GIGA and ESIWA Workshop

"Geopolitics, militarisation and risk - a new case for Confidence Building Measures in the Indo-Pacific"

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Workshop Report

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Abbreviations

ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting
ADMM+	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
COC	Code of Conduct
CRIMARIO	Critical Maritime Routes in the Indo-Pacific
CSBMs	Confidence and Security Building Measures
DGAP	German Council on Foreign Relations
ESIWA	Enhancing Security in and with Asia
EU	European Union
GIGA	German Institute for Global and Area Studies
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IORIS	Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing
IPMDA	Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
Quad	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
SCS	South China Sea
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	United States
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is the theatre of growing geopolitical tensions, increasing competition between states, and an unprecedented militarization and arms build-up across countries. New technological developments fuel these dynamics and add to a climate of distrust, a lack of transparency, and increase the risk of miscommunication and misunderstanding and therefore, conflict. At the same time, existing multilateral fora have a rather disappointing track-record in aiming to reduce these risks, and it remains unclear what role new regional partnerships will play in this. Given this deteriorating security environment, Indo-Pacific countries, but also countries from outside the region, are challenged with investing in existing and developing new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to effectively mitigate those risks and ensure a free, open, and stable Indo-Pacific. CBMs are defined as "arrangements designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create."[1]

Against this backdrop, on 27-28 November 2023, the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and the Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) Project, as co-organizers, held a two half-day hybrid workshop in a track 1.5 mode, titled "Geopolitics, militarisation and risk – a new case for Confidence Building Measures in the Indo-Pacific" in Berlin and online. Selected expert individuals, including researchers and government officials from countries in Europe, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, exchanged ideas and discussed under the Chatham House Rule the risks of emerging technologies as they relate to geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the effectiveness of CBMs in the region and scope for the European Union (EU) and Germany to contribute to developing or enhancing CBMs.

The discussions followed up on the inaugural workshop held on 20 April 2023, co-organized by GIGA, the German Federal Foreign Office and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on "Asia and the Indo-Pacific – The theatre of growing conflicts in the 21st century? Changing geopolitics, risks and possible mitigating Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)." Bringing together German and European experts, the workshop mapped flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region, including on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea (SCS) and in the China-India border region, and identified an increased risk of escalation due to misunderstandings and accidents. Despite a variety of institutions and CBMs on the

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[1] Johan Jorgen Holst (1983), Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework, Survival, 25 (1), pp 2-15, here p 2.

multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral level, it was concluded that the region is lacking effective CBMs to mitigate those risks.

Experts drew on these observations and discussed in four sessions the impact of military modernization, CBM regimes that respond to the dangers of emerging military technologies, the effectiveness of existing fora and scope for European contributions, and recommendations for future engagement.

The impact of military modernization, including new arms technologies, on Indo-Pacific stability

In the first session, the speakers set the scene for the workshop by highlighting areas most significantly affected by the emergence of new arms technologies, including non-proliferation, maritime territorial disputes, and information manipulation. Referring to the location of the conference venue at the former inner-German border (Berlin Wall), a major flashpoint of the Cold War, one speaker noted that flashpoints today are located in the Indo-Pacific, first and foremost in the SCS and the Taiwan Strait.

One speaker introduced a war-gaming scenario of a Taiwan Strait contingency that was conducted in the aftermath of the large-scale Chinese military exercises in reaction to US speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Sharing the results of the war-gaming exercise, the speaker emphasized the critical role that submarine forces will play in a contingency. However, the speaker pointed out the high likelihood of a deadlocked situation. The speaker concluded that in a Taiwan Strait contingency, there would be no winners and therefore, the importance of CBMs remains very high. According to the speaker, Japan, which would be greatly impacted by a Taiwan Strait contingency, prepares for such a scenario, among other things, by enhancing its defense along the Southwestern Island chain, by increasing its air and naval forces including submarines and air defense capabilities. Given the increasing lack of manpower due to demographic changes, Japan is also introducing more unmanned systems.

