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Feinstein and Lindberg's support for the ICC is tempered by an insistence that the US should not ratify the Rome Treaty, at least in the near future. To ratify the Treaty would promote 'global governance', which is not their goal (p. 93). Their end is justice, which somehow they separate from universality. This only makes sense if one accepts that justice can be selective, which Kantian supporters of the Court do not. The book was published before the recent ICC Review Conference, but Feinstein's opinions continue to reflect the middle-way approach, welcoming US involvement but refusing to advocate outright ratification. This stance might be tolerable to Kantian liberals if they were reassured that all American war crimes were being prosecuted in US courts. But that is not necessarily the case. For example, liberals arguing for prosecution of those individuals implicated in the 'enhanced interrogation' programme remain disappointed. The fact that Feinstein and Lindberg see the ICC as a means to prosecuting non-American crimes will likely exacerbate the concern that US liberalism serves to defend selective justice. All that said, their proposals for engaging and educating Congress can be read as a means of preparing for ratification, which does suggest that American liberal internationalism can move in a Kantian direction.

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International organization and foreign policy

Regional leadership in the global system: ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers. Edited by Daniel Flemes. Farnham: Ashgate. 2010. 394pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 0 75467 912 7.

New powers: how to become one and how to manage them. By Amrita Narlikar. New York: Columbia University Press. 2010. 208pp. \$45.00. ISBN 978 0 23170 202 7.

These two books address a common and important question which has attracted considerable interest in academic and policy-making circles in recent years: that of the fluid and shifting nature of the international balance of power, and in particular, the emergence and significance of 'new' and rising powers. Daniel Flemes's 15-chapter edited volume examines this power problem from a strictly *regional* perspective, concerning itself with the 'foreign policies of regional powers'. Amrita Narlikar's slim and readable book is about the 'new kids' on the *global* power block. Flemes's list of actual or aspiring regional powers—eight in total—is quite long: Brazil, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, South Africa and Venezuela, but includes Narlikar's neat new power trio: India, Brazil and China. This fact, in itself, leaves one wondering where to draw the line between regional and global powers and which type of classification is most useful. Though this question remains largely unresolved, both books, in concerning themselves with the ideas, interests and strategies of rising states, offer valuable insights and novel perspectives on contemporary questions of power, leadership and negotiating behaviour.

If discussions of power and leadership are scarcely new, it is true that they have rarely been approached from a regional perspective. The first section of the Flemes volume advances a theoretical and conceptual framework for thinking about regional power. There are strong chapters by Douglas Lemke and Dirk Nabers offering contrasting positions on measuring and assessing power, leadership and hegemony. Lemke, building on his earlier work, looks at the hard power or material capabilities of regional powers. The chapter by Nabers offers a thoughtful account of how leadership and hegemony may be exercised in different regional settings, drawing on the three-dimensional perspective of power offered

by Steven Lukes. The last chapter in this section makes the interesting case for treating India, Brazil and South Africa as a distinctive 'revisionist' category of regional power.

The following three sections of the volume are dedicated to considering how strategies, ideas and domestic considerations impact on the foreign policy-making of different regional powers. Though there is necessarily some overlap here, the different chapters offer a variety of distinctive contributions to the overarching questions that inform the volume. They also show how much the leadership credentials of different states vary. Brazil, for example, practises 'middlepowermanship', yet is ultimately not convincing as either a regional or global player; India seems to self-consciously eschew a dominant regional foreign policy role except through extension of its global policy; South Africa, by contrast, has developed a strong regional policy at different levels in which the concept of responsible power is combined with that of 'southern power', emphasizing the new leadership agenda of a number of developing countries.

If major differences can be discerned between the three regional powers described above, making difficult any one size fits all definition, the gap opens further if we incorporate a wider circle. Indeed, it is not immediately apparent where countries like Iran, Venezuela or Israel qualify in the regional leadership stakes. Their denomination as regional powers or leaders tends to come not from within their respective regions, but from without, and reflects the hopes (in the case of Israel) and fears (in the cases of Iran and Venezuela) of major external (mostly western) powers regarding regional stability. Hence, if it is at all meaningful to speak of a regional model of leadership—and the jury is arguably still out on this question—care needs to be exercised in applying and explaining the label 'regional power' and in considering its many possible faces.

