence from multilateral framework and its awkward position with regard to pending international treaty regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons convention or the ABM-Treaty.

However, as I have argued in detail elsewhere (Mayer 2006), in the light of wider global responsibilities, there can be no doubt that a functioning transatlantic alliance will be a cornerstone of the newly emerging global order. European powers and the US should and will not head for a divorce (Daalder 2001) and Europe is unlikely to run the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Leonard 2005) alone or against the United States. The current European leaders in Germany, France and Britain and many in the public recognise that US leadership is indispensable and that the Atlantic community is of highest strategic priority. There is a lot of hope in Berlin, Paris and London for a renewed but more responsible leadership from Washington in a post-Bush era. European regional powers object to Washington's indifference to their specific interests over the last 8 years and desire a new administration which values European perspectives. There is an opportunity for a fresh start in US-European relations, and, I would argue, European powers should launch the initiative rather than waiting for another US wish list. France and Germany, not Britain, ought to be behind the initiative as they contributed their part to the fall out over Bush's Iraq policy. However, there is no need to expand on this topical issue within this paper.

In the context of our theme, it is important to highlight that the transatlantic partnership and the ability to influence Washington is a unique power resource available to this extent only to the European regional hegemons. While this empowers France, Germany and Britain compared to say China, Russia or Brazil, it can also be constraining as argued in the following section.

### **1.3. Euro-centrism and Western universal claims as obstacles in discourses with Rising Regional Hegemons**

Many conceptual thinkers in France, Germany and Britain, while adapting to the rapid and still accelerating tendencies of globalisation, still seem to be trapped in traditional Euro-centric and western perspectives. Europeans still believe to be fresh, innovative and even rejuvenated after enlargement and some transatlantic emancipation. Outsiders, with some delight however, notice the wrinkles, the cracks in Europe's face, and they identify shallowness in Europe's old missionary illusions. World order is shifting with speed, and whether recognised in Berlin, London, Paris or Brussels, Europe is perceived by most

rising powers and new players as an area of significant decline (Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2007; Fioramenti/Lucarelli 2007). Nevertheless, Europeans speak tediously to themselves and surprisingly confidently to others. Europeans still see the old continent as a normative leader and a, sometimes **the**, model for other regions. If not redefined and refined, such message no longer sells. Non-European, non-Western voices, among them for example the ever present Kishore Mahbubani and Fareed Zakaria (Mahbubani 2005, Mahbubani here main citations), have managed to influence main stream debates in the Euro-American world. Then real impact of the shifting balance of power within global discourse, in fact the “globalisation of global thought”, in my reading, is still to come and has not unfolded its full impact in neither London, Paris, Berlin or Washington. David Slater, for example as one Western voice, also calls for post-colonial geo-politics (Slater 2004), showing that the three constitutive elements of Euro-American or western thinking have come under threat. The traditional elements are: First, the belief of the West as providing a very special and primary feature of its inner socio-economic, political, individual and cultural life that justifies a civilizational role vis-à-vis others. Second, there is the traditional conviction that this special culture was internal and intrinsic to the Euro-American development and the result of a process of mutual self-affirmation which owed nothing to exchange and association with non-Western cultures. In fact, a sense of superiority flows from the self-referential framework expressed in the exclusive claim as a driver of modernization and liberal development. The third element is the claim that the Western model, be it the American or European version, constitutes a universal step forward for the whole of humanity in all regions of the world. (Slater 2004)

Without going into further detail of a debate widely covered in the literature, it is important to note that the three core assumptions are still explicit or implicit in much of the thinking of national adaptation strategies in Germany, France and Britain. To me, that is a serious obstacle to a realistic discourse with and adaptation to rising powers. It adds to the uniqueness of the European or Western perspective and is unlikely to be shared or tolerated by any other regional and rising power in the future. There is an emerging and indeed powerful “case against the West” (Mahbubani 2008).

## **2. Common Background Factors for French, German and British Visions of World Order**

### **2.1. The Intellectual Background: Discourses on World Order**

Against the background of general constraints of European national adaptation strategies since 1990, it is necessary to recognize that each national debate was, however, significantly influenced by the larger waves of change in global politics and resulting international debates on world order. Ever since the end of the Cold War world order is constantly reshaping (Mauil 2005). The roots of the acceleration of economic globalisation, however, can be traced back to at least the early 1970s and are by no means a direct result of the fall of the Berlin wall. Without summarising the debates on global order in any detail which others have done much more extensively (for example among many others Hurrell 2007; Krause 2007; Zürn 2007; Walt; Haas 2008 ...), I should only note that the classical experts on national foreign policy in all three countries still engage too little with scholars on global order, economic globalization, global governance and regional and area studies. From a European perspective, there is clearly a significant “missing link” between “globalization and Europeanization” (Hennis 2001) and “regionalism and global order” (Breslin/Higgott 2003). Nevertheless, each national adaptation strategy was clearly influenced by such larger consideration. The foreign policy community of all three countries in their debates on national adaptation clearly recognise that Europeans live in a state of transition and uncertainty at the beginning of the 21st century.