Another speaker identified six key weapon systems that have the potential to unleash an interactive arms-build up between the United States (US) and China and trigger a major conflict: namely missile deployment and missile defense systems, hypersonic missiles, underwater competition, drone warfare, cyber warfare, and control of the cognitive domain.[2]

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[2] The control of the cognitive domain refers to a state's ability to control information and influence the human psychological and cognitive domains in a targeted state. China engages in these influence operations to spread

While China had invested heavily in all these areas, the US, in response, is upgrading its own capabilities, including through enhancing its missile defence systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), further developing multi-demand application for hypersonics, and by installing the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). The speaker noted the parallelism of the technologies of the so-called 4th Industrial Revolution with those of the 2nd Industrial Revolution in the late 19th century, ultimately culminating in the First World War. The speaker indicated, however, that the deployment of these technologies had not yet reached the level of an arms-race, and thus avoided the term.

One speaker asserted that several emerging technologies, such as AI, machine learning, and 3D-printing of weapons, are used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance, and might change the military dynamics of balance in the region. Aside from Sino-US competition, the speaker made mention of the emergence of asymmetric competition in the region, that is, between countries with extensive military capabilities and middle- and small powers that can not cope with these developments. The speaker mentioned the asymmetric competition between India and Pakistan as an example. Such competition, the speaker concluded, adds to more unpredictable and unstable situations in the region. With reference to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the speaker observed three trends that are ultimately impacting security in the Indo-Pacific region. First, whereas conventional and nuclear capabilities were previously used for the purpose of deterrence only, some countries now deploy them to build battlefield capabilities. Therefore, the speaker identified a lowered level of the use of violence by some countries. Second, the speaker asserted a new focus on information systems, which will be crucial for countries to build effective defense and deterrence. Third, the speaker also noted that countries are increasingly reluctant to be open about their plans and developments and that it has become more difficult to achieve transparency allowing to build confidence.

Noting this wide array of security risks in the region but highlighting the growing assertiveness by China as the major challenge, another presenter displayed three key features to be considered when trying to work out effective CBMs for the Indo-Pacific. First, further polarization and bloc-building should be avoided; instead, the speaker emphasized the need to uphold an equi-distance between the US and China. Second, critical dependencies should be reduced, and

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its narratives and counter the perceived attempt by the West to enforce its universal values, see Renato De Castro (2023), Interactive Arms Build-Up and Modernizations Amidst Great Powers' Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region, Workshop Paper, p. 9.

efforts increased that focus on building the resilience of regional countries. Therefore, the speaker pointed out the importance of building not only partnerships addressing hard-security issues, but also to engage in soft-security initiatives. In this regard, the speaker highlighted maritime security, including the fight against piracy and illegal fishing, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) as two key areas for cooperation. The speaker mentioned the EU's maritime capacity building initiative Critical Maritime Routes in the Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) and the HA/DR joint training exercise Southern Cross as successful activities. Finally, the speaker emphasized the need to consolidate and support regional multilateral fora. Although the potential contribution of minilateral formats – *"cooperative relations that usually involve between three and nine countries, and are relatively exclusive, flexible and functional in nature"*[3] – to security-building in the Indo-Pacific was acknowledged, the speaker held that engagement with the region should follow a pragmatic approach. While participation in such mechanisms should be sought where possible, the building of an anti-China coalition should be avoided, and regional countries should not be forced into choosing sides between Beijing and Washington. Instead, the focus should remain on the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its security architecture, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM +), and on regional frameworks such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Minilateralism, according to the speaker, poses a risk of undermining these existing multilateral fora.