Avoiding the use of the term 'regional' and focusing instead on three 'new' powers, Amrita Narlikar's volume covers some parallel ground. The purpose, however, in tracking the behaviour of new powers is to better understand and 'manage them', as the book's subtitle suggests. Indeed, hers is a persuasive account of why we should take time to study and understand the negotiating strategies of these powers. Doing so, Narlikar argues, could help to reduce uncertainty and misunderstanding about their intentions and thus also the risk of conflict. There is a clear message for policy-makers here. The four variables invoked to help analyse and conceptualize negotiating behaviour, strategy, coalition-building, framing and leadership, are quite similar to those used in Flemes's volume, though the purpose is different. It is not to measure or model leadership as such, but to test different hypotheses of negotiation behaviour and ultimately to plot states' policies on a conformist–revisionist spectrum. This plotting helps to show both how they can optimize their own bargaining power and, importantly, how to reduce the damaging international fall-out produced by uncertainty about new power behaviour. Colourful metaphors like 'tall poppies' and 'doormats' illustrate the particular weaknesses (and possible strengths) of India and Brazil in their negotiating stances. China, the obvious leader in the rising power stakes, offers some interesting lessons.

Narlikar is right in noting that new and rising powers both historically and at present have represented a source of instability in the international system. She is also right, of course, that the management of new powers by the older, more established powers is a major contemporary concern. But how long will the management committee of international society be comprised of these 'old powers'? What neither book really embraces, at least not fully, is the concept of a world designed not around the principles of the established powers, but around a set of principles framed also by the new, the emerging, the regional powers that the authors describe. One of the final chapters in the Flemes volume—

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in reference to Europe—warns of the dangers of narcissism. It is increasingly incumbent on the older western powers to imagine and prepare for a world in which they no longer call all the shots. This is not just a question of managing new powers, but accepting and adjusting to their own diminished roles. Whatever changes the new balance of power may bring about as we move further into the twenty-first century, it is increasingly clear that international relations will be managed on rather different lines from those that prevailed in the twentieth.

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Conflict, security and defence*

The worst-kept secret: Israel's bargain with the bomb. By Avner Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press. 2010. 370pp. Index. £19.50. ISBN 978 0 23113 698 3.

It is believed that Israel acquired the ability to deploy nuclear weapons in the second half of the 1960s, approximately a decade after the technology transfer agreement with France in 1956 that accompanied the Suez escapade. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations tried but failed to dissuade the Israeli government from acquiring the weapons. In September 1969, Richard Nixon and Golda Meir met at the White House and struck a 'bargain' that has lasted to this day. Although its details have not been fully revealed, it is understood that Israel agreed not to announce its possession of nuclear weapons, whether through testing or formal declaration, and henceforth to reveal no information on its nuclear policies or capabilities. The United States, for its part, agreed to make an exception of Israel in its non-proliferation policies. It would turn a blind eye to Israeli nuclear activity, end the pressure to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and remove the conditions previously attached to arms sales and other transactions.

Thus was born the policy of opacity, a term coined by Avner Cohen and described in his influential book, *Israel and the bomb*, which appeared in 1998 (Columbia University Press). He prefers to call it *amimut* in this sequel, a Hebrew word for opacity or ambiguity that encompasses 'the taboo-like social aspects of Israel's prohibitions and restraints in connection with its nuclear weapons' as well as the policy itself. Besides filling out the history and giving it more nuances, Cohen now provides an impressive critique of *amimut* and its consequences for Israeli political culture, foreign relations and increasingly its security.

This critique has two main strands. First, *amimut* offends against Israel's democratic tradition. The Israeli people have been denied, and have themselves conceded, the right to be informed about a vital aspect of their country's security policy and practice. There can be neither public scrutiny nor debate amidst strict censorship enforced by the Office of the Military Censor ('Censora'). Furthermore, a large area of activity has been placed outside the reach of Israeli law. This raises significant questions about the quality of governance of Israel's nuclear institutions and assets, and acclimatizes Israelis to a culture of secrecy and decision-making by unaccountable cliques. Second, *amimut* 'has become a political fiction empty of content ... [and] prevents Israel from being included as a major stakeholder in today's nuclear community'. Everyone knows that Israel has a sophisticated nuclear force, yet *amimut* prevents it from engaging in meaningful dialogue, let alone negotiation, with other states on nuclear issues. It is constantly forced into denial and negativity and cannot actively shape the international debate inside or outside its region. The blanket refusal to

* See also Priyanjali Malik, *India's nuclear debate: exceptionalism and the bomb*, pp. 504–5.