General and conflicting visions of world order have come in different shapes and sizes and, no doubt, in changing fashions over the last 20 years. They include

\*concepts of US hegemony in a uni-polar world (Krauthammer 1990; Krauthammer 2003)

\*visions of neo-realist instability at a global scale, no power or group of powers would dominate and no hegemon would manage to stabilise regions. The likelihood of wars and crisis spreading around the world was great

\*notions of, either antagonistic or cooperative, multi-polarity with several distinct poles or concentrations of old and new powers such as China, India, Russia and Brazil (more or less challenging established powers in the West). Multi-polarity can be seen as

cooperative assuming that few major powers work together on defining rules and discipline those who violate them. In the 1990s, a well received variant of this vision was the concept of tri-polar regionalism (US, EU, Japan) with competing trading blocs. Other visions of multi-polarity are perceived as more conflictual and competitive with the possibility of dialogue between major power breaking apart

\*hierarchical (top and great powers, middle powers, small powers or super-powers, great powers, regional powers) and layer-cake models of order with uni-polar, multi-polar multi-regional and transnational layers (Nye et al.)

\*a likely return to bi-polarity with the US (West) and China heading for the new clash in the 21st century (Mearsheimer)

\*cultural friction, clash of civilizations, asymmetric warfare and globally networked terrorism as the defining feature of an unstable world

\*notions of a more stable transpolar order where economic rather than political power is decisive and where national states are in rapid decline overtaken by business, market and other non-state actors

\*optimistic scenarios of a structured and well governed New World Order centred around strong institutions of global governance, the rule of law and functioning international regimes

\*a world of economical and culturally integrated and distinct regions with interregional dialogues and agreements

\*newer debates on a non-polar world (Haas: 2008; Roberts) characterises by numerous centres of meaningful power. Haas defines such order to include six major powers (like the multi-polar image): China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia and the US. Different from a simple multi-polar image there is a second significant layer of regional powers to include Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi-Arabia, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea. Most importantly “meaningful power centres” include the major international organisations (UN, IMF, World Bank, ASEAN, African Union, OPEC, Shanghai co-operations etc.) and even “states within states” (California etc.) and global cities (New York, London, Sao Paulo, Tokio,

Shanghai) with their own logics. They also include the largest world energy, manufacturing and financial firms. Each of these power centres, states in particular, are then constantly challenged from above (IOs), from below (militias such as Hamas, Taliban, Hezbollah) and from the side (NGOs and corporations). Churches, networks of political parties, global media, drug cartels and global charities all play an independent additional and powerful part. What is significant for this article, however, is that in this comprehensive vision of a “non-polar world” there is no mention of Britain, France or Germany as constituting independent “meaningful centres of power”. It is a vision of Ernst Haas, but certainly very much worth noting!

All these general notions have filled the intellectual debates over the last two decades. Different theoretical assumptions such as neo-realist instability versus uni-polar or multi-polar stability, notions of deep and divisive cultural friction as well as more optimistic scenarios of stability through a rule-based multilateralism have been the consistent parameters of the global debate. Any reflections on national adaptation to non-European powers must naturally be part of the crucial larger debates on France’s, Britain’s, Germany’s and the EU’s place within “a world of many worlds” (Hurrell 2007; Katzenstein 2005). These classical concerns of geo-politics, geo-strategy and world order must then be also linked to reflections on the societal consequences of economic globalisation. Questions about the future of advanced economic societies facing competition of rising industrial powers are as important as concerns about the extent to which a “European Way of Life” can be preserved. As indicated before, foreign policy-makers in Britain, France and Germany have broadly failed to sufficiently integrate themselves with thinkers on globalisation, global order, development studies and on non-Western approaches to international affairs.

## **2.2. Dominance of Domestic Politics as a Common Constraint to Foreign Policy Adaptations in France, Britain and Germany**

More than in other regional powers, foreign policy adaptation in Britain, France and Germany, be it adjustment to economic globalisation or reactions to rising powers, is deeply embedded in the dominance of domestic politics. Adaptation strategies to a rapidly changing world order while domestic societies in Britain, France and Germany tended to be satisfied with the old status quo during the cold war for the most the time. National elite discourses on global order tend to be ahead of domestic political perceptions. Policy-makers face a dilemma: while the international demands on European regional powers are increasing, it becomes harder to find domestic electoral support for extended global engagement and for the allocation of appropriate resources for an

enhanced global role. Electorates in all three countries are currently pre-occupied with the domestic reform agendas such as labour market, pension, health and education or with changing notions of national identity as a result of immigration. For a significant number of European voters, globalisation remains a synonym for decreasing social standards rather than for new opportunities.