In the subsequent discussion, the role of minilateral formats was under further debate. One participant, referring to the criticism of minilaterals, raised the question of whether minilateralism was not actually a positive development, and used the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) as an example, initiated by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between the US, Australia, Japan, and India. Introducing the term "institutional polygamy", another participant referred to a multitude of parallel initiatives on maritime domain awareness and information-sharing, such as the IPMDA and the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing (IORIS) platform introduced by the EU. The participant highlighted the need to cooperate with all different formats, but only if interoperability and complementarity of the mechanisms are ensured. Another participant noted that more minilateral action is likely to unfold in the Indo-Pacific, as ASEAN-led fora are mere "talking

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[3] Singh, Bhubhindar; Teo, Sarah (Eds.) (2020), Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN. 1st ed.: Routledge, p 2.

shops" unable to solve problems and minilaterals are viewed as providing solutions in a deteriorating security environment.

Discussing the narrative of an "Asian NATO", it was asserted that a NATO-like system in the Indo-Pacific is neither desired nor possible, and that a NATO-expansion into the region should be avoided to prevent further escalation between the US and China. One participant noted that despite the absence of such a system, a variety of bilateral security partnerships (e.g., between the US and the Philippines, the US and Japan, and between South Korea and Japan) contributed to a more networked US-alliance system in the region, and a diversification of defence-relations, including among middle- and small powers, was observed by the workshop participants. This, as one participant noted, was a development triggered by the Russian war of aggression.

Further discussion focused on Sino-Russian security cooperation. Joint Sino-Russian military exercises, including in the East China Sea, were identified as a worrisome trend. Finally, the possibility of a nuclear dimension in a Taiwan contingency was debated. Although the likelihood of a nuclear escalation was assumed to be very low due to the high precision of Chinese conventional ballistic missiles observed in the above war-gaming scenario, a nuclear strike by China in response to a failed invasion of Taiwan was described as a "nightmare scenario".

In conclusion, it was asserted that emerging technologies are potentially contributing to deteriorating stability in the Indo-Pacific, and that these developments fuel existing competition and further militarization across the region.

CBM regimes that respond to the dangers of emerging military technologies: transparency as a means to build confidence and reduce tensions

The second session of the workshop was concerned with CBM regimes as they relate to the dangers of new military technologies, and whether transparency can be achieved. It was noted that there had never been a strong arms control regime in the Indo-Pacific, and that to some countries in the region, increased transparency actually adversely affects the building of trust.

One speaker focused on the maritime sphere and observed a new normalization of unsafe, unprofessional, and potentially dangerous conduct on and above the seas of Asia. The speaker addressed China's reckless behavior and its attempt to territorialize the seas, thereby

undermining the rules-based international order under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its credibility as a responsible maritime stakeholder. The speaker noted that naval incidents are also increasingly likely to involve non-military or coast-guard vessels. The speaker warned that this blurring of civil and military responsibilities at sea creates further problems for achieving transparency. Overall, the risk of miscommunication and misperception is rising. The speaker then went on to highlight three minilateral developments that have the potential to contribute to stability and transparency-building in the region. First, the Quad, in its effort to provide public goods, including maritime domain awareness, was mentioned as an initiative that aims to make the seas more transparent in support of the rules-based international order. However, the speaker noted that the Quad, consisting of like-minded countries, had a credibility-problem in the region and was viewed by many as an exclusionary club and an anti-China coalition. Although the Quad used emerging technologies such as satellite technology to provide countries with real-time data, the speaker held that several questions remained. For example, Quad states are resistant to sharing this data with China, and access to data might be limited to a few states only. Furthermore, it is not yet clear how and if the surveillance data could be weaponized. Nevertheless, the speaker noted that the Quad might have a positive role to play in providing states with sovereign resilience and enhance their capabilities. Second, the speaker mentioned AUKUS, a security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US, as a mechanism with the potential to contribute to stability in the region.[4] However, the speaker noted that a lack of diplomacy around AUKUS was problematic (both domestically and internationally), and that many countries are concerned about the negative implications for regional transparency and nuclear proliferation. Third, the speaker mentioned a potential Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS to be negotiated between ASEAN and China. The speaker noted that the COC could create a new set of regional rules that don't accord with the rules under UNCLOS. The speaker concluded that all these mechanisms are designed to exclude either China (in the case of the Quad and AUKUS) or the US (in the case of the COC), and that effective CBMs need to be inclusive and bridge the gap between competitors. Therefore, the speaker highlighted the important role of regional middle and small powers in this.