Furthermore, selling a global strategic vision has become harder for politicians in a generally changing media environment. Media consumption has undergone a strong shift towards television and has created a media-driven democracy that reacts to events rather than relies on long-term trends and convictions. An understanding of international complexities, today less black and white than in the cold war period, decreases through an event-driven and flashpoint coverage of international crisis. Politicians in Germany, France and Britain, instead of following a longer-term strategic compass, usually react ad-hoc to domestic moods created by selective crisis reporting. This makes a coherent foreign policy adaptation more difficult and has created some nervous shifts in direction on all three countries even though the general paradigms of foreign policy have been more stable.

Another constraint for European regional powers are the politicians themselves: on the whole, the global experiences and strategic expertise of politicians seem to be declining across Europe. During the post-war and cold war periods, most parliamentarians had an awareness of strategic requirements through the experience of war and the all encompassing East-West divide. Today, political careers in most European countries are more than ever made through local constituencies and domestic agendas. On the whole, there is less opportunity for politicians to gain serious international experience prior to entering politics. With global order being so fluid, cosmopolitan political leadership is more needed than ever in Europe. Such leadership, however, is extremely difficult to recruit, develop and groom. The increased ambition of European regional powers and growing global demand are contrasted by a more inward-looking electorates and a more provincial political class. It goes some way in explaining why, as the next section will show, national discourses on world order have been remarkably conservative and why adaptation strategies were very much filtered through traditional identities and classical perceptions of national foreign policy roles.

### **3. Common Challenges, National Adaptations: Individual Foreign Policy Strategies of France, Britain and Germany**

#### **3.1. Germany:**

Domestic debates on the transformation of German foreign policy since 1990 have been, at least compared to Britain and France, more substantial. A fundamental rethink of German foreign policy was by no means a surprise as the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification required a comprehensive reflection about the essentials of German foreign policy. However, until recently the debates have also been the most provincial of the three: Europe's central power developed an essentially European debate on European order (Hellmann 1996; Mayer 1997; Mayer 2001) and only recently developed a wider global perspective. To some extent this GIGA project and similar research agendas in other German think tanks are an indication that things are changing in Germany. It remains, however, an outsider's observation that a much more integration of and dialogue between the various research communities is needed. The traditional foreign and security policy community speaks too little to area studies experts, and compared to France and Britain, there is a much smaller pool of experts for many world regions and regional powers. Last but not least, ministries as well as the chancellor's office are still organised around outdated rationales with specific desks such as, for example, "East", "West", "Developing World" and "Global Questions" (Globale Fragen). However, the reform of German foreign policy and an increasingly global outlook is steady work in progress.

Since unification there have been several waves of debates on a new German foreign policy. Broadly speaking, I would distinguish between, at least, three major phases since 1990: a German period (1990-1994), a European period (1995-2004) and, more recently, a "globalising period" in discourse on Germany's role in the world.

Immediately after unification, there emerged a lively public debate over new directions of German foreign policy summarised by Arnulf Baring's simple question "Deutschland was nun ?", Germany what now ? (Baring 1994). Historians, journalists and political scientist, a.o. former chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Schmidt 1995; Schmidt 1996), Wolfgang Schäuble, Rudolf Seiters (Schäuble/Seiters 1996) and Joschka Fischer (Fischer 1994), intellectuals such as Karl Kaiser (Kaiser 1991), Hans-Peter Schwarz (Schwarz 1994) or Timothy Garton Ash (Garton Ash 1994) as well as many think-tank researchers (for example Janning 1994; Lübke-meier 1994), engaged in a public discussion of the unified country's role in the world. They revisited the cold-war principles of German foreign policy and made suggestions for alterations. During the cold war Germany followed a strategy of rehabilitation and regaining respect through a

firm policy of self-binding and integration in western institutions, mainly the EC and NATO. West-Germany steered a balanced and difficult course between five major poles, i.e. Washington (for security), Moscow (for détente), East-Berlin (for German-German relations), Paris/Brussels (for European Integration) and after 1973 New York (UN, global issues) which together became the mental reference frame for Germany's foreign policy. Different from Britain and France, no global or superpower ambition, enhanced national pride and open national interest were desired, allowed and possible against Germany's historical background. "Multilateralism is our patriotism", Willy Brandt summarised in the 1970s (Brandt 1977). Germany's mind-set meant modesty, means meant money, model meant multilateralism and the master plan meant mediation.

All these assumptions were questioned in the first debate on German foreign policy and possible alternative options included:

1. a deepened core Europe as the first priority
2. strengthening the wider west as the alternative to core Europe
3. giving priority to Mitteleuropa (East and central Europe)
4. pursuing a Moscow first strategy
5. developing global ambitions

According to Hellmann's convincing categorisation (Hellmann 1995), five different schools of thought emerged during this early period. They included

- a) "normalization-nationalists", a small and insignificant right-wing within the CDU, CSU and FDP arguing for the existence of distinct virtues of German culture and showing scepticism towards the wider western community
- b) "internationalists", also a small group at the time, mainly within the Greens, the left-wing of the SPD and in the PDS, advocating global civil society and the end of nation states as reference points of global order
- c) "Moderate Eurosceptics", also a small group who appreciated the achievements of European integration, but argued against ambitious plans for further deepening and comprehensive enlargement
- d) "Europeanists", a large mainstream group who argued for deeper integration as the first and almost exclusive immediate priority
- e) "pragmatic multilateralists", a large and dominant group who argued that Germany would benefit most from a policy of self-binding and multi-lateralism through many institutions without giving exclusive priority to one over the other

In practical politics, these theoretical options were not as clear cut as stated above. What in reality emerged is an ongoing adaptation and maturation of German foreign policy over the years with different emphases in different phase (Rittberger 2001). Apart from “normalisation-nationalist thinking”, it included all elements of what at the time seemed alternative strategies. During the, what I call “German period” between 1990 and roughly 1995 (the 1994 Constitutional Court decision on out-of-area deployment opened a new phase) the debate was very self-absorbed. As Ludger Kuehnhardt pointed out, the Germans brought down a wall between them but build up a mental wall around them. However, what Germany achieved at the time and what influences current debates until today were two things: first, to reconfirm the policy of voluntary self-binding and a commitment to multi-lateral decision making. Secondly, Germany became an advocate for a special and privileged treatment for Moscow, even if nobody would pursue a full Moscow first strategy. As a result and until today, even in the most current Georgia crisis, Germany places high emphasis on an understanding with Russia. Long traditions of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century history, cold war experiences in Ost-Politik and gratitude for Gorbochev’s approval of German unification in the 2+4 process play an important ideational part.

Between 1995 and 2004, in what I would call the “European phase”, the “Europeanist” focus, i.e. prioritising the deepening (introduction of the EURO, institutional reforms, Reform Treaty) and widening (EU enlargement) became the most important strategic imperative. “Europa als Schicksalsgemeinschaft” (Europe as a community of common destiny) was the overriding Leitmotif of the Kohl administration. This legacy remains a very important conviction and is a powerful ideational source for German thinking on dealing with rising power. More than in Britain and France, there is a deeply held belief that Germany should engage with rising powers within and through an ever stronger European Union.

Compared with Kohl, Schroeder was much more of a pragmatic multi-lateralist, generally less guided by an inner strategic compass than by reactive foreign policy “ad-hocary”. During his reign however, the sharp winds of globalisation lifted up the debate on Germany’s role in the world. A sense of declining economic competitiveness and the notion of an outdated economic and welfare state model under threat from new economic powers, both in Eastern Europe and worldwide, helped to move Germany into the current “global phase” of debates on foreign policy adaptation.

Against a structurally conservative domestic electorate that largely fears globalisation and tends to object to “military adventures” and global ambitions, the country has nevertheless made significant progress towards meeting its enhanced global

responsibilities. When engaging with rising powers and global order, the mainstream foreign policy consensus consists of the following elements that emerged of an almost 20 year debate.

+ Germany should stick to its path of multi-lateralism and institutional self-binding. Within the main institutions, i.e. the EU, UN, NATO, G8, OSCE and WTO, Germany should increase its structural power and try to shape policies even more so than in the past. The ambition to assume a permanent seat in the UN Security Council follows such logic.

+ There is a conviction that individual European countries can only stay powerful and significant if working in and through Europe as a whole. The dominant vision is that of a multipolar world with the US, the EU (speaking with one voice), China and Russia as the principal great players, surrounded by layers of integrated regions (with different and multiple regional hegemons), but globally regulated by strong institutions of global governance and policy regimes.

+ As a consequence, Germany promotes a common European foreign policy more than France and much more than Britain. In addition, it seeks privileged access and individualised strategies vis-à-vis the US, Russia and China. The transatlantic alliance remains the anchor for all German global ambitions. In dealing with Russia and China “engagement rather than containment” and “change through engagement” (Steinmeier) are the overriding guiding principles.

+ With regard to other rising powers, institutionalisation through global governance structures as well as the promotion of deeper regional integration and enhanced co-operation through region-to-region dialogue are the prescribed preferences (see CDU-strategy papers 2007 and 2008 on “Europe and Asia”, “Europe and Latin America”).

### **3.2. France:**

Analysis of evolution of French debate will have to be completed and properly written.

Main arguments will be presented orally at the conference:

++ High degree on of continuity in French thinking since the end of the Cold War:

Emphasis on old concept of L'Europe Puissance, i.e. Europe as a political actor that is strategically essential and instrumental to meet mainly French aspirations of retaining global influence far beyond France's economic might.