Another speaker highlighted the importance of human communication to build transparency. To prevent conflict and reduce potentially dangerous situations, the understanding of other parties needed to be enhanced. The speaker also noted, however, that just because CBM-

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[4] Under the partnership, the UK and US will share nuclear propulsion technology with Australia, and the latter will acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines from the UK.

frameworks exist between countries, they do not necessarily trust each other. The speaker named Japan and China as an example: although there are some mechanisms in place between the two countries, a different understanding of what transparency means makes it difficult to achieve effective CBMs. Transparency for China, the speaker went on, means that the other side accepts Chinese claims. However, as the speaker noted, sharing similar values does not automatically translate into trust. The speaker named relations between Japan and Taiwan as an example: although both countries are strong democracies, have close security ties with the US, and face China's coercive measures as their greatest security threat, the Japanese and Taiwanese defence forces know almost nothing about each other, and a lack of communication would hinder effective cooperation in a potential Taiwan contingency. The reason for this, the speaker noted, was China opposing any official or military exchanges between the two countries.

On CBMs in Southeast Asia, one speaker asserted that technological advancements are a major factor in countries' economic development. Emerging technologies, including dual-use technologies, thus contribute to the well-functioning of developing countries, the independence of the nation-state, and are essential for economic growth. Consequently, efforts to regulate, monitor and control the acquisition of new technologies might be seen by some as potential restrictions or even intrusions upon their sovereignty. Therefore, the speaker noted, CBMs on new technologies must not only address the potential for misunderstanding between competing states, but also how the CBMs themselves will be perceived. Within ASEAN, drone- and cyber-technology, as well as AI, are relatively inexpensive to acquire and offer great economic opportunities, but also entail risks when applied militarily. Therefore, the development of CBMs is necessary. The speaker identified the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) as appropriate fora for addressing new technologies and building transparency, mutual trust, and confidence. States could use these to inform others on their use, to promote understanding and allow other states to make their own informed assessments. The speaker noted that these fora are also open for extra-regional stakeholders, such as the EU, to share information.

In the subsequent discussion, some participants raised the question of how effective ASEAN-led fora can be given that they follow a consensus-based approach. One participant noted that ASEAN fora, including the ARF, are not necessarily about solving problems, but about process-building and building relationships, and that many ideas on CBMs are not initiated by governments, but stem from track-2-consultations. Therefore, further discussions needed to be held, including at this level. On the question of potential EU-engagement, it was asserted that

home-grown fora are preferable, but that the EU should participate in existing mechanisms. Finally, some participants expressed their doubts on whether it will be possible to include China in meaningful CBMs, given its reluctance to be transparent and the different understandings of what transparency means.

<u>Evaluating the effectiveness of existing fora and CBM regimes in the region and how they cope with new technologies. Is there scope for European contributions?</u>

In the third session, participants further evaluated the effectiveness of existing fora and CBM regimes and debated the scope for European contributions.

One speaker introduced a typology of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs)[5] and differentiated between declaratory, transparency, and constraint measures.[6] Declaratory measures, which are usually non-binding in nature, are the easiest to negotiate, and include instruments such as non-aggression pacts. While they are not necessarily useless, they are not sufficient on their own. Transparency measures, such as the Shangri-La dialogue, the ARF, or the ADMM+, are widely known. However, the variety of actors, particularly in the maritime sphere, makes it difficult to find consensus. Finally, constraint measures, the most intrusive of all CSBMs, are the hardest to negotiate and implement, if not entirely impossible, *"due to specific restrictions placed on personnel, equipment and activities that may clash with countries' own preferences and priorities."*[7] The speaker then identified four key obstacles when it comes to the proliferation of new and the deepening of existing CSBMs in Southeast Asia. First, so far, the focus in the region had been on practical security cooperation against common challenges, and CSBMs had only been of secondary concern. Second, when interstate conflicts arise, ASEAN states prefer to turn to international bodies for problem solving. However, extra-regional actors may not be willing to arbitrate the disputes as they want to avoid international involvement. Third, regional countries view CSBMs as inhibiting their freedom in national defence planning and armament. Fourth, Southeast Asian CSBMs tend to adopt a "building bloc"-approach. Furthermore, extra-regional players might not be willing to subscribe to ASEAN-led initiatives. Despite these challenges, the speaker saw some promise in