++ Sustained illusions of grandeur, i.e. global power and self-importance remain undeconstructed. When the world became generally more multi-lateral in the 1980s and 1990s, France insisted to make its own global power status felt and its distinctive national voice heard in all global places that matter, great ambition to place French personnel in strategic positions in organisations of global governance (UN, IMF, WTO, EU, Council of Europe, EIB and EBRD).

++ Peculiar mixture of working for and within Europe as well as outside Europe as a global force with unique ties in Africa, the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East. Guiding principle: A strong France in a strong Europe to amplify the global strength of France.

++ Challenge of US hegemony while depending on Washington (independence with the limits of dependence).

++ Strong image of a multi-polar world with classical balance of power between essentially antagonistic poles.

++ Strong belief in superiority of European social model as the more attractive western alternative to the US. Strong emphasis on French exceptionalism in Europe and European exceptionalism in the world. At the same time a strong sense of Europe as a model for managing and preserving diversity and heterogeneity within a nevertheless collectively regulated global order Europe as a normative leader and transformative power, the reference point for how to collectively harmonise global diversity.

Dangers in French thinking:

France convictions are outdated

France chooses the wrong enemy (the US)

France must realise that compromises rather than old imposition of French ideas are essential for leadership in Europe

France must realise that global reputation is declining sharply

France needs to change its style of engagement vis-à-vis former colonial and rising powers

Section to be completed

### **3.3. Britain:**

Among the three European regional powers discussed here, Britain remains the most difficult to conceptualise. In contrast to France and Germany, reflections on the necessary changes in British foreign policy since 1990 have led to far less alteration in London's global outlook. Anthony Foster and William Wallace, two of country's most prominent experts on British foreign policy, commented in the late 1990s that the "most remarkable aspect of the British foreign policy debate (...) is how little it appears to have been affected by the transformation of international order." (Forster/Wallace 1997: 124). Since then, the picture has not changed dramatically. In fact, notions of US unilateral leadership, the idea of Britain being Washington's closest ally and the success of London's financial and legal services at the time of the exaggerated hype of economic globalisation, reaffirmed Britain's view that it was the best prepared European power for the world to come. The fact that Britain's debate on Europe and the EU, a famously unique one that cannot be discussed in detail here, was more de-coupled from debates on global order than what we normally see in either France or Germany, only confirms the notion of little conceptual change. While in German and French eyes Europeanisation was part of the answer to the challenges of globalisation, in Britain it has been seen as an obstacle to Britain's global role, links and ambitions. There were some valid points indeed why less change in Westminster was the appropriate response to more change in the world.

On the whole, Britain needed less adaptation of the, in the British view, proven and sound foundations of British foreign policy. Apart from Margaret Thatcher's individual obsession with relative power calculations vis-à-vis Germany, the island nation had been less shaken by the end of the cold war than Germany or France. Britain has had traditionally a more global perspective as a former imperial power with colonies in Asia, Africa, America and Australasia. Britain has also always had a historical sense of self-importance as a global power and world hegemon in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. With its long tradition of parliamentary democracy, political stability and constitutional monarchy the country and its entire political and business class share a self-perception of having been the ultimate and original pillar of the West and the mother of modernization. Despite the dramatic relative decline, a "very long good-bye" arguably beginning in the late 1870s

(Zakaria 2008:22-26), Britain even after 1945 remained what can be seen as the world's second most important "status power". It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Head of the Commonwealth and a nuclear power with a strong professional army as well as a special relationship with the United States sharing the undisputed world language. After the economic crisis of the 1970s, it then became a driver of world liberalisation and deregulation and has now the most global of the European economies with high capital inflow (FDI) and outflow. Aligned to its self-perception as a global force, Britain gives a very high importance "national sovereignty" and "sovereign independence". As a late entrant to the European Integration process it never developed the idealisation of Europe so common in continental Europe and it regarded the EU, with its typical island perspective and classical rivalry attitude, as a Franco-German venture. In the British national narrative, the image of Britain as being "non-European" still has a very strong force. Even among Oxford undergraduates with their wide ranging educational background, more than 50 % would simply say that Britain is not in Europe. The notion of being a different and more individualistic society with weaker family networks, a minimalist social security system, centralised authority and Westminster and therefore anti-federalist is constantly reinforced by an overwhelmingly anti-European press. In my view, the British press has had a very corrosive impact on public opinion on Europe, but one would not want to expand on this within the context of this paper.

All these factors described above point to a strong importance of ideational factors and power resources when assessing the resources and tools of Britain as a regional power.

Regardless of material factors that would place Britain among the global middle powers, nobody in the Britain questions the notion of Britain being an important global actor always looking far beyond Europe and the European Union. In the concert of our three regional powers, Britain is the probably strongest outside its own region (if we accept that Britain is within Europe of course) and the weakest inside.

The dependence on the United States is Britain's empowerment and imprisonment at the same time. It has helped London for a long time to keep a privileged status in world affairs and to remain a global power with the material resources of a regional hegemon. As far as power resources are concerned, Britain managed to become the champion of soft power exerting disproportionate regional and global influence through its long standing democratic credentials, its historical success, old global links and networks, its educational system, the power of London as the most global financial centre, the quality of its diplomatic service and, last but not least, its language.

As far as adaptation to changing world order and rising powers are concerned, all British governments since 1990 seem to have shared a consensus of the essential paradigms of British foreign policy. These are:

- + Actively driving economic globalisation in one's own Anglo-Saxon image (Globalisation as Liberalisation, Westernisation and Universalisation).
- + Closest possible alliance with the United States as the ultimate enforcer of the existing security order (UN-Security Council, NATO, Intervention in Defence of Global/Western values).
- + Promote Europe first and foremost as an Economic Project.
- + Engage and trade with all Rising Powers first and foremost bilaterally as a national global power and, if necessary, through confrontation and force based on a strong sense of national interest and a belief in superior western values.
- + Conceptual distinction of world order as a rivalry between democratic societies and open economies and closed societies (of all sorts) and protected market.
- + Recognition of cultural differences but strong belief in universal principles of the Western rule of law.

Different British governments since 1990 placed different emphasis on themes within the broad common consensus. The Blair government took some pride in 1997 in declaring the become Britain's most pro-European government in history. However, spin trumped substance in this policy areas as well and the general record of Blair's European policy was a disappointment indeed (Julie Smith 2007 an others.).

#### Brief Conclusion:

Comparing the three discourses and the resulting strategies of Britain, France and Germany, it is, at least to me, rather remarkable how much traditional foreign policy roles and patterns and very classical understandings of one's position in the world still shape the general outlook of all three European hegemons. Ideational and identity based

concepts of foreign policy seem to have the strongest influence on the adaptation strategies of Britain, France and Germany

### **3. European Perceptions of Individual Rising Regional Powers**

For the final version of the paper, this section intends to compare British, German and French visions of individual regional powers. The section needs to be filled before for publication, but further research is needed. It intends to look separately at French, German and British visions of the following powers

#### **3.1. China: Perceived Mega-Threat**

#### **3.2. Russia: Antagonism rising**

#### **3.3. India: Economic threat but potential political partner**

#### **3.4. Japan: The forgotten Power, undervalued and overlooked**

#### **3.5. Brazil and Mexico: Regional Drivers in Development, Economic and Political Partners**

#### **3.6. South Africa and Nigeria: Scepticism vis-à-vis cape of hope**

#### **3.7. Iran: Uncontrollable Enemy?**

#### **3.8: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan: Overlooked Innovators in World Technology and Trade?**

### **4. Normative Prescriptions: How Europe's Regional Hegemons Should Engage With Rising Non-European Hegemons**

Inspired by the core insights of the English School of International Relations, it is impossible for me to analyse global governance, the balance and interaction of regional powers without some attention to normative theory and ethical concerns. The rise of new powers must not necessarily constitute a threat to European powers but it can, if

understood and accommodated wisely, contribute to a better governance of the globe. In the final part of the paper I therefore offer a brief prescription of what principles should guide European powers when engaging with new regional powers. Not European concerns and interests but global concerns and values should be the benchmark. European powers approaches to a global role have traditionally started off by analysing the capacity and interest of European countries – ‘ $x$ ’- and logically concluded that because of such power and interests they should act in the world in a certain way,  $f(x)$ . What European powers, however, ought to do is to meticulously analyse the world (and the views of other powers) and the general normative principles needed to make the globe a better place – the result of this analysis is  $\gamma$ ; action should then be a function of these principles,  $f(\gamma)$ . Indeed, it is the plural global community that should be the primary reference point for European and all other regional powers when deciding in their international activities (Mayer/Vogt 2006: 235). For European hegemons and the continent as a whole this would mean a radical rethinking.

#### **4.1. Rethinking Europe in A Non-European World**

Although the Regional Powers Network Project concentrates on nation states as the primary unit of analysis, in the case of the three European hegemons, it is justifiable and necessary to reflect upon Europe’s general role in a future world order. The EU in particular has been increasing its profile and economic profile (in particular through its common currency, the EURO) and is often seen one of the poles/power in a future multi-polar world. “Rethinking Europe in a Non-European World” is a title of a research programme at Oxford University which to extent bridges my previous work on EU external relations (Mayer/Vogt 2006; Mayer 2008a; Mayer 2008b) with my current interest in the Rising Regional Powers and Global Order. Without going into detail on instruments of EU foreign policy and the EU as a global actor (which is covered by a different paper in this conference), I would, however, suggest principles of a general strategy for Europeans, individual countries as well as the EU.