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[5] The term was used to differentiate CSBMs from CBMs, which, according to the speaker, largely refer to transparency measures.
[6] For a complete typology, see Collin Koh (2023), Frozen in Time? Confidence and Security Building Measures in Southeast Asia, Workshop Paper.
[7] Ibid., p 4.

developments outside of ASEAN. For instance, intra-ASEAN mechanisms might prove more effective, e.g., smaller COC negotiated between interested ASEAN parties.

Another speaker focused on China's views on CBMs and explained why it proves so difficult to negotiate with China. Providing some historical background, the speaker observed that China seems to be more willing to engage in CBMs when it perceives an asymmetry of power, that is, when it considers itself to be in a vulnerable position. For instance, China, which had previously been only marginally involved in implementing CBMs, changed its attitude with the end of the Cold War. Worried about an outbreak of conflict, China, focused entirely on its economic development at the time, tried to reduce tensions and improve relations with the Soviet Union. However, since the 1990ies and its relative rise in terms of military and economic power, China has an increased perception of its own strength and is less willing to engage in such mechanisms. Instead, it has developed its own CBM-discourse and set conditions under which it is willing to cooperate. For example, the other party must accept China's basic positions, and on territorial issues in particular. Furthermore, aiming to achieve an asymmetry favoring China, it prioritizes measures with an economic dimension, but rejects military-only measures. CBMs for China, according to the speaker, could be the lifting of economic sanctions, the rejection of decoupling, or the abandonment of the "China-threat"-narrative. However, China would be unwilling to accept any restraint on issues of sovereignty, particularly in the SCS. The ASEAN-model, emphasizing peaceful coexistence and non-interference into internal affairs, therefore, allows China to participate in dialogues while buying time to increase its strategic advantage. China remains reluctant to be transparent. The publishing of defence white papers and its military budget, the speaker held, are merely a strategy by China to impress its adversaries. However, when it comes to its nuclear and ballistic capabilities, China refuses transparency. In conclusion, the speaker asserted that for the time-being, meaningful cooperation with China on CBMs seems not very likely. Nevertheless, the speaker noted that China might show greater CBM-engagement should its (economic) position be weakened in the future.

In the same vein, a third speaker held that China could be pressured into increasing its willingness to cooperate through the proliferation of "mirror minilateralism." The term refers to *"parallel minilaterals possessing three key features: (1) pursuit of highly similar CBM agendas, (2) involvement of the middle powers of the region, of single ASEAN states, of the EU and the UK, in flexible configurations, and (3) avoidance of US and Chinese shared*

membership."[8] The speaker observed a stalling of ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the ARF, which had been unable to respond to growing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. Moreover, discord within ASEAN, e.g., over the civil war in Myanmar, as well as the continued hedging of ASEAN members between the US and China, contributed to a "de-centering" of ASEAN as external stakeholders increasingly circumvent regional mechanisms. Given the ineffectiveness of ASEAN-led mechanisms, mirror minilateralism might provide a "way out". The consolidation of US-led minilaterals could push Beijing to interact more effectively with US-allies such as Japan and Australia as it would try to create wedges between the partners. Middle powers, the speaker noted, would then act as a connective tissue between US-led minilaterals on the one hand and minilaterals with China that exclude the US (such as the China-Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation) on the other hand. This would eventually open the room for further engagement, including by the EU, France, or Germany. Mirror minilateralism, therefore, could lead to a constructive CBM agenda without shared membership between the US and China, and thus overcome the current deadlock.