The underlying assumption for my normative prescriptions is the recognition that the centre of gravity in world order is rapidly shifting and that Europe is bound to become more marginal. The changing balance of forces characterised by economic globalisation, emerging regional powers, new security challenges, cultural diversity and very old problems of development and global social justice all contribute to an increasing marginalisation of Europe as a driver in world affairs. In line with French and German thinking and in opposition to some traditional British discourse, I believe that only a

common and united European voice and joint action through the EU will ensure influence of European countries, be it regional hegemony or otherwise, in shaping world order. What Europe needs, however, is a serious change of perspective and a generally different rhetoric in world affairs. European hegemony as well as the EU have to fundamentally revise their Eurocentric self-image and should modestly contribute a serious debate with other regional powers on wider global responsibilities. Europe's role and responsibility in the world will remain important and might even rise if Europe quickly accepts a distinctly non-European, non-Western perspective and welcome regions and regional powers as equal partners in global discussions on world order and solutions to global problems.

#### **4.2. Global Responsibility As a Reference for all Regional Powers**

The 21<sup>st</sup> century will likely see a pluralistic world with constantly shifting but interrelated power distribution changes between states, markets, and international organisations and regions. As a result, there will be overlapping and sometimes contrary rationales in the fields of global security (polar rivalry), economic globalization (transnational, transpolar interdependence), energy and resource management (interdependence and rivalry), global environmental protection, human rights and migration, human development and global health, global civil society participation and cultural diversity. There can be no doubt that distinct regional differences and viewpoints on all these issues will emerge. Different from the past, one can hardly imagine that Western and European intellectual leadership will remain as strong as it has been in the past 200 years. Hence, discourse between regions and regional powers each recognising and appreciating cultural differences and different stages in economic development must be the prudent way forward. In theoretical terms, the classical insights and normative concerns of the English school, pluralism, appreciations of historical and cultural diversity, non-dogmatic diplomacy on shared principles of international society, will remain as valuable as ever.

European and Western power should therefore contribute to inter-regional debates without imposing their standards on others. They can and should define and defend their values with exaggerated claims of universality. Global responsibility strikes me central reference point. In the ears of many non-Europeans, defining notions of global responsibility sounds very much like the oldest feature of colonial rule, i.e. defining values on one's own terms and interests and then declaring them as global necessities.

In fact, offering moral principles and ethical values as a guideline for a new narrative of the Europe's and European powers might not look like any significant departure from traditional thinking. Colonial powers such as Britain and France always

claimed to civilise others. As far as the EU is concerned, ever since the early conceptualisation of the EU as a global actor, such as Gunnar Sjöstedt's work in the mid-1970s (Sjöstedt 1977), a consistent set of values and principles as the prerequisite for EU action has been identified. Almost all academic writing on Europe's external actorness points to overarching values alongside the (lack of) capacity to mobilise common policies as one of the legitimizing pillars of EU external relations (Bretherton/Vogler 1999). Furthermore, all familiar labels such as Europe as a "civilian power" (Duchene 1973), a "normative power" (Manners 2002), a "soft power" (Nye 2004), a "soft empire" (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005) a "transformative power" (Grabbe 2006), an "ambiguous power" (Gasteyger 1996), a "conflicted trade power" (Meunier/Nicolaidis 2006), a "green normative power" (Falkner 2007) or even, most bizarrely, a "metrosexual superpower" (Khanna 2004) are based on the notion of the EU as a uniquely norm-obeying actor.

Why, therefore, do we need another norm based approach and how is it different?

I simply advocate a change of perspective: Europe's self-image of a civilian force "doing good for the whole world" and most other normative approaches depart from Europe -- its desires, missions and convictions. It is essentially an inside-out perspective. Europe is seen as the sender of norms and assumes responsibilities voluntarily. The basic assumption tends to be that "what is good for Europe must be good for the world". What is instead needed is an acknowledgement that Europe is the receiver of global obligations which are allocated to Europe, European powers and/or the West by general moral consideration. The discourse of such global obligations must be shaped by non-European thinkers as well, by African voices, Asian voices, Latin Voices, Russian voices, Muslim voices and whoever wishes to engage. Only an outside-in perspective can make sense for European regional powers today.

One needs to define global responsibility first and then ask what Europe, with its regional powers and the EU's particular set of instruments, values and capacities, ought to do to qualify as a responsible force in world affairs. The central contribution of my recent book on this topic defines a set of general moral principles, admittedly shaped by Western thinking, that one ought to apply when distributing responsibilities to international organisations, nation states, other actors and to the EU in particular (Szigeti 2006; Mayer/Vogt 2006; Mayer 2008a; Mayer 2008b).