Discussing the concept of mirror minilateralism further, some participants questioned the willingness of countries, and China in particular, to cooperate in such mechanisms. It was noted that entering into a minilateral format with China might not be in the interest of some countries, including Australia.

Another participant clarified that the reason the ARF is not working was not because of Chinese resistance to it, but because China was buying into it. The participant also warned that the ARF and ASEAN should not be conflated, and that discord over how to handle the crisis in Myanmar or a COC are separate from the ARF. The participant also doubted that CBMs among like-minded minilaterals would be needed, and asserted that instead, CBMs between minilaterals (such as the Quad) and China should be sought. Another participant emphasized that it might not be useful to be overly ambitious when it comes to CBMs. Instead of creating new measures, the focus should be on deepening existing institutions. While it can be fruitful to have parallel institutions, the participant noted that there might be more promise in bilateral initiatives.

On European engagement, participants discussed whether lessons on CBMs from Europe could be applied to the Indo-Pacific. It was noted that differences in strategic culture and types of weapons (land based as opposed to primarily naval) made it difficult to apply CBMs to the region that work well in Europe. Several participants also agreed that the EU should not be in

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[8] Aurelio Insisa (2023), Mirror Minilateralism: Extra-ASEAN Fora for Confidence-Building Measures in the Indo-Pacific, Workshop Paper, p 1.

the "driving seat" when it comes to implementing CBMs in the Indo-Pacific, but that signaling commitment to the region remains important. One participant noted that some ASEAN leaders might resist a stronger EU-role, as they perceive it to be unable to solve problems at home. Finally, the discussion revolved around the question whether the EU could truly play the role of a neutral actor in the region, given that the EU sides with the US in the ongoing competition between the US and China.

<u>Looking ahead and recommendations</u>

The final session of the workshop was concerned with discussing the way ahead and making recommendations for future CBM-engagement. Government representatives from Germany, France, Italy, and Indonesia shared their respective national perspectives. There was agreement on the continued relevance of the Indo-Pacific region, and that the EU and European member states must further step up their engagement. A government representative from Indonesia reaffirmed that ASEAN opens the door to everyone who respects International Law, and that the EU should act as a net contributor for peace. The following recommendations for EU-contributions were made: The EU should

- ➢ continue its commitment to and presence in the region and increase the visibility of EU-initiatives such as the Global-Gateway Initiative,
- ➢ increase capacity-building activities and information sharing,
- ➢ send strong messages in support of UNCLOS and support regional countries in ensuring peace and freedom of navigation and overflight, follow a humble approach to the region, act in an inclusive manner and learn from regional countries to bridge the trust gap,
- ➢ work toward a coordinated maritime presence,
- ➢ continue and strengthen dialogue to foster mutual understanding, including on the track-1.5 and track-2 level.

Several Workshop participants have submitted working papers for the Conference, as listed below. They will be made public together with this report:

Aurelio Insisa (2023), Mirror Minilateralism: Extra-ASEAN For a for Confidence-Building Measures in the Indo-Pacific, Workshop Paper

Collin Koh Swee Lean (2023), Frozen in Time? Confidence and Security Building Measures in Southeast Asia, Workshop Paper

Jai Galliot (2023), Australia's Foray into Unmanned, Missile and Nuclear Systems and the Operative, Technical and Security Risks, Workshop Paper

Jay Batongbacal (2023), CBMs and New Technologies in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific, Workshop Paper

Katsuya Yamamoto (2023), CBM Regimes that Respond to the Dangers of Emerging Military Technologies: Transparency as a Means to Build Confidence and Reduce Tensions, Workshop Paper

Petr Topychkanov (2023), Military Modernization and the Impact on Stability in the Indo-Pacific, Workshop Paper

Renato De Castro (2023), Interactive Arms Build-Up and Modernization Amidst Great Powers' Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region, Workshop Paper