The six principles of global responsibility are the following:

- Contribution Principle - An actor has a duty to mitigate harmful consequences of action to which it has contributed. If it has caused and contributed to a situation of harm or loss it is clearly responsible.
- Beneficiary Principle - If an actor has benefited from a situation where others suffered harm or loss, it then has the duty to alleviate the harm or reduce the loss.
- Community Principle - Membership in a community or group means incurring certain duties. If one is part of a community one has the responsibility to obey the law, rules and customs of this community.
- Capacity Principle - If there is a valid obligation to do X all actors who are capable of fulfilling that duty must act.
- Legitimate Expectation Principle -- Actors have a duty to do X if others legitimately expect the actor to do X. This principle is very difficult to operationalize. However, the clearest duty arises if an institution has repeatedly stated an intent to do X.
- Consent Principle -- X is obliged (i.e. shoulders a voluntarily-acquired duty) to do something once it has consented to do so.

These general principles of responsibility can be applied to any moral actor, individuals and collective of individuals such as states or international organisations. They certainly apply to all regional powers, in particular France and Britain as former colonial powers and to Germany with its own historical responsibilities. Applied to the Europe several obvious questions arise. The division of competencies between regional powers, EU member states and the EU institutions in Brussels, not always clear even to experts and practitioners, pose particular challenges. Since member states retain significant power, in fact the very decisive one with regard to foreign and security policy, the nature of the actor is very significant when discussing the EU's global responsibility.

How much responsibility rests with the EU, how much with the member states? Europe's role vis-à-vis other regional powers and regions is shaped by a combination of EU and member state activity. With shared agency comes shared responsibility. However, just for example, if one takes the "contribution principle" seriously, is the EU in its entirety responsible for historical wrong-doings, that is, is it responsible for the

colonial crimes committed by Britain and France in Africa, India and elsewhere? Surely not, as these national historical responsibilities must rest with the member states? But what if, as, for example in the case of the ACP agreements and in fact most relations with African countries and regional bodies, colonial heritages and patterns were simply transformed and translated into EU preferences and privileged policies? Then, surely, the EU as a whole must bear some responsibility for perceived injustices following from its own policies. These examples show that the distinction between regional powers and the EU remain somewhat blurred and that the allocation of moral obligations to specific actors, Britain, France, Germany, the EU or any other actor is an extremely difficult task. What can said, however, is that no European regional power can be analysed and understood without the EU dimension.

Another principle problem arises from overlapping and conflicting responsibilities. Any real political decision may have very different consequences for different communities. An illustrative example is Europe's role in the WTO and the world trading system. To whom should European governments and the EU be responsible when deciding on and implementing trade policies? The economist Terry O'Shaughnessy distinguishes between five different responsibilities: first, EU residents who would be adversely affected by a decision towards free trade or towards lowering subsidies for industries they work in and for factors of production they currently own; second, to European publics in general; third, to residents in former European colonies (ACP countries); fourth, to the functioning and principles of the international trading system as such and, fifth, to residents of the world at large. In early empirical studies, it has been shown that the EU and European powers in the past tended to give primary attention to one of the first four constituencies over the last one. However, one can not conclude that any of the first four would always trump the others (O'Shaughnessy 2006). If global responsibility, that is, concerns for the residents of the world at large, would be the first priority, one would have to judge the EU not fulfilling its duties. It can be assumed that rising powers will hold Europeans accountable for failing to meet standards which they advocate so vigorously.

This one example gives an indication of the last, but not the least important general practical relevance of advocating principles of global responsibility. Do they have any use for practical decision-making and, if so, how does one translate principles into policies?

## **Practical Implications**

Four general practical functions result from a better understanding of the moral foundations of “globally responsible European powers”:

- First, moral foundations and normative origins of global policy goals provide a check list for policy makers, academics, diplomats and journalist within European regional powers. They indicate what these powers should and what they should not do. Reflecting about moral principles can clearly generate sharper policy-relevant questions and enlighten the discourse with other regional hegemons
- Second, an awareness of moral sources of responsibility allows for a better list of priorities when it comes to deciding what Europe and European regional powers should do first and foremost in light of limited capacities and resources.
- Third, European foreign policy making still depends touch much on old-fashioned on national preferences, legacies and practices in all member states, in particular in France, Britain and Germany. Defining and thinking about common European responsibilities in a global order helps to overcome national egotisms. What might follow is for a better convergence of perceived national interests in Britain, France and Germany.
- Fourth, in light of Europe’s colonial past and its very dubious and ill-received legacy of civilising missions based on moral justifications, a normative or ethical adaptation strategy of old powers to newly rising powers must make such principles of morality transparent and crystal clear. Otherwise, Europeans soon become irrelevant in today’s non-European world. France, Germany, Britain Europe have to persuade others that they advocate common ideas indeed rather than to prescribe and promote, as in the past, simply their own illusion of superior civilisation and general grandeur. European regional powers can only shape the direction of global discourse through a two-way-discourse between Europe and other regional poles and powers. To make the foundations of European thinking transparent therefore provides the initial legitimacy to engage in the formulation of global tasks and shared responsibilities. It also reduces the danger of “asymmetrical discourses” of which Europeans and the West as a whole have been criticised so often.

## **Conclusion**

To be written

## **Bibliography**

To